Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics

by Edited by William A. Barnett , Norman Schofield , Melvin Hinich

• ISBN13: 9780521417815
• ISBN10: 0521417813
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1993-08-27
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Section 1 investigates models of voting and representation, section 2 explores dimensions of political institutions, section 3 covers strategic aspects of competition, and section 4 examines key aspects of government behavior.

Table of Contents

Political economy: a personal interpretation and an overview Norman J. Schofield

Part I. Perspectives on Political Economy: 1. Political ideology, communication, and community Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger

2. Implementation and enforcement in institutional modeling Leonid Hurwicz

3. Toward a theory of institutional change Douglas C. North

4. The development of contemporary political theory Peter C. Ordeshook

Part II. Representation and Voting: 5. Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections Roger B. Myerson

6. Party competition in a spatial model of coalition Norman J. Schofield

7. Some foundations for empirical study in the Euclidean spatial model of social choice Craig A. Tovey

Part III. Political Institutions: 8. Communications in institutions: efficiency in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with hidden information Randall L. Calvert

9. The courts and slavery in the United States: property rights and credible commitment John N. Drobak

10. On the pervasiveness of sophisticated sincerity Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel

11. Initial versus continuing proposal power in legislative seniority systems Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman

Part IV. Political Competition: 12. Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram

13. Campaign contributions and party-candidate competition in services and policies David P. Baron and Jongryn Mo

14. Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote John Londregan and Thomas Romer

15. Credibility and the responsiveness of direct legislation

Part V. Information Acquisition by Government: 16. Information acquisition and orthogonal argument David Austen-Smith

17. A welfare analysis of political action Susanne Lohmann

Part VI. Government Behaviouor

18. Monetary policy and credibility under exact monetary aggregation William A. Barnett

19. A general equilibrium model with endogenous government behaviour Eric Drissen and Frans Van Winden.