Political Power And Corporate Control

by Gourevitch, Peter Alexis

• ISBN13: 9780691122915
• ISBN10: 0691122911
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2005-08-15
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Corporate governance has become front page news in the United States and Europe with the collapse of companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat. Once the sleepy preserve of corporate lawyers and accountants, the way corporations are run is increasingly the subject of government intervention and public scrutiny. In this book, Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn take a major step beyond standard accounts by explaining how politics shapes corporate governance-how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. They combine a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America-collectively 99.5% of the global stock market by value-and with detailed narratives of specific country cases.

Author Biography

Peter A. Gourevitch is Professor of Political Science and founding Dean at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii
PREFACE	xiii
CHAPTER ONE Introduction and Summary Argument	1	(14)
Why Fight about Corporate Governance?	3	(1)
Great Variance and the "Great Reversals"	4	(6)
Putting the Pieces Together: In Search of a Political Explanation	10	(2)
Policy Consequences	12	(2)
Plan of Attack	14	(1)
CHAPTER TWO Governance Patterns: What Causes What?	15	(12)
Outcomes: Dependent Variables and Patterns of Control	16	(4)
Capitalist Economic Policies, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Degrees of Coordination	20	(2)
Politics: Preferences and Institutions	22	(4)
Conclusion	26	(1)
CHAPTER THREE Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition	27	(30)
Origins of the Debate	28	(2)
Incomplete Contracts and Private Order	30	(9)
Law and Regulation: Minority Shareholder Protections—Information, Oversight, Control, and Incentives	39	(12)
Varieties of Capitalism: Degrees of Coordination in Market Economies	51	(4)
Conclusion	55	(2)
CHAPTER FOUR Politics: Preferences and Institutions	57	(38)
Mapping Financial Interests on Political Processes: A Causal Model	57	(2)
Preferences and Coalitions among Owners, Managers, and Workers	59	(8)
Political Institutions: Majoritarian and Consensus Mechanisms	67	(16)
Alternative Arguments: Legal Family and Economic Sociology	83	(10)
Conclusion	93	(2)
CHAPTER FIVE Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict	95	(54)
Section 1: Owners and Managers Dominate Workers	96	(36)
The Investor Model	96	(27)
Analytic Narrative	123	(9)
Korea: Changing Institutions, Shifting Preferences	123	(9)
Section 2: Workers Dominate Owners and Managers	132	(15)
The Labor Power Model	132	(8)
Analytic Narrative	140	(9)
Sweden: The Exemplar of the Labor Power Model?	140	(7)
Conclusion	147	(2)
CHAPTER SIX Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict	149	(56)
Section 1: Cross-Class Coalitions	149	(38)
The Corporatist Model: Workers and Managers Dominate Owners	150	(9)
Analytic Narrative	159	(28)
Germany: From Corporatist Bargain to a Transparency Coalition	160	(7)
Japan: Concentration without Owners	167	(10)
The Netherlands: The Evolution of "Poldermodel" Corporatism	177	(10)
Section 2: Building Coalitions in Authoritarian Systems	187	(16)
The Oligarchy Model: Owners Dominate Workers and Managers	187	(2)
Analytic Narratives	189	(16)
Russia: Oligarchs and Politics	190	(2)
China: "Selectorate–Electorate" Coalition	192	(7)
Singapore: Shareholder Protections with "Guided" Democracy	199	(4)
Conclusion	203	(2)
CHAPTER SEVEN Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions	205	(72)
Section 1: Workers and Owners Dominate Managers	205	(32)
From Class Conflict to Corporatist Compromise	206	(22)
Analytic Narratives	228	(9)
Chile: Authoritarian Roots of the Transparency Coalition	228	(4)
Malaysia: Ethnicity and Democracy in Governance Politics	232	(5)
Section 2: Managers Dominate Owners and Workers	237	(36)
"Managerism"	237	(4)
Analytic Narratives	241	(32)
The United States: A Contested Path from Oligarchy to MSP	241	(18)
United Kingdom: The Power of Majoritarian Political Institutions?	259	(3)
France: Without the State, Who Is in Control?	262	(11)
Conclusion	273	(4)
CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion: Going Forward	277	(20)
Questions and Answers: What Explains Variance?	277	(8)
Shortcomings and Guideposts for Future Research	285	(2)
Conclusion: Fighting over the Governance Debate	287	(10)
DATA APPENDIX	297	(16)
BIBLIOGRAPHY	313	(20)
INDEX	333