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List of ABBREVIATIONS | p. vii |
Preface | p. xiii |
Introduction and Summary Argument | p. 1 |
Why Fight about Corporate Governance? | p. 3 |
Great Variance and the "Great Reversals" | p. 4 |
Putting the Pieces Together: In Search of a Political Explanation | p. 10 |
Policy Consequences | p. 12 |
Plan of Attack | p. 14 |
Governance Patterns: What Causes What? | p. 15 |
Outcomes: Dependent Variables and Patterns of Control | p. 16 |
Capitalist Economic Policies, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Degrees of Coordination | p. 20 |
Politics: Preferences and Institutions | p. 22 |
Conclusion | p. 26 |
Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition | p. 27 |
Origins of the Debate | p. 28 |
Incomplete Contracts and Private Order | p. 30 |
Law and Regulation: Minority Shareholder Protections--Information, Oversight, Control, and Incentives | p. 39 |
Varieties of Capitalism: Degrees of Coordination in Market Economies | p. 51 |
Conclusion | p. 55 |
Politics: Preferences and Institutions | p. 57 |
Mapping Financial Interests on Political Processes: A Causal Model | p. 57 |
Preferences and Coalitions among Owners, Managers, and Workers | p. 59 |
Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Mechanisms | p. 67 |
Alternative Arguments: Legal Family and Economic Sociology | p. 83 |
Conclusion | p. 93 |
Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict | p. 95 |
Owners and Managers Dominate Workers | p. 96 |
The Investor Model | p. 96 |
Analytic Narrative | p. 123 |
Korea: Changing Institutions, Shifting Preferences | p. 123 |
Workers Dominate Owners and Managers | p. 132 |
The Labor Power Model | p. 132 |
Analytic Narrative | p. 140 |
Sweden: The Exemplar of the Labor Power Model? | p. 140 |
Conclusion | p. 147 |
Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict | p. 149 |
Cross-Class Coalitions | p. 149 |
The Corporatist Model: Workers and Managers Dominate Owners | p. 150 |
Analytic Narrative | p. 159 |
Germany: From Corporatist Bargain to a Transparency Coalition | p. 160 |
Japan: Concentration without Owners | p. 167 |
The Netherlands: The Evolution of "Poldermodel" Corporatism | p. 177 |
Building Coalitions in Authoritarian Systems | p. 187 |
The Oligarchy Model: Owners Dominate Workers and Managers | p. 187 |
Analytic Narratives | p. 189 |
Russia: Oligarchs and Politics | p. 190 |
China: "Selectorate-Electorate" Coalition | p. 192 |
Singapore: Shareholder Protections with "Guided" Democracy | p. 199 |
Conclusion | p. 203 |
Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions | p. 205 |
Workers and Owners Dominate Managers | p. 205 |
From Class Conflict to Corporatist Compromise | p. 206 |
Analytic Narratives | p. 228 |
Chile: Authoritarian Roots of the Transparency Coalition | p. 228 |
Malaysia: Ethnicity and Democracy in Governance Politics | p. 232 |
Managers Dominate Owners and Workers | p. 237 |
"Managerism" | p. 237 |
Analytic Narratives | p. 241 |
The United States: A Contested Path from Oligarchy to MSP | p. 241 |
United Kingdom: The Power of Majoritarian Political Institutions? | p. 259 |
France: Without the State, Who Is in Control? | p. 262 |
Conclusion | p. 273 |
Conclusion: Going Forward | p. 277 |
Questions and Answers: What Explains Variance? | p. 277 |
Shortcomings and Guideposts for Future Research | p. 285 |
Conclusion: Fighting over the Governance Debate | p. 287 |
Data Appendix | p. 297 |
Bibliography | p. 313 |
Index | p. 333 |
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