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EXCERPT FROM THE PREFACE TO THE 2006 EDITION
One may argue that relations between Israel and the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority are bound to deteriorate into a renewed armed confrontation and a return to bloodshed (a "third Intifada"). Such a development might render the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a haven for regional and international Islamic extremists, with serious spillover effect on Jordan's political stability as well as terrorism on both regional and international levels. The Palestinian territories -- contrary to their better interests -- may turn into a second Iraq, and Hamas would be remembered merely as an ephemeral local episode.
The turn of events described above is certainly not etched in stone. Hamas's social concerns and the economic exhaustion of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may well create an effort of reconstruction rather than violence, at least for a while. If Israel unilaterally withdraws from the West Bank in the same fashion implemented in the Gaza Strip, it might play into the hands of Hamas because it would remove the onus of officially dealing with Israel on this key political issue. Hence, Hamas has a vested interest in obtaining full control over resumed negotiations between Israel and PA president Abbas over key issues, especially concerning the permanent status of the Palestinian territories.
The assessment that Hamas's composite strategy might lead to a dead end and a return to a hopeless, zero-sum dynamic of conflict is based on an essentialist or deterministic view of the Palestinian "other." According to this approach, Hamas is an Islamist body with predetermined strategic priorities, firm political positions, and ultimate anti-Israeli goals. Its behavior, therefore, depends neither on Israeli policies nor on Israel's relations with Hamas.
To a large extent, this essentialist approach toward Hamas has been inspired by deeply rooted Israeli assumptions by which Israel's political and security priorities and policies are irrelevant to how the Palestinian "other" views the situation or responds to it. According to this line of thought, Israel's security policies should be determined independently of the complex reality in which Hamas is now functioning. It therefore neglects the need to continually follow the rationale, nuances, contradictions, and tensions reflected in Hamas's public positions and conduct.
This approach portrays Hamas as an uncompromising entity that is focused rigidly on ultimate goals and is willing to bring its politics to absurd extremes in order to achieve them. It is to this that one may look in order to understand what breathes life into the perception that the future conduct of Hamas is premeditated and thus predetermined, stemming purely from the movement's established ideology. Therefore, entertaining the prospect of moderation in Hamas's positions is futile. Talk of political compromise is aimed solely at dulling the senses.
A more interpretive perception will view Hamas as a movement that is operating within an ever-changing historical context, aware of practical constraints, sensitive to its surroundings, attentive to circumstances, and subject to considerations of cost effectiveness. Initially established by refugees as a social movement, Hamas prospers particularly among poor refugees and urban dwellers. In spite of its image as a primarily murderous organization, its main energies and activities have been focused on providing social and communal services through a well-administrated web of institutions, from clinics, kindergartens, and schools to a blood bank and welfare services such as the distribution of food and other basic commodities for the needy.
According to this rationale, it is likely that the Hamas-led government would authorize its officials to follow the policy adopted by mayors and heads of local councils of maintaining contacts with Israeli officials on ongoing matters related to daily life and well-being of the Palestinian population, particularly the movement of goods and people across Israeli and Palestinian territories. It is likely that internal, regional, and international pressures will lead Hamas to adopt an approach that is more network-oriented than goal-focused, to display more political pragmatism than religious extremism, and to distance itself from its radical image in order to facilitate a strategy of political openness. Above all else, what is considered in the essentialist approach as an inviolable obstacle that hastens the return of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to a state of predestined confrontation may be perceived according to the interpretive perception as a dynamic situation of shifting interests and changing priorities derived from the reality of an order negotiated by multiple parties.
