Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies

by Albright, David; Berkhout, Frans; Walker, William

• ISBN13: 9780198280095
• ISBN10: 0198280092
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1997-05-29
• Publisher: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Summary

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the basic materials used in nuclear weapons. Plutonium also plays an important part in the generation of nuclear electricity. Knowing how much plutonium and HEU exist, where and in which form is vital for international security and nuclearcommerce. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 is a thorough revision of the World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992. It provides a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the amounts of plutonium and HEU in military and civilian programmes, in nuclear and non-nuclear weaponstates, and in countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The capabilities that exist for producing these materials around the world are examined in depth, as are the policy issues raised by them. Containing much new information, it is indispensable to all those concerned with the greatcontemporary issues in international nuclear relations: arms reductions in the nuclear weapon states, nuclear proliferation, nuclear smuggling, the roles of plutonium and enriched uranium in the nuclear fuel-cycle, and the disposition of surplus weapon material.

Table of Contents

Preface	xv	(1)
Acknowledgements	xvi	(1)
Glossary	xvii	(11)
Abbreviations, acronyms and conventions	xxviii
Part I. Introduction	3	(26)
1. Reasons, aims and sources	3	(9)
I. Introduction	3	(1)
II. Four security contexts	4	(2)
III. The need for greater transparency	6	(2)
IV. The limits to accuracy	8	(1)
V. The scope of the book	9	(1)
VI. Sources	10	(2)
2. Characteristics of highly enriched uranium and plutonium and their production processes	12	(17)
I. Introduction	12	(1)
II. Highly enriched uranium	12	(6)
III. Plutonium	18	(2)
Table 2.1. Plutonium half-lives, and weapon-grade and reactor-grade isotopic concentrations, at given fuel discharges	20	(3)
Table 2.2. Neutron cross-sections	23	(6)
Part II. Military inventories in the nuclear weapon states	29	(104)
3. Inventories of military plutonium in the nuclear weapon states	29	(50)
Introduction	29	(1)
II. The production process	30	(3)
III. Methods of estimating military plutonium inventories	33	(4)
IV. The United States	37	(13)
V. The former Soviet Union	50	(9)
VI. The United Kingdom	59	(7)
VII. France	66	(10)
VIII. China	76
Table 3.1. Historical sources of weapon-grade plutonium	32	(6)
Table 3.2. US production reactors	38	(2)
3.3. US Departmemt of Energy total production of weapon-and fuel-grade plutonium (book inventory), 1947-89	40	(2)
Table 3.4. US Department of Energy inventory of plutonium, by grade, February 1996	42	(3)
Tabel 3.5. US Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy inventories of plutonium, by location	45	(1)
Table 3.6. Total plutonium inventory differences at US production sites, cumulative to February 1996	46	(1)
Table 3.7. US inventory of weapon-grade plutonium declared to be excess to weapon requirements	47	(1)
Table 3.8. Plotonium in the DOE waste inventory	48	(1)
Table 3.9. The US plutonium inventory held by the Departments of Energy and Defense, February 1996	49	(5)
Tabel 3.10. Estimated plutonium production by military reactors in the former Soviet Union, 31 December 1993	54	(3)
3.11. Estimated Soviet military plutonium output, calculated from estimated krypton releases and plutonium arisings, 31 December 1983	57	(1)
Table 3.12. Total inventory of military plutonium of the FSU, 31 Decemmber 1993	58	(7)
Table 3.13. Estimated British inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995	65	(3)
Table 3.14. Estimated French inventory of military plutonium, 31 December 1995	68
Figure 3.1. Plutonium in warhead production	30	(11)
Figure 3.2. US Department of Energy weapon-grade plutonium production, 1947-88	41	(3)
Figure 3.3. Plutonium inventories of the US Department of Energy, 31 December 1993	44	(35)
