Philosophy of Mind A Beginner's Guide

by Ravenscroft, Ian

• ISBN13: 9780199252541
• ISBN10: 0199252548
• eBook ISBN(s): 9780192652393
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-04-28
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• More Book Details

Summary

Designed specifically for students with no background knowledge in the subject, this accessible introduction covers all of the basic concepts and major theories in the philosophy of mind. Topics discussed include dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, functionalism, the computational theory of mind, connectionism, physicalism, mental causation, and consciousness. The text is enhanced by chapter summaries, a glossary, suggestions for further reading, and self-assessment questions.

Author Biography

Ian Ravenscroft completed his PhD at the Research School of Social Science, Australian National University. After spending a year teaching in the Philosophy Department at the University of Auckland, he became an ARC Research Associate at Flinders University. In 1998, Ian moved to the Philosophy Department at King's College London, where he directed the graduate program in the philosophy of mental disorder. He is now back at Flinders University.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	x
Introduction	1	(8)
Part 1 What are mental states?
1 Dualism	9	(16)
1.1 Substance dualism	10	(1)
1.2 Arguments in favor of substance dualism	11	(5)
1.3 Arguments against substance dualism	16	(2)
1.4 Property dualism	18	(2)
1.5 Assessing epiphenomenalism	20	(2)
1.6 Conclusion	22	(3)
2 Behaviorism	25	(14)
2.1 Philosophical behaviorism	25	(1)
2.2 Arguments in favor of philosophical behaviorism	26	(4)
2.3 Arguments against philosophical behaviorism	30	(3)
2.4 What is methodological behaviorism?	33	(1)
2.5 Arguments for methodological behaviorism	34	(1)
2.6 Arguments against methodological behaviorism	35	(4)
3 The identity theory	39	(11)
3.1 More about the identity theory	39	(2)
3.2 Arguments in favor of the identity theory	41	(2)
3.3 Evidence from deficit studies	43	(1)
3.4 Arguments against the identity theory	44	(3)
3.5 Reductive and nonreductive physicalism	47	(1)
3.6 Conclusion	48	(2)
4 Functionalism	50	(14)
4.1 Introducing functionalism	50	(3)
4.2 Functionalism and brain states	53	(2)
4.3 Functionalism and the six features of mental states	55	(2)
4.4 Two famous arguments against functionalism	57	(5)
4.5 Conclusion	62	(2)
5 Eliminativism and fictionalism	64	(17)
5.1 From theory to reality	64	(1)
5.2 Introducing eliminativism	65	(2)
5.3 Eliminativism about mental states	67	(4)
5.4 Anti-eliminativist arguments	71	(1)
5.5 Fictionalism	72	(3)
5.6 Conclusion	75	(6)
Part 2 Mind as machine
6 The computational theory of mind	81	(16)
6.1 Syntax and semantics	81	(2)
6.2 What's a computer?	83	(1)
6.3 Turing machines	84	(3)
6.4 The computational theory of mind	87	(2)
6.5 The language of thought	89	(2)
6.6 The Chinese room	91	(3)
6.7 Conclusion	94	(3)
7 Connectionism	97	(20)
7.1 What connectionist networks are like	97	(4)
7.2 Some important properties of connectionist networks	101	(3)
7.3 Connectionism and the mind	104	(3)
7.4 Rationality, language, systematicity	107	(5)
7.5 Conclusion	112	(5)
Part 3 Mind in a physical world
8 Physicalism and supervenience	117	(8)
8.1 Physical properties	118	(1)
8.2 Introducing the supervenience approach to physicalism	118	(2)
8.3 Refining the supervenience approach to physicalism	120	(2)
8.4 A problem for the supervenience approach to physicalism?	122	(3)
9 Content	125	(19)
9.1 The resemblance theory	126	(1)
9.2 The causal theory	127	(3)
9.3 The teleological theory	130	(2)
9.4 Fodor's theory	132	(3)
9.5 Functional role theory	135	(4)
9.6 Wide or narrow?	139	(5)
10 Mental causation	144	(15)
10.1 The problem of causal exclusion	145	(2)
10.2 Responding to the problem of causal exclusion	147	(3)
10.3 The causal efficacy of content	150	(2)
10.4 Responding to the problem of the causal efficacy of content	152	(7)
Part 4 Consciousness
11 Varieties of consciousness	159	(12)
11.1 Phenomenal consciousness	159	(3)
11.2 Access consciousness	162	(2)
11.3 Is access a function of phenomenal consciousness?	164	(2)
11.4 Avoiding confusion	166	(2)
11.5 Other kinds of consciousness	168	(3)
12 Phenomenal consciousness	171	(19)
12.1 The knowledge argument	171	(3)
12.2 Responding to the knowledge argument	174	(6)
12.3 The explanatory gap	180	(3)
12.4 Can the explanatory gap be filled?	183	(2)
12.5 Functionalism and phenomenal consciousness	185	(2)
12.6 Concluding remarks	187	(3)
Appendix: Paper writing tips	190	(2)
Glossary	192	(4)
Some useful resources	196	(3)
References	199	(5)
Index	204