The rise of Hamas to power through a democratic process is an unprecedented phenomenon in the Arab Muslim countries and thus deserves the attention of students of Islamic and Middle East politics. This is particularly the case in view of the scholarly debate on the compatibility of Islam and democracy but even more so in view of Hamas's self-definition as an Islamic national liberation movement. First, the municipal and general elections in the Palestinian territories were marked by Hamas's full compliance with the democratic "rules of the game" within the confines of Palestinian domestic politics. Indeed, Hamas opted to escalate violence against Israel as a means of protest against the PA's decision to cancel the results of municipal elections in some local government councils in the Gaza Strip where Hamas had won a majority. In a final analysis, however, the Islamic movement demonstrated restraint toward its political rivals and the process as a whole. Indeed, this behavior, and the incorporation of typically secular and leftist-nationalist factions into its government, may turn out to be no more than tactical and temporary measures aimed at paving the road to power and mitigating the alarm echoes resulting from its victory on both domestic and international levels, rather than an indication of normative political behavior. It is, however, noteworthy that the political process in the Palestinian territories took place under severe economic and social conditions, partial military occupation, and harsh restrictions imposed by Israel, none of which encourage collective democratic conduct.
Second, that Hamas has been identified with the militant ideology and strategy of jihad makes its electoral victory even more alarming to secular ruling elites in the neighboring Arab countries who struggle against their own Islamic militants. They dread Hamas's expanding influence on their societies and a similar rise to power if open and free elections are allowed. Hamas has established close links with, and enjoys support from, state and nonstate "peace spoilers," especially Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shi'i Hizballah.
However, it is likely that regional and international actors would largely put pressure on Hamas to reconcile with the "rules of the game" or risk an intolerable price in terms of international economic and diplomatic aid. Moreover, the rise of Hamas to power may well change regional and international priorities toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This means that the network perspective and multilevel approach might overshadow the deterministic approach.
The deterioration of social and economic conditions in the Palestinian areas underlines the crucial role of the international community in revitalizing their economy, which under certain conditions might encourage the Hamas-led PA government to accept a formula short of recognition of the state of Israel (e.g., the principle of two-state solution). Thus, in view of the PA's dire financial straits and the difficulties Hamas faces in committing itself to the Oslo agreements -- despite the long-term record of the clean-handed and efficacious system of social services provided by Hamas and the discernible local impact made by Hamas-dominated municipal and local government during the last year -- it is doubtful that controlling the Palestinian government would allow Hamas to miss the opportunity of promoting its posture as a provider of social services in the PA areas.
From a regional and international perspective, the Israeli-Palestinian issue has become too volatile to be left in the hands of the two parties alone. The Jordanians, Egyptians, and Saudis fear that the economic deterioration of the Palestinian Authority and the renewal of military confrontation between Israel and the PA will bring about an Islamic radicalization that could threaten their own political stability. In their eyes, this has made their intervention in the issue crucially important. This is also true of the United States and the European Union, which fear the deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into a conflict between Islam and the West.
Under these circumstances, regional and international actors ought to minimize the disadvantages of the current situation rather than bring about a radical change. Radical responses taken by Israel against Hamas, such as financial strangulation and diplomatic isolation, are likely to be perceived by regional parties and international actors as a boomerang that, in the spirit of Baudelaire, transforms the hangman into the accused and the injury into a dagger. Such dramatic Israeli steps might result in harsh worldwide criticism that will lead to broad opposition.
Along this line, one cannot exclude the possibility that regional actors and the international community will increase their efforts to revive existing political initiatives and possibly even propose new ones in order to bridge the gap between Israel's minimum demands and the maximum concessions the new Palestinian regime will be willing to make. Furthermore, in light of the changes that have taken place in the Palestinian arena, such political initiatives will redefine regional and international priorities according to the interests of the relevant actors. It is possible that regional and international forces will mold joint principles to guide political activity built on an agreed-upon agenda. This, however, will require the direct and committed involvement of the U.S. government, whose absence from the scene under the George W. Bush administration has been detrimental to the relations between Israelis and Palestinians.
A renewed dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians may well depend more on regional and international arrangements in which Israel and the Palestinians talk to each other through a third party. The Arab peace plan advanced by the Beirut summit in 2002 -- based on the trade-off of Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the war of 1967 for an all-Arab normalization of relations with it -- and its incorporation into the U.S.-backed "road map," are the types of initiatives that might control the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian political agenda in which Hamas would be hard-pressed to join.
Often in politics, what might be perceived as an inconceivable order can turn into an inevitable reality. At first it will seem harsh and dissonant; later still, full of inspiration; and eventually, inescapable.
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