Perfect Deterrence

by Frank C. Zagare , D. Marc Kilgour

• ISBN13: 9780521781749
• ISBN10: 0521781744
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-09-25
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.

Table of Contents

List of figures	xiii
List of tables	xvi
Preface	xix
Part I Theoretical underpinnings	1	(96)
Classical deterrence theory	3	(34)
Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications	7	(17)
Structural deterrence theory	8	(8)
Decision-theoretic deterrence theory	16	(8)
Empirical anomalies	24	(6)
Logical problems	30	(2)
Coda	32	(5)
Rationality and deterrence	37	(28)
On rationality	38	(6)
Procedural rationality	38	(1)
Instrumental rationality	39	(5)
Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality	44	(5)
Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats	49	(5)
Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance	54	(4)
Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution	58	(5)
Coda	63	(2)
Credibility and deterrence	65	(32)
On credibility	66	(4)
Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats	70	(11)
On capability	81	(3)
Deterrence and uncertainty	84	(9)
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with complete information	86	(1)
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with one-sided incomplete information	87	(6)
Coda	93	(4)
Part II Direct deterrence	97	(70)
Uncertainty and mutual deterrence	99	(34)
Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence	101	(3)
Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence	104	(7)
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game	111	(17)
Class 1 equilibria	114	(9)
Class 2A and 2B Attack Equilibria	123	(3)
Class 3 Bluff Equilibrium	126	(2)
Coda	128	(5)
Unilateral deterrence	133	(34)
Game form	135	(4)
Unilateral deterrence under complete information	139	(4)
Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information	143	(1)
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game	144	(14)
Deterrence equilibria	148	(5)
Other equilibria	153	(5)
The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory	158	(6)
Coda	164	(3)
Part III Extended deterrence	167	(116)
Modeling extended deterrence	169	(28)
Preliminaries	170	(5)
The Asymmetric Escalation Game	175	(8)
Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation	183	(4)
The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information	187	(5)
Stability-instability paradox	189	(3)
Escalation dominance	192	(1)
Subgame-perfect equilibria	192	(3)
Coda	195	(2)
Modeling Massive Retaliation	197	(22)
Modeling all-or-nothing deployments	200	(3)
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation	203	(11)
Challenger-Soft Deterrence Equilibrium	205	(2)
No-Response Equilibrium	207	(2)
No-Limited-Response Equilibria	209	(5)
Coda	214	(5)
Modeling Flexible Response	219	(36)
Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions	221	(3)
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response	224	(19)
Escalatory Deterrence Equilibria	226	(6)
All-or-Nothing Equilibria	232	(2)
Flexible Response Equilibria	234	(9)
Multiple equilibria	243	(3)
Discussion	246	(4)
Coda	250	(5)
Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence	255	(28)
Theory and evidence	257	(1)
Assumptions	258	(3)
Behavioral possibilities	261	(1)
Deterrence and conflict spirals	262	(10)
Traditional deterrence	263	(3)
Non-traditional deterrence	266	(4)
Conflict spirals	270	(2)
Discussion	272	(4)
Coda	276	(7)
Part IV Implications	283	(26)
Perfect Deterrence Theory	285	(24)
Capability: a necessary condition	290	(3)
Deterrence and the status quo	293	(3)
Credibility and deterrence	296	(5)
Deterrence breakdowns, limited conflicts, and escalation spirals	301	(2)
Nuclear weapons and deterrence	303	(4)
Coda	307	(2)
Appendices	309	(75)
1 Deterrence models	311	(12)
2 Useful definitions	323	(5)
3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game	328	(3)
4 Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game	331	(8)
5 Unilateral Deterrence Game	339	(8)
6 Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Massive Retaliation'' version	347	(7)
7 Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Flexible Response'' version	354	(11)
8 Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version	365	(19)
References	384	(21)
Index	405