The Nature and Value of Knowledge Three Investigations

by Pritchard, Duncan; Millar, Alan; Haddock, Adrian

• ISBN13: 9780199586264
• ISBN10: 0199586268
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-07-29
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critica

Author Biography

Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since t 971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action.

Table of Contents

Knowledge And Understanding Analytical Table Of Contents	p. 3
The Value Problem for Knowledge	p. 5
The Value Problem	p. 5
Unpacking the Value Problem	p. 5
The Swamping Problem	p. 8
Fundamental and Non-fundamental Epistemic Goods	p. 11
The Relevance of Epistemic Value Monism	p. 13
Responding to the Swamping Problem I: The Practical Response	p. 16
Responding to the Swamping Problem II: The Monistic Response	p. 18
Responding to the Swamping Problem III: The Pluralist Response	p. 20
Concluding Remarks	p. 23
Knowledge and Final Value	p. 25
Introduction	p. 25
Robust Virtue Epistemology	p. 25
Knowledge and Achievement	p. 28
Interlude: Is Robust Virtue Epistemology a Reductive Theory of Knowledge?	p. 33
Achievement without Knowledge	p. 34
Knowledge without Achievement	p. 40
Back to the Value Problem	p. 44
Concluding Remarks	p. 46
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology	p. 48
Introduction	p. 48
Contra Virtue Epistemology	p. 48
Two Master Intuitions about Knowledge	p. 51
Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology	p. 54
Interlude: Is Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology a Reductive Theory of Knowledge?	p. 58
Diagnosing the Structure of Knowledge	p. 59
Back to the Value Problem	p. 62
Concluding Remarks	p. 65
Understanding	p. 66
Introduction	p. 66
The Final Value of Achievements	p. 66
Understanding	p. 73
Understanding and Epistemic Luck	p. 77
Understanding and Cognitive Achievement	p. 80
Back to the Value Problem	p. 83
Two Potential Implications of the Distinctive Value of Understanding Thesis	p. 84
Concluding Remarks	p. 86
Knowledge And Recognition Analytical Table Of Contents	p. 91
Knowledge in Recent Epistemology: Some Problems	p. 97
Introduction	p. 97
The Traditional Analytical Project and the Central Tension	p. 99
Knowledge, Evidence, and Reasons	p. 110
Concepts versus Phenomena	p. 115
The Way Ahead	p. 118
Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities	p. 120
Introduction	p. 120
Perceptual-recognitional Abilities	p. 124
Broad and Narrow Competence	p. 128
Avoiding Reduction	p. 133
Perceptual Knowledge and Justified Belief	p. 137
Closure and Doxastic Responsibility	p. 140
Knowledge from Indicators	p. 144
Introduction	p. 144
Knowledge from Indicators	p. 149
Recognitional Abilities Again	p. 151
Detached Standing Knowledge	p. 155
Back to Knowledge from Indicators	p. 159
Taking Stock	p. 162
The Social Transmission of Knowledge	p. 164
Why Knowledge Matters	p. 164
Approaching the Epistemology of Testimony	p. 169
Telling and Informing	p. 177
Acquiring True Beliefs and Acquiring Knowledge through being Told	p. 179
Access to Facts about Knowledge	p. 186
Knowledge And Action Analytical Table Of Contents	p. 191
Knowledge and Justification	p. 195
Introductory Remarks	p. 195
The Modest Route	p. 198
Fool's Knowledge	p. 202
The Distinctive Value of Knowledge	p. 204
Fool's Justification	p. 210
Arguing from Illusion	p. 212
The Regress of Justifications	p. 214
Concluding Remarks	p. 217
Second-Order Knowledge	p. 219
Introductory Remarks	p. 219
Transparency and Knowledge	p. 220
Transparency and Entitlement	p. 223
On Trying to do without Transparency	p. 226
Transparency and Luminosity	p. 228
Non-sensible Knowledge	p. 233
Self-knowledge	p. 236
Concluding Remarks	p. 239
Knowledge of Action	p. 241
Introductory Remarks	p. 241
Non-sensible Knowledge of Action	p. 242
The Two Dimensions	p. 245
The Distinctive Value of Knowledge of Action	p. 248
Non-observational Knowledge	p. 250
Practical Knowledge and Intention	p. 253
Ptactical Knowledge and Direction of Fit	p. 256
Concluding Remarks	p. 259
Bibliography	p. 261
Index	p. 271
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