New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas

by Biel, Anders; Eek, Daniel; Garling, Tommy; Gustafsson, Mathias

• ISBN13: 9780387725956
• ISBN10: 0387725954
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2008-01-01
• Publisher: Springer Verlag

Summary

This edited volume has been compiled to present the latest developments in the field of social dilemma research. Social dilemmas are situations when there is a conflict between self-interest and collective interest. Research in this area has gained interest in the last twenty years in disciplines such as sociology, psychology, and economics. It also has wide applications to numerous real-world issues such as environmental degradation, organizational management, and societal public good. The main aim of this work was to investigate under what circumstances people make decisions that are inline with the collective interest as well as investigating what can increase the likelihood of cooperation. There will be three man sections mirroring the different levels of analysis: individual, group, and societal.

Table of Contents

The Conceptual Framework of Social Dilemmas	p. 1
Introduction	p. 1
New Issues	p. 2
The Individual	p. 2
The Group	p. 2
Society	p. 5
New Paradigms	p. 6
A Theoretical Framework	p. 7
A New Look at the Theory of Social Value Orientations: Prosocials Neither Maximize Joint Outcome nor Minimize Outcome Differences but Prefer Equal Outcomes	p. 10
Introduction	p. 10
Theories of Social Value Orientations	p. 11
An Alternative Equality Hypothesis	p. 12
Empirical Evidence in Support of the Equality Hypothesis	p. 13
Do Prosocials Maximize Joint Outcomes?	p. 13
Do Prosocials Minimize the Differences in Outcomes?	p. 17
Moderating Factors	p. 21
Discussion and Conclusions	p. 23
A Classification of Games by Player Type	p. 27
Introduction	p. 27
U-U vs. I-I: The "Discontinuity Effect"	p. 28
Summary	p. 30
G-G vs. G: Intergroup vs. Single-Group Games	p. 31
The Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) Game	p. 31
Summary	p. 33
G-G vs. I-I: Intergroup vs. Inter-Individual Gaines	p. 34
The Game of Chicken	p. 34
Price Competition	p. 35
Summary	p. 36
Competition Between Different Types of Players	p. 37
Summary	p. 38
Concluding Comments	p. 38
How Do We React to Feedback in Social Dilemmas?	p. 43
How Do We React to Feedback in Social Dilemmas?	p. 43
Explicit Feedback	p. 44
Effects on Cooperation	p. 44
Collective Failure Does Not Always Lead to Defection	p. 46
Feedback, Ostracism, and Exit	p. 48
Emotional Reactions to Feedback	p. 48
Feedback and Structural Solutions	p. 49
Implicit Feedback	p. 51
The Case of Sanctioning Systems	p. 51
Implicit Feedback: The Case of Emotions	p. 52
Conclusion	p. 53
Group-Based Trust in Social Dilemmas	p. 57
Introduction	p. 57
Previous Research on Group-Based Trust	p. 59
Unilateral Trust in an Ingroup Member	p. 60
Trust when the Situation is Interdependent	p. 61
Overview of the Design	p. 63
Procedure	p. 63
Results	p. 65
Discussion	p. 68
Promoting Cooperation in Social Dilemmas via Fairness Norms and Group Goals	p. 72
Introduction	p. 72
Distributive Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas	p. 73
Resource Dilemmas and Fairness	p. 74
Public-Good Dilemmas and Fairness	p. 75
Comparing Fairness Conceptions in Resource and Public-Good Dilemmas	p. 75
Explaining the Importance of Fairness in Social Dilemmas	p. 76
Fairness Norms and Group Goals in Social Decision Making	p. 77
Preferences for Public-Good Allocations	p. 79
Promoting Unselfish Public-Good Allocations via Group Goals and Distributive Fairness	p. 80
Fairness Mediates the Effects of Group Goal on Public-Good Allocations	p. 82
Generalizing Effects of the Group Goal on Profit Allocations to Cost Allocations	p. 84
Discussion and Conclusions	p. 85
Extensions and Implications	p. 86
A Note on the Public-Good Dilemma Paradigm	p. 87
Bringing Back Leviathan into Social Dilemmas	p. 93
Introduction	p. 93
The Structural Approach to Solving Social Dilemmas	p. 95
Research on Sanctions and Sanctioning Behavior	p. 97
Altruistic Punishment	p. 99
Motivations Behind Sanctions	p. 101
Group Size	p. 104
