A clear and accessible introduction to the philosophy of mind, ideal for use on undergraduate courses.

Preface	p. xi
Introduction: The Ontology of Mind	p. 1
What is the mind?	p. 1
Ontological alternatives	p. 2
Interpretation and method	p. 4
Dualisms of Mental and Physical Phenomena	p. 7
The mind-body problem	p. 8
Substance dualism	p. 10
Descartes' first argument	p. 12
Descartes' second argument	p. 14
Causal interaction problem	p. 15
Berkeley's idealist 'dualism' of minds and ideas	p. 20
Property dualism	p. 22
Kripke's modal analysis of property dualism	p. 24
Objections to property dualism	p. 31
Inconsistency of irreducibility and emergence claims in property dualism	p. 32
Incoherence of chronologically fundamental and evolutionarily emergent psychological properties	p. 33
Ontological economy of eliminativism and reductivism	p. 34
Explanatory disadvantages of property dualism	p. 34
Causal irrelevance of intentional epiphenomena	p. 37
Objection from evolutionary science	p. 38
Neurophysiology of the phantom limb	p. 39
Scientific psychology and the metaphysics of mind	p. 44
Elimination and Reduction Strategies for the Concept of Mind: Behaviourism, Materialism, Functionalism	p. 46
Ockham's Razor	p. 47
Classical behaviourism	p. 49
Logical behaviourism: Ryle's exorcism of the ghost in the machine	p. 53
Mind-brain identity: eliminative and reductive materialisms	p. 56
Armstrong's materialist logical behaviourism	p. 60
Stich's theory of brain sentence tokens	p. 63
Functionalism and computationalism	p. 65
Qualia and content for Nagel's bat and Jackson's colour scientist	p. 69
McGinn's naturalistic mysterianism	p. 73
Denying the obvious	p. 78
Artificial Intelligence: Mechanism, Minds and Machines	p. 81
Can machines think?	p. 82
Mechanical models of mind	p. 83
From La Mettrie to von Neumann	p. 86
Turing's test of machine intelligence	p. 88
Rule-structured programming	p. 93
Parallel distributed processing (connectionism)	p. 99
Searle's Chinese Room	p. 103
Lucas' Göet;del sentence criterion	p. 105
What computers can and cannot do	p. 111
Understanding and the mechanization of meaning	p. 114
Lloyd's simple mechanical minds	p. 116
Intrinsic versus extrinsic representation	p. 120
Smoke, fog and mirrors	p. 125
Creativity problems for minds and machines	p. 130
Mechanism and intentionality	p. 132
Intentionality and the Nature of Thought	p. 134
Intentionality	p. 135
Brentano's Intentionality thesis	p. 136
Primacy of the intentional, inteliminability and irreducibility	p. 139
Fodor's objection to the irreducibility of intentionality	p. 143
Chisholm and Sellars on the intentionality of thought and language	p. 145
Demystifying intentionality	p. 150
Putnam's Twin Earth counterexample	p. 151
In defence of folk psychology	p. 155
Intentionality of sensation as the basis of thought	p. 157
Dennett's intentional stance	p. 160
Searle's mind-body antireductionism	p. 162
Logical triviality problem	p. 165
Implications and critique of Searle's antireductionism	p. 168
Alternative concepts of mind-body reduction	p. 175
Why do pains hurt?	p. 180
Sentience, consciousness, self-consciousness	p. 182
Self identity puzzles	p. 186
The intended self	p. 190
Supervenience and the Emergence of Consciousness	p. 194
Qualia and intentionality	p. 195
Modes and models of consciousness	p. 197
Kim on weak and strong supervenience	p. 200
Emergence as super-supervenience	p. 203
Ontic and explanatory priority of intentionality	p. 208
Chalmers on the supervenience of intentionality on qualia	p. 211
Super-supervenience and the metaphysics of emergence	p. 216
Collective intentionality	p. 220
Searle's irreducible 'We intend'	p. 221
Language, meaning and cointentionality	p. 223
Epistemic dimensions of collective intentionality	p. 227
Social implications of language	p. 229
Origin of social institutions	p. 234
Derivative qualia as poetry	p. 235
The Dignity of Mind	p. 237
Ascent of the mind	p. 238
Emergence and supervenience	p. 239
The privacy of experience	p. 242
Wittgenstein's private language argument	p. 247
Solipsism and knowledge of other minds	p. 251
Agent causation	p. 255
Intentionality and intention in action	p. 257
Freedom of action, purpose and the will	p. 261
Helmholtz's critique of agent causation	p. 264
Passions of the soul: sensation, emotion, imagination, memory	p. 266
Death	p. 268
Afterword: The Challenge of Intentionalism: Toward a Scientific Metaphysics of Mind	p. 270
Glossary of Technical Terms	p. 273
Bibliography	p. 286
Index	p. 297
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

What is included with this book?

The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.