Papers in Experimental Economics

by Vernon L. Smith

• ISBN13: 9780521024655
• ISBN10: 052102465X
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-03-16
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Vernon L. Smith is the main creator of the burgeoning discipline of experimental economics. This collection of his papers from 1962 to 1988 surveys major developments in the field from early attempts to simulate economic behavior in now classic double oral auction markets through recent studies of industrial organization and decision making. Topics covered include monopoly and oligopoly supply and demand theory under posted pricing, uniform pricing, double continuous auction, and sealed bid-offer auction; hypothetical valuation and market pricing; asset price bubbles; predatory pricing; market contestability and natural monopoly; and the methodology of experimental economics. Taken together, the papers form a history of the study of economics under controlled conditions. Vernon Smith is Regents Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona, and is the author of over 100 articles and books on capital theory, finance, natural resource economics, and experimental economics. He is president of the Public Choice Society and past founding president of the Economic Science Association.

Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Part I. The Formative Years: Introduction

1. An experimental study of competitive market behaviour

2. Effects of market organization on competitive equilibrium

3. Nature, the experimental laboratory, and the credibility of hypotheses with D. B. Rice

4. Experimental auction markets and the Walrasian hypothesis

5. Experimental studies of discrimination versus competition in sealed-bid auction markets

6. Experimental economics: induced value theory

7. Bidding and auctioning institutions: experimental results

8. Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: an empirical study of speculation with R. M. Miller and C. R. Plott

9. Experimental economics at Purdue

Part II. Institutions And Market Performance: Introduction

10. On nonbinding price controls in a competitive market with A. W. Williams

11. An experimental comparison of alternative rules for competitive market exchange with A. W. Williams

12. Competitive market institutions: double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions with A. W. Williams, W. K. Bratton and M. G. Vannoni

13. Markets as economisers of information: experimental examination of the 'Hayek Hypothesis'

14. The effect of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets with A. W. Williams

15. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science

16. Experimental economics

17. A comparison of posted-offer and double-auction pricing institutions with J. Ketcham and A. W. Williams

18. Hypothetical valuations and preference reversals in the context of asset trading with M. Knez

19. Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets with G. L. Suchanek and A. W. Williams

Part III. Public Goods: Introduction

20. The principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in social choice

21. Incentive compatible experimental processes for the provision of public goods

22. An experimental comparison of three public good decision mechanisms

23. Experiments with a decentralised mechanism for public good decisions

24. Experimental tests of an allocation mechanism for private, public or externality goods with D. L. Coursey

Part IV. Auctions And Institutional Design: Introduction

25. Incentives and behaviour in English, Dutch and Sealed-bid auctions with V. M. Coppinger and J. A. Titus

26. Theory and behaviour of single object auctions with J. C. Cox and B. Roberson

27. A test that discriminates between two models of the Dutch-first auction non-isomorphism with J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker

28. Theory and behaviour of multiple unit discriminative auctions J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker

29. Theory and individual behaviour of first-price auctions J. C. Cox and J. M. Walker

30. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation with S. J. Rassenti and R. L. Bulfin

31. Designing 'smart' computer-assisted markets with K. A. McCabe and S. J. Rassenti

Part V. Industrial Organization: Introduction

32. An empirical study of decentralised institutions of monopoly restraint

33. Natural monopoly and contested markets: some experimental results with D. Coursey and R. M. Isaac

34. In search of predatory pricing with R. M. Isaac

Part VI. Perspectives On Economics: 35. Theory, experiment and economics

36. Experimental economics: behavioural lessons for microeconomic theory and policy.