4. Inventories of highly enriched uranium in the nuclear states	79	(54)
I. Introduction	79	(1)
II. Overview of enrichment programmes	79	(2)
III. The United States	81	(13)
IV. The former Soviet Union	94	(22)
V. The United Kingdom	116	(5)
VI. France	121	(5)
VII. China	126
Table 4.1. HEU stocks dedicated to nuclear weapons, reserves ansd associated categories, including excess, as of 31 December 1995	80	(5)
Table 4.2. Estimates of US consumption of HEU, to 31 December 1994	85	(6)
Table 4.3. Estimated allocation of US highly enriched uranium, 31 December 1993	91	(1)
Table 4.4. US highly enriched uranium inventories, declared excess, 6 February 1996	92	(11)
Table 4.5. Russian enrichments capacity in the early 1990s	103	(3)
Table 4.6. Estimated increase in the separative capacity of Soviet centrifuges	106	(6)
Table 4.7. Estimated Soviet consumption of seperative work units, to 31 December 1987	112	(4)
Table 4.8. Estimated uranium-235 content of the HEU at the Ulba Plant	116	(4)
Table 4.9. Estimated British inventory of HEU, 31 December 1995	120
Figure 4.1. Highly enriched uranium inventories of the US Department of Energy, 31 December 1993	82	(26)
Figure 4.2. Maximum and minimum estimates of annual Soviet gas-certifuge capacity, 1957-92	108	(11)
Figure 4.3. Maximum and minimum estiamtes of annual Soviet uranium enrichment capacity, 1950-92	109	(1)
Figure 4.4. Maximum and minimum estimates of cumulative Soviet seperative output, 1950-88	110	(23)
Part III. Principal civil inventories	133	(124)
5. Plutonium produced in power reactors	133	(15)
I. Introduction	133	(2)
II. The fuel cycle in civil reactor systems	135	(1)
III. Fueling strategy and fuel burnup	136	(2)
IV. A sketvh of methods	138	(3)
V. Discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from civil reactors	141	(6)
VI. Conclusions	147
Table 5.1. Fuel characteristics of power reactors	136	(4)
Table 5.2. Past discharges of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993	140	(2)
Table 5.3. Past discharges of plutonium from nuclear power reactors, to 31 December 1993	142	(1)
Table 5.4. Estimated discharges of spent fuel and plutonium from nuclear power reactors, 1994-2000 and 2001-10	143	(11)
Figure 5.1. The nuclear fuel cycle includiong reprocessing	134	(1)
Figure 5.2. The once-through nuclear fuel cycle	135	(2)
Figure 5.3. Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, natural uranium fuel	137	(1)
Figure 5.4. Specific plutonium production as a function of fuel burnup, enriched uranium fuel	138	(6)
Figure 5.5. World spent-fuel and plutonium discharges from power reactors by decade, 1961-2010	144	(1)
Figure 5.6. Spent-fuel discharge profiles by decade for Canada, France, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA, 1961-2010	145	(1)
Figure 5.7. Plutonium discharges from power reactors in six regions: 1961-2010	146	(2)
6. Reprocessing, Programmes and plutonium arisings	148	(45)
I. Reprocessing in the nuclear fuel cycle	148	(2)
II. The evolution of fuel-cycle strategies	150	(5)
III. A sketch of methods	155	(1)
IV. Overview of power-reactor fuel reprocessing	155	(2)
V. Commercial reprocessing programmes	157	(26)
VI. Summary of power-and fast-reactor fuel reprocessing, 1960-2000	183	(7)
VII. Projections of plutonium separation to 2010	190	(2)
VIII. Conclusions	192
Table 6.1. National spent-fuel management policies, 1960-2000 and beyond	154	(2)
Table 6.2. World industrial-scale reprocessing plants	156	(4)
Table 6.3. Cumulative past plutonium separation at sellafield and Dounreay, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993	160	(2)
Table 6.4. Existing contracts for fuel reprocessing at THORP, 1995	162	(6)
Table 6.5. Existing contracts for oxide-fuel reprocessing at La Hague, 1995	168	(4)
Table 6.6. Cumulative past plutonium separation at La Hague and Marcoule, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993	172	(2)
Table 6.7. VVER-440 fuel dispatched to RT-1, 1976-93	174	(10)
Table 6.8. Cumulative separation of plutonium from power-reactor and research-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000	184	(4)
Table 6.9. Distribution of cumulative plutonium separation from power-reactor fuel, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000	188	(1)
