The Populist Paradox

by Gerber, Elisabeth R.

• ISBN13: 9780691002675
• ISBN10: 0691002673
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1999-07-01
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Do small but wealthy interest groups influence referendums, ballot initiatives, and other forms of direct legislation at the expense of the broader public interest? Many observers argue that they do, often lamenting that direct legislation has, paradoxically, been captured by the very same wealthy interests whose power it was designed to curb. Elisabeth Gerber, however, challenges that argument. In this first systematic study of how money and interest group power actually affect direct legislation, she reveals that big spending does not necessarily mean big influence. Gerber bases her findings on extensive surveys of the activities and motivations of interest groups and on close examination of campaign finance records from 168 direct legislation campaigns in eight states. Her research confirms what such wealthy interests as the insurance industry, trial lawyer associations, and tobacco companies have learned by defeats at the ballot box: if citizens do not like a proposed new law, even an expensive, high-profile campaign will not make them change their mind. She demonstrates, however, that these economic interest groups have considerable success in using direct legislation to block initiatives that others are proposing and to exert pressure on politicians. By contrast, citizen interest groups with broad-based support and significant organizational resources have proven to be extremely effective in using direct legislation to pass new laws. Clearly written and argued, this is a major theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of citizens and organized interests in the American legislative process.

Table of Contents

List of Figures List of Tables	p. xi
Acknowledgment	p. xiii
What Is the Populist Paradox?	p. 3
A Theory of Interest Group Influence	p. 6
Motivation: The Study of Interest Group Influence	p. 10
Justification: Why Study Direct Legislation?	p. 15
Plan of the Book	p. 19
Interest Group Choice	p. 21
Forms of Influence	p. 21
Interest Group Choice	p. 27
Achieving Influence	p. 30
Summary and Conclusions	p. 36
Direct Legislation Hurdles	p. 37
Achieving Direct Modifying Influence	p. 38
Achieving Direct Preserving Influence Achieving Indirect Modifying Influence	p. 50
Achieving Indirect Preserving Influence: Opposing an Initiative to Signal the Legislature	p. 52
Behavioral Hurdles	p. 52
Summary and Conclusions	p. 58
Group Characteristics and Resources	p. 59
Monetary and Personnel Resources	p. 59
Using Resources to Overcome Hurdles	p. 60
Membership Characteristics	p. 65
Classifying Groups and Their Resources	p. 69
Hypotheses about Motivations and Forms of Influence	p. 71
Summary	p. 75
Motivations and Strategies	p. 76
Methodology	p. 76
What Do Groups Say They Do?	p. 80
What Do Groups Actually Do?	p. 93
Summary and Conclusions	p. 100
Direct Policy Consequences	p. 101
Direct Policy Consequences	p. 101
Summary and Conclusions	p. 119
Indirect Policy Consequences	p. 121
State Policy Differences	p. 122
Summary and Conclusions	p. 136
The Populist Paradox: Reality Or Illusion?	p. 137
Economic Group Limitations	p. 137
Citizen Group Dominance	p. 140
Implications for the Study of Direct Legislation	p. 140
Implications for the Study Of Interest Group Influence	p. 141
Positive versus Normative Implications	p. 142
A Final Assessment	p. 146
Appendixes	p. 147
Direct Legislation Institutions	p. 147
Survey Of Organizations	p. 152
References	p. 159
Index	p. 165
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.