Power Indices and Coalition Formation

by Holler, Manfred J.; Owen, Guillermo

• ISBN13: 9780792373599
• ISBN10: 0792373596
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2001-09-01
• Publisher: Kluwer Academic Pub

Summary

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role. New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.

Table of Contents

``Why Power Indices and Coalition Formation?''	1	(14)
Manfred J. Holler
Guillermo Owen
1. Refinements and Extensions of Power Indices
``An Average Value Function for Cooperative Games''	15	(14)
Vladimir Akimov
William Kerby
``Extended Probabilistic Characterization of Power Indices''	29	(16)
Matthias Brueckner
``Axiomatics of Level Structure Values''	45	(18)
Frederic Chantreuil
``Values for Multialternative Games and Multilinear Extensions''	63	(24)
Rie Ono
``Models and Reality: The Curious Case of the Absent Abstention''	87	(18)
Dan S. Felsenthal
Moshe Machover
``Global Monotonicity of Values of Cooperative Games: An Argument Supporting the Explanatory Power of Shapley's Approach''	105	(22)
Rene Levinsky
Peter Silarszky
``On the Probabilistic Relationship Between the Public Good Index and the Normalized Banzhaf Index''	127	(16)
Mika Widgren
``A Note on the Holler-Packel Axiomatization of the Public Good Index (PGI)''	143	(10)
Stefan Napel
2. Coalition Formation and Values
``Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures''	153	(22)
Rafel Amer
Francesc Carreras
``Equal Treatment for Both Sides of Assignment Games in the Modified Least Core''	175	(28)
Peter Sudholter
``On Small Coalitions, Hierarchic Decision Making and Collective Competence''	203	(12)
Sven Berg
``An Axiomatic Approach to Probabilistic Efficient Values for Cooperative Games''	215	(16)
Tadeusz Radzik
Theo Driession
``Set Games''	231	(22)
Harry Aarts
Yukihiko Funaki
Kees Hoede
3. Power in European Decision Making
``Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures''	253	(20)
Annick Laruelle
Mika Widgren
``Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules''	273	(18)
Thomas Konig
Thomas Brauninger
``Calculus of Consent in the EU Council of Ministers''	291	(24)
Hannu Nurmi
Tommi Meskanen
Antti Pajala
``Coalition Formation and Voting in the Council of the European Union''	315	(26)
Madeleine O. Hosli
``Voting Power in the European Central Bank''	341	(12)
Matthias Brueckner
4. Power and Representation
``Power Indices and the Design of Electoral/Constitutional Systems''	353	(10)
Ron J. Johnston
``Implementing Democracy in Indirect Voting Processes: the Knesset Case''	363	(8)
Annick Laruelle
``Index of Power for Cabinet''	371
Jacek W. Mercik