Table 6.10. Cumulative plutonium separation in the UK, France and Russia from non-nuclear weapon states, at end of 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000	189	(1)
Table 6.11. Cumulative discharged power-reactor plutonium which has been separeated, at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, 1993 and projected to 2000	190	(1)
Table 6.12. Projected annual spent-fuel and cumulative plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing plants, three scenarios for 2001-10	191
Figure 6.1. Past and projected plutonium separation from power-reactor magnox fuel at the British B205 reprocessing plant, 1960-2010	158	(5)
Figure 6.2. Projected rates plutonium separation from oxide fuel at the British Sellafield THORP reprocessing plant, 1994-2010	163	(1)
Figure 6.3. Past and projected plutonium separation from gas-graphite power-reactor fuel at the French Marcoule UPI and La Hague UP2 reprocessing plants, 1960-2000	166	(1)
Figure 6.4. Total plutonium separation from gas-graphite power-reactor fuel in France, 1960-2000	167	(2)
Figure 6.5. Plutonium separation from oxide-fuel reprocessing at the La Hague UP2 and UP3 reprocessing plants in France 1975-2000	169	(9)
Figure 6.6. Past and projected quantities of plutonium separated at the German WAK and Japanese Tokai-mura reprocessing plants, 1970-2000	178	(1)
Figure 6.7. World annual separation of civil plutonium
Figure 6.8 Rate of civil plutonium separation at industrial-scale reprocessing facilites in the UK, France and Russia, 1960-2000	187	(6)
7. Commercial and research and development uses of plutonium	193	(45)
I. Introduction	193	(1)
II. Fast-reactor fuel cycles	194	(1)
III. Plutonium use in fast reactors	195	(2)
IV. Past and projected plutonium use in fast reactors	197	(12)
V. Plutonium use in thermal reactors	209	(3)
National programmes for thermal plutonium recycling	212	(11)
VII. Summary of Plutonium use in thermal reactors: past and projected	223	(6)
VIII. Commercial and R&D plutonium use compared with quantities separated	229	(8)
IX. Conclusions	237
Table 7.1. Fast reactors: retired and operating in 1995	196	(1)
Table 7.2. Plutonium fuel fabrication facilities	197	(8)
Table 7.3. Estimated plutonium consumption in nuclear R&D reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan, 31 December 1993	205	(4)
Table 7.4. Plutonium consumed in fast and experimental reactor fuel, 31 December 1993 and high and low scenarios for 1994-2000 and 2001-10	209	(14)
Table 7.5. Plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel fabrication, up to 31 December 1993	223	(1)
Table 7.6. Scenario for plutonium consumption in LWR-MOX fuel, 1994-2000	224	(3)
Table 7.7. LWR-MOX fabrication capacity, 1993-99	227	(2)
Table 7.8. Projected MOX fuel fabrication capacity, high and low scenarios for 2001-10	229	(1)
Table 7.9. Power-reactor plutonium separation and use, to 31 December 1993	230	(3)
Table 7.10. Civil Plutonium balances as declared by states, as of 31 December 1993	233	(2)
Table 7.11. National plutonium balances assuming utility MOX policies are implemented, 1994-2000	235
Figure 7.1. LWR-MOX production at the German Hanau fuel fabrication plant, 1972-92	213	(3)
Figure 7.2. LWR-MOX production at the Belgian Dessel PO fuel fabrication plant, 1986-1995	216	(2)
Figure 7.3. MOX fuel reloads at Electricite de France reactors, 1987-95	218	(8)
Figure 7.4. Projected world LWR-MOX fuel fabrication capacity: committed facilites, 1990-2005	226	(6)
Figure 7.5. Estimated national plutonium balances by ownership and location, 31 December 1993	232	(2)
Figure 7.6. Plutonium consumption forecasts: committed MOX fabrication capacity and Utility MOX plans, 1994-2010	234	(2)
Figure 7.7. Projected world and European/Japanese plutonium surpluses, 1990-2010	236	(2)
8. Civil highly enriched uranium inventories	238	(19)
I. Introduction	238	(1)
II. Civil suppliers of highly enriched uranium	239	(2)
III. Civil reactors using HEU fuels, 1995	241	(1)
IV. Converting to low-enriched uranium fuels	242	(3)
V. Spent fuel take-back and reprocessing of HEU fuels	245	(3)
VI. US exports of highly enriched uranium	248	(5)
