Pleasure and the Good Life Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism

by Feldman, Fred

• ISBN13: 9780199297603
• ISBN10: 0199297606
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-06-22
• Publisher: Clarendon Press

Summary

Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining what we mean when we ask what the Good Life is. He argues that this should not be taken to be a question about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the life that is good in itself for the one who livesit. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the pleasant life. After showing that the usual formulations of hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a starting point for discussion. He then considers awebalogue of classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick, Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claimsthat attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in the literature -- are worthy of more careful attention. Another main theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing how they evade some ofthe objections. He also shows how it is possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore, and the Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly likethe ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after dealing with thelast of the objections, he gives a sketch of his hedonistic vision of the Good Life.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(198)
1. The Quest for the Good Life	7	(14)
1.1 Pleasure and the Good Life	7	(1)
1.2 Clarification of "the Good Life"	8	(4)
1.3 What is the Question about the Good Life?	12	(2)
1.4 Why Should We Be Interested in this Question?	14	(1)
1.5 What are the Main Sorts of Answer that have been Given?	15	(6)
2. Hedonism: A Preliminary Formulation	21	(17)
2.1 Problems Concerning the Formulation of Hedonism	21	(4)
2.2 Default Hedonism	25	(5)
2.3 The Hedonism of Aristippus	30	(5)
Appendix A: Another Defective Formulation	35	(3)
3. Classic Objections to Hedonism	38	(17)
3.1 The Argument from Worthless Pleasures	38	(3)
3.2 The Argument from False Pleasures	41	(2)
3.3 The Argument from Unconscious Pleasures	43	(2)
3.4 Brentano's Cigar	45	(4)
3.5 The Argument from Nonexistent Pleasures	49	(2)
3.6 Moore's Heap of Filth	51	(1)
3.7 Ross's "Two Worlds" Objection	52	(3)
4. Attitudinal Hedonism	55	(53)
4.1 Attitudinal Pleasure	55	(8)
4.2 Measuring Attitudinal Pleasures and Pains	63	(3)
4.3 Formulating Attitudinal Hedonism	66	(5)
4.4 The Objects of Enjoyment; Mill's Hedonism	71	(8)
Appendix B: Reflections on the Attitudinal/Sensory Distinction	79	(12)
B.1 The Nature of Sensory Pleasures	79	(2)
B.2 The Delightfulness of Pleasure, the Awfulness of Pain	81	(2)
B.3 Painful Pleasures, Pleasant Pains	83	(2)
B.4 Masochism	85	(6)
Appendix C: The Hedonism of Epicurus	91	(17)
C.1 The Evidence concerning Epicurean Hedonism	91	(4)
C.2 Static Pleasure	95	(3)
C.3 The Formulation of Epicurean Hedonism	98	(4)
C.4 A Vision of the Good Life according to Epicurean Hedonism	102	(1)
C.5 Why I Find Epicurean Hedonism Implausible	103	(5)
5. Replies to Some Objections	108	(16)
5.1 False Pleasures: A Problem for IAH?	109	(5)
5.2 Unconscious Pleasures: A Problem for IAH?	114	(3)
5.3 The Objection from Worthless Pleasures	117	(7)
6. Hedonism and the Shape of a Life	124	(18)
6.1 The Shape of a Life	124	(5)
6.2 Shape of Life and Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism	129	(2)
6.3 Hedonism Unscathed	131	(11)
7. G.E. Moore, Hedonist?	142	(26)
7.1 Moore's Pluralism	143	(5)
7.2 A Moorean Form of Hedonism	148	(7)
7.3 The Equivalence of MDAIAH to Moore's Theory	155	(2)
7.4 Problems for MDAIAH	157	(3)
Appendix D: Darwall on Valuing Activity	160	(8)
8. But is it Really "Hedonism"?	168	(20)
8.1 A Historical Account of Hedonism	169	(1)
8.2 Moore's Criterion of Hedonism	170	(1)
8.3 Hedonism and "Pleasant Lives"	171	(1)
8.4 Basic Intrinsic Value States and Hedonism	172	(10)
8.5 Some Hard Cases	182	(2)
8.6 'Pleasure is the Good'	184	(1)
8.7 Monism and Pluralism in Axiology	184	(2)
8.8 Axiological Taxonomy	186	(2)
9. Problems about Beauty and Justice	188	(11)
9.1 Moore's Heap of Filth	188	(1)
9.2 A Problem about Justice	189	(1)
9.3 A Hedonistic Reply to the Heap of Filth	190	(2)
9.4 A Hedonistic Reply to Ross's "Two Worlds" Objection	192	(5)
9.5 Atomism	197	(2)
10. Themes and Puzzles	199	(8)
10.1 Themes	199	(2)
10.2 My Vision of the Good Life	201	(4)
10.3 Unresolved Puzzles	205	(2)
Bibliography	207	(6)
Index	213