Principles of Conflict Economics: A Primer for Social Scientists

by Charles H. Anderton , John R. Carter

• ISBN13: 9780521698658
• ISBN10: 0521698650
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2009-03-16
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two important ways. First, it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives. Second, it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. Drawing on a half-century of scholarship, this book presents a primer on the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Although much work in the field is abstract, the book is made accessible to a broad audience of scholars, students, and policymakers by relying on historical data, relatively simple graphs, and intuitive narratives. In exploring the interdependence of economics and conflict, the book presents current perspectives of conflict economics in novel ways and offers new insights into economic aspects of violence.

Author Biography

Charles H. Anderton is Professor of Economics at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, where he has taught since 1986. John R. Carter is Professor of Economics at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, where he has served on the faculty since 1976.

Table of Contents

List of Figures	p. xi
List of Tables	p. xvii
Preface	p. xix
Introduction: Definition and Scope of Conflict Economics	p. 1
What Is Conflict Economics?	p. 1
A Look at Conflict Large and Small	p. 2
Methodology of Conflict Economics	p. 10
Organization of Book	p. 13
Bibliographic Notes	p. 13
Production Possibilities and the Guns versus Butter Trade-Off	p. 15
Production Possibilities Model	p. 15
Applications	p. 21
Bibliographic Notes	p. 27
Rational Choice and Equilibrium	p. 28
Rational Choice Model	p. 28
Supply, Demand, and Market Equilibrium	p. 43
A Taxonomy of Goods	p. 50
Bibliographic Notes	p. 52
Fundamentals of Game Theory	p. 53
Basic Concepts	p. 53
Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games	p. 59
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma	p. 63
Bibliographic Notes	p. 66
A Bargaining Model of Conflict	p. 67
Elements of Conflict	p. 67
Sources of Violent Conflict	p. 69
Third-Party Intervention	p. 78
Bibliographic Notes	p. 81
Conflict between States	p. 83
The Conflict Cycle	p. 83
Patterns of Armed Interstate Conflict	p. 85
Hirshleïfer's Bargaining Model and Interstate War	p. 87
Selected Empirical Studies of Interstate Conflict	p. 92
Bibliographic Notes	p. 101
Civil War and Genocide	p. 104
Definitions	p. 104
Patterns of Armed Civil Conflict and Genocide	p. 105
Theoretical Perspectives on Civil War	p. 113
Selected Empirical Studies of Civil War and Genocide	p. 118
Bibliographic Notes	p. 124
Terrorism	p. 126
Defining Terrorism	p. 126
Patterns of Terrorism	p. 127
A Rational Choice Model of Terrorism	p. 132
Game Theoretic Perspectives of Terrorism	p. 139
Selected Empirical Studies of Terrorism	p. 146
Bibliographic Notes	p. 153
Geography and Technology of Conflict	p. 155
Boulding's Model of Spatial Conflict	p. 155
O'Sullivan's Three-Dimensional Model of Spatial Conflict	p. 164
Schelling's Inherent Propensity toward Peace or War	p. 168
Number and Size of Nations	p. 174
Selected Empirical Studies	p. 179
Bibliographic Notes	p. 183
Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and Arms Control	p. 185
Definitions	p. 185
Patterns of Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and Arms Control	p. 186
The Richardson Arms Race Model	p. 197
The Intriligator-Brito Model	p. 202
An Economic Choice Model of Arms Rivalry	p. 210
Selected Empirical Studies	p. 217
Bibliographic Notes	p. 220
Military Alliances	p. 222
Definitions	p. 223
Patterns of Interstate Alliances	p. 226
Pure Public Good Model of Alliances	p. 229
Joint Product Model of Alliances	p. 237
Selected Empirical Studies	p. 240
Bibliographic Notes	p. 244
Conflict Success Functions and the Theory of Appropriation Possibilities	p. 246
Conflict Success Functions	p. 246
A Model of Appropriation Possibilities	p. 249
Appropriation Possibilities in a Production/Exchange Economy	p. 256
Bibliographic Notes	p. 267
Statistical Methods	p. 269
Populations and Samples	p. 269
Probability and Sampling	p. 270
Expected Values and Unbiased Estimators	p. 272
Statistical Inference	p. 272
Regression Analysis	p. 274
A More Formal Bargaining Model of Conflict	p. 277
Basic Model of Resource Conflict	p. 277
Selected Sources of Violence	p. 280
References	p. 285
Author Index	p. 307
Subject Index	p. 315
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