VII. Civil inventories of highly enriched uranium	253
Table 8.1. Summary of the distribution of US HEU exports	248	(1)
Table 8.2. United States HEU exports and retransfers for non-Euratom countries	249	(1)
Table 8.3. United States HEU exports and external retransfers for Euration countries	250	(1)
Table 8.4. Amount of US-origin HEU projected to remain overseas	251	(6)
Part IV. Material inventories and production capabilities in the threshold states	257	(138)
9. De facto nuclear weapon states: Israel, India and Pakistan	257	(25)
I. Israel	257	(7)
II. India	264	(7)
III. Pakistan	271
Table 9.1. Estimated plutonium production in the Israeli Dimona reactor, 31 December 1994	262	(1)
Table 9.2. Estimated inventories of Israeli weapons-grade plutonium , at the end of 1994, 1995 and 1999	263	(6)
Table 9.3. Estimated inventories of Indian weapon-grade plutonium, at the end of 1994 and 1995	269	(8)
Table 9.4. Estimated production of weapon-grade uranium at the Pakistani Kahuta centrifuge enrichment plant, 1986-91	277	(3)
Figure 9.1. SPOT image showing a probable plutonium rector complex near Khushab, Pakistan	280	(2)
10. North Korea	282	(27)
I. Introduction	282	(1)
II. An unsafeguarded reactor emerges	282	(1)
III. Intial safeguards declaration	283	(5)
IV. Rector defuelling	288	(7)
V. Plutonium production reactors	295	(8)
VI. Plutonium separation	303	(3)
VII. How much plutonium does North Korea have?	306	(1)
VIII. What about enrichment activities?	307	(1)
IX. Has North Korea built nuclear weapons?	307	(2)
11. A special case: Iraq	309	(42)
I. Introduction	309	(2)
II. The Iraqi nuclear weapon programme	311	(2)
III. Summary of Iraqi fissile material production plans before 1991	313	(4)
IV. The Iraqi enrichment programme	317	(24)
V. Projected indigenously produced weapon-grade uranium inventory for Iraq	341	(1)
VI. The Iraqi plutonium progrmme	342	(2)
VII. The crash programme	344	(5)
VIII. Post-war activities	349
Table 11.1. Selected EMIS separator design specifications	320	(2)
Table 11.2. An R120 seprator deployment schedule for 70 machines, declared by Iraq (but not achieved)	322	(1)
Table 11.3. Actual R120 separator deployment schedule at A1 Tarmiya	323	(15)
Table 11.4. Maximal estimated centrifuge production	338	(3)
Table 11.5. Projected Iraqi weapon-grade uranium inventories	341	(4)
Table 11.6. Iraq's safeguarded fuel	345
Figure 11.1. Map of Iraq showing the approximate locations of the main inspection sites	316	(35)
12. Countries of concern: Iran, Algeria, South Korea and Taiwan	351	(18)
I. Introduction	351	(1)
II. Iran	352	(11)
III. Algeria	363	(2)
IV. South Korea	365	(1)
V. Taiwan	366	(3)
13. Countries backing away from nuclear weapons: Argentina, Brazil and South Africa	369	(26)
I. Introduction	369	(1)
II. Argentina and Brazil	369	(8)
III. South Africa	377	(10)
Table 13.1. Illustrative output of the Y-Plant	387	(8)
Part V. Conclusions	395	(66)
14. Overview of present and future stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium	395	(21)
I. Introduction	395	(1)
II. Investories at the end of 1994	395	(2)
III. Types of inventory	397	(1)
IV. Military inventories in nuclear weapon states	398	(3)
V. Weapon-related inventories and capabilities in countries other than the acknowledged nuclear weapon states	401	(3)
VI. Civil inventories of plutonium and HEU	404	(2)
VII. Material under international safeguards	406	(5)
VII. Possible future trends in plutonium and HEU inventories	411
Table 14.1. Central estimates for civil and military inventories of plutonium and HEU, 31 December 1994	397	(1)
Table 14.2. Central estimates for inventories of plutonium and HEU by type, 31 December 1994	398	(1)
Table 14.3. NWS inventories of highly enriched uranium, after losses and draw-downs, 31 December 1994	399	(1)
Table 14.4. NWS inventories of military plutonium, after losses, 31 December 1994	400	(2)
Table 14.5. Central estimates for current and former de facto nuclear weapon states' inventories of plutonium and HEU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes	402	(1)
Table 14.6. Central estimates for de facto nuclear weapon states' inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and WGU, produced for nuclear weapon purposes	402	(2)
