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| The theory of economic regulation | p. 3 |
| The independent judiciary in an interest-group perspective | p. 22 |
| Does interest group theory justify more intrusive judicial review? | p. 49 |
| Ways of criticizing public choice : the uses of empiricism and theory in legal scholarship | p. 131 |
| Legislative organization | p. 159 |
| Empire-building government in constitutional law | p. 175 |
| Prodelegation : why administrators should make political decisions | p. 235 |
| The political origins of the administrative procedure act | p. 255 |
| The presidential power of unilateral action | p. 293 |
| Statutes' domains | p. 343 |
| Politics without romance : implications of public choice theory for statutory interpretation | p. 363 |
| Congress is a "they," not an "it" : legislative intent as oxymoron | p. 427 |
| Legislative intent : the use of positive political theory in statutory interpretation | p. 445 |
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