Punishments and Rewards	p. 106
Social Sanctions	p. 109
Net Benefits of Sanctions	p. 110
Future Directions	p. 111
The Dark Side of Sanctions	p. 112
Social Value Orientations	p. 113
Ingroup, Outgroup, and Sanctions	p. 114
Direct and Indirect Effects of Sanctions	p. 115
Effectiveness of Coercive and Voluntary Institutional Solutions to Social Dilemmas	p. 124
Introduction	p. 124
Method	p. 131
Participants	p. 131
Experimental Conditions	p. 131
Procedure	p. 131
Results	p. 133
Non-Coercive Authority	p. 133
Moderately Coercive Authority	p. 134
Exploitative Authority	p. 134
Dominating Authority	p. 135
Summary	p. 136
Discussion	p. 138
A Recursive Model for Changing Justice Concerns in Social Dilemmas	p. 142
Justice Concerns in Social Dilemmas	p. 143
Distributive Justice Concerns	p. 144
"Triggers" for Change	p. 145
Procedural Justice Concerns	p. 145
Increasing Distributive Satisfaction	p. 146
Reducing the Uncertainty	p. 146
Engaging the Group Members	p. 147
Introducing Specific Allocation Solutions and Possible Sanctions	p. 147
Reactions to Violations: Restorative and Retributive Justice	p. 150
Restorative Justice	p. 152
Retributive Justice	p. 153
When Restoration and Retribution "Miss the Mark"	p. 155
Implications of the Recursive Model for Understanding Decisions in Social Dilemmas	p. 156
The Emergence of Generalized Exchange by Indirect Reciprocity	p. 159
Previous Solutions to Generalized Exchange	p. 159
Theoretical Framework	p. 160
Representation of Strategies	p. 161
Definition of "Goodness"	p. 162
Summary of the Theoretical Background	p. 165
An Empirical Study	p. 166
Method	p. 166
Results	p. 168
Discussion	p. 171
	p. 172
The Herdsman and the Sheep, Mouton, or Kivsa? The Influence of Group Culture on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas	p. 177
Culture and Appropriateness Framework	p. 179
Culture and Identity	p. 180
Culture and Recognition of the Situation	p. 181
Culture and Rules	p. 183
Discussion	p. 184
Will Lessons from Small-Scale Social Dilemmas Scale Up?	p. 189
Matching Institutions to Physical Worlds	p. 190
The World of Private Goods	p. 190
The World of Common Pool Resources	p. 190
Prior Research on Robust CPR Institutions	p. 192
The Global Relevance of Research on Local CPR Regimes	p. 195
Dilemmas of Extending Design Principles to the Global Scale	p. 197
Limits to Direct Generalization	p. 198
Cross-Sectoral Foundations of Institutional Design	p. 200
Institutional Adjustments Needed in Scaling Up Sustainable Regimes	p. 202
A Continuing Need for Creativity	p. 207
Effect of Information Structure in a Step-Level Public-Good Dilemma Under a Real-Time Protocol	p. 212
Protocols of Play	p. 212
Information Structure	p. 214
Criticality	p. 214
The Logic of Critical Mass	p. 215
Method	p. 216
Participants	p. 216
Design	p. 216
Procedure	p. 216
Results	p. 218
Contribution Rate	p. 218
Public-Good Provision	p. 218
Timing of the Decisions	p. 219
Discussion	p. 220
Effectiveness of the Real-Time Protocol	p. 221
Criticality	p. 222
Irrational Decision-Making Behaviors	p. 225
The Management of Time in the Real-Time Protocol	p. 227
Toward an Analysis of Cooperation and Fairness That Includes Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory	p. 230
Cooperation and Fairness	p. 230
Games	p. 232
Core and Convexity	p. 236
Example Games	p. 238
The CP3 Game	p. 239
The HSW1 and HSW2 Games	p. 241
Fairness Solutions	p. 242
Experimental Results Reconsidered	p. 245
Efficiency and Compliance	p. 245
Geometric Localization of Results	p. 246
Summary and Discussion	p. 248
Using Genetic Algorithms for Simulation of Social Dilemmas	p. 252
Introduction	p. 252
Genetic Algorithms	p. 253
Simulation	p. 256
Initialization of the Vector Populations	p. 256
Transformation and Recombination of Individual Patterns	p. 257
Evaluation and Selection of a Sampled Subgroup	p. 257
A Time-Use Social Dilemma	p. 258
Conclusions	p. 262
Toward a Comprehensive Model of Social Dilemmas	p. 265
The Problem, and the Nay-Sayers	p. 265
Toward a Comprehensive Model	p. 266
Complementary and Supplementary Ideas	p. 271
Index	p. 281
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