Table 14.7. Civil stocks of plutonium by NPT status, 31 December 1994 (and 1993)	404	(1)
Table 14.8. Civil plutonium separation and use, to 31 December 1994 (and 1993)	405	(3)
Table 14.9. Approximate quantities of plutonium under IAEA safeguards, 31 December 1993	408	(4)
Table 14.10. Projection of cumulative spent-fuel dicharges, plutonium separation and unrecycled stocks, 31 December 1993, 2000 and 2010	412	(2)
Table 14.11. Illustrative inventories of weapon-grade plutonium and HEU inside and outside operational nuclear weapons	414	(2)
15. The control and disposition of fissile materials: the new policy agenda	416	(45)
I. Introduction	416	(2)
II. Two industrial and regulatory systems	418	(3)
III. Contemporary pressures to achieve universality and transparency	421	(3)
IV. Measures against undeclared activities in NNWS parties to the NPT	424	(3)
V. Bilateral initiatives to strengthen controls in the FSU	427	(3)
VI. Extending the multilateral framework for material controls	430	(7)
VII. The disposition of excess plutonium and HEU	437	(7)
VIII. HEU disposition	444	(2)
IX. Plutonium disposition	446	(7)
X. Obstacles to an international disposition strategy	453	(1)
XI. Conclusion: moving towards the framework of control required by complete nuclear disarmament	454
Table 15.1. Illustrative inventories of plutonium available for disposition	443	(2)
Table 15.2. HEU disposition scenarios	445	(2)
Table 15.3. Capacities for disposition through plutonium recycling in power reactors	447	(14)
Appendices	461	(30)
Appendix A. Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium production	461	(11)
I. Weapon-grade plutonium production	461	(3)
II. Highly enriched uranium	464
Table A.1. Representative conversion factors for reactors producing weapon-grade plutonium	462	(1)
Table A.2. Conversion factors for gas-graphite reactor with natural uranium fuel	463	(1)
Table A.3. Gas-graphite, air-cooled reactor with natural uranium fuel	463	(5)
Table A.4. Overview of principal enrichment technologies	468	(1)
Table A.5. Common examples of Enriched uranium output	469	(1)
Table A.6. Weapon-grade uranium production (93% enriched)	469	(1)
Table A.7. Current activites on uranium sepration and the level of such activities, by country	470	(1)
Table A.8. Commercial enrichment plants	471
Figure A.1. The basic elements of a gaseous-diffusion plant	465	(1)
Figure A.2. A gas centrifuge and a centrifuge rotor	466	(1)
Figure A.3. EMIS configuration	467	(5)
Appendix B. Calculation of plutonium production in power reactors	472	(7)
Table B.1. Plutonium discharge rate by reactor type	473	(6)
Appendix C. Sepration of plutonium from power-reactor fuel at reprocessing plants	479	(7)
Table C.1. Plutonium separation from British Magnox power-rector fuel at B205	479	(1)
Table C.2. Plutonium separated from foreign Magnox fuel at B205	480	(1)
Table C.3. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-reactor fuel at UP1 (France)	481	(1)
Table C.4. Plutonium separated from Magnox power-fuel at UP2 (France)	482	(1)
Table C.5. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP2 (France)	483	(1)
Table C.6. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at UP3	483	(1)
Table C.7. Plutonium separated from oxide fuel at WAK (Germany)	484	(1)
Table C.8. Plutonium Separated from oxide fuel at Tokai-mura (Japan)	484	(1)
Table C.9. World annual separation of civil plutonium, 1965-2000	485	(1)
Appendix D. Reaserch reactors(>1 MWth) using HEU fuel	486	(5)
Table D.1. US operating reaserch and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU Fuel (as of mid-1995)	486	(1)
Table D.2. US-supplied operating research and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU (.90%) fuel (as of mid-1995)	487	(1)
Table D.3. Russian operating research and test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)	488	(1)
Table D.4. Russian-supplied operating research had test reactors with power >1 MWth using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)	488	(1)
Table D.5. Chinese and Chinese-supplied operating research and test reactors using HEU fuel (as of mid-1995)	489	(2)
Index	491