Practical Intelligence and the Virtues

by Russell, Daniel C.

• ISBN13: 9780199565795
• ISBN10: 0199565791
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-06-22
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right,and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously orkindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. Thisbook develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or 'phronesis'--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalenceabout the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues--a trend Russell argues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, 'the virtuous person'. Written ina clear and careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers and students alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology.

Author Biography

Daniel Russell (Ph.D., University of Arizona, 2000) is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wichita State University, Kansas. His main research and teaching interests lie in ancient philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy. He is the author of Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford, 2005), and is currently completing a book on the relation of virtue to happiness, bridging ancient and modern perspectives.

Table of Contents

Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach	p. 1
Deliberation	p. 4
Phronesis	p. 13
The Phronesis Controversy	p. 31
Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action	p. 35
Right Action for Virtue Ethics	p. 37
Right Action and Serious Practical Concerns	p. 39
Two Constraints on Right Action	p. 44
Must Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint?	p. 46
Can Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint?	p. 65
Right Action and Virtuous Motives	p. 72
The Structure of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics	p. 74
Virtuous Acts and Virtuous Motivations	p. 77
Why Virtues are Virtues	p. 86
Reasons for Virtue	p. 95
Right Action and 'The Virtuous Person'	p. 103
Doing Without 'The Virtuous Person'	p. 104
'Virtuous Enough'	p. 112
Ideals and Aspirations	p. 123
Virtues, Persons, and 'The Virtuous Person'	p. 130
Representing 'The Virtuous Person'	p. 135
The Enumeration Problem	p. 143
The Enumeration Problem	p. 145
The Enumeration Problem: An Introduction	p. 145
Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Actions	p. 161
Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Persons	p. 166
Enumeration and Naturalism	p. 172
Individuating the Virtues	p. 177
From Individuation to Enumeration	p. 178
'The Same Reasons'	p. 188
Reasons, Individuation, and Cardinality	p. 196
Implications for Hard Virtue Ethics	p. 204
Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination	p. 209
Magnificence as a Virtue	p. 212
Subordination, Specialization, and Cardinality	p. 217
Alternatives to the Subordination View	p. 221
Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues	p. 237
Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions	p. 239
Situationism and Dispositionism	p. 243
Situationism and Personality	p. 252
Idiographic Predictions of Consistency	p. 263
Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence	p. 268
How to Test Broad-Based Dispositions for Cross-Situational Consistency	p. 269
Putting Dispositions to the Test: Four Representative Experiments	p. 273
Interpreting the Findings	p. 278
From Situationism to Virtue Theory	p. 292
Situationism: From Empirical to Philosophical Psychology	p. 295
Situationism and Virtue Theory: Normative Adequacy	p. 304
From Common Sense to Virtue Theory?	p. 306
Out-Sourcing the Empirical Work?	p. 314
A Cognitive-Affective Approach to the Virtues	p. 323
Defending Hard Virtue Theory	p. 333
Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues	p. 335
The Unity of Which Virtues?	p. 339
What Unifies the Virtues?	p. 355
Attributive and Model Theses	p. 362
Responsibility for Character	p. 374
Depth, Self-Construction, and Responsibility	p. 374
On Responsibility and 'Ultimate Responsibility' for Character	p. 380
What is Critical Distance?	p. 388
From Critical Distance to Responsibility	p. 392
Objections to the Critical Distance View	p. 404
Works Cited	p. 415
Index Locorum	p. 429
General Index	p. 433
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