Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification

by Fogelin, Robert J.

• ISBN13: 9780195089875
• ISBN10: 0195089871
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1994-09-22
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

This work, written from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, is an examination of contemporary theories of knowledge and justification. It takes ideas primarily found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism , restates them in a modern idiom, and then asks whether any contemporary theory of knowledge meets the challenges they raise. The first part, entitled "Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge," attempts to rescue our ordinary concept of knowledge from those philosophers who have assigned burdens to it that it cannot bear. Properly understood, Fogelin shows that the concept of knowledge is unproblematic. The second part of this study, called "Agrippa and the Problem of Justification," examines Agrippa's contribution to Pyrrhonism, a systematic reduction of its procedures which came to be known as the "Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief." These modes present a completely general procedure for refuting any claim a dogmatist might make. Though largely unnoticed, there is, according to Fogelin, an uncanny resemblance between problems posed by Agrippa's "Five Modes" and those that contemporary epistemologists address under the heading of a theory of justification . Fogelin examines the strongest contemporary theories of justification--in both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist forms. The conclusion is that recent philosophical writings on justification have made no significant progress in responding to the Pyrrhonian problems these writings have addressed.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Philosophical Skepticism and Pyrrhonism	p. 3
Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge
Gettier Problems	p. 15
Gettier's Formulation	p. 15
Gettier's Reasons for Accepting His First Point	p. 16
Gettier's Understanding of Justification	p. 17
A Second Interpretation of Justification	p. 18
The Gettier Problems and Nonmonotonicity	p. 21
Variations on the Gettier Problems	p. 23
Epistemic Responsibility	p. 26
Conclusion	p. 28
Fourth-Clause Theories	p. 31
Analyses of Knowledge	p. 31
Indefeasibility Theories	p. 33
Externalism	p. 41
The Attraction of Externalism	p. 42
BonJour against the Reliabilists	p. 43
Externalist Grounds	p. 46
Goldman and Causal Theories of Knowing	p. 49
The Move to the Subjunctive	p. 54
Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis	p. 61
Conclusive Reasons	p. 61
Subjunctivism	p. 66
Subjunctivitis	p. 70
Subjunctive Conditionals and Possible Worlds	p. 72
Nozick against the "Skeptics,"	p. 75
The Failure of Epistemic Closure	p. 79
Nozick against the Skeptics	p. 81
Dretske against Epistemic Closure	p. 82
Epistemic Grace	p. 88
Justificatory Procedures	p. 89
Doubts	p. 90
Levels of Scrutiny	p. 93
Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing?	p. 95
It's Hard to Say	p. 98
Summary of Part I	p. 99
The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox	p. 102
The Lottery Paradox	p. 102
The Preface Paradox	p. 105
The Conjunction Principle for Knowledge	p. 108
Agrippa and the Problem of Justification
Agrippa and the Problem of Epistemic Justification	p. 113
The Problem	p. 114
Success Conditions on Theories of Justification	p. 117
Theories of Epistemic Justification	p. 119
Foundationalism	p. 123
Forms of Foundationalism	p. 123
Chisholm's Version of Foundationalism	p. 124
Levels of Justification	p. 125
Certainty and the Self-Presenting	p. 129
Presumptions	p. 132
The Transfer of Justification	p. 134
Material Epistemic Principles	p. 135
Summary and Evaluation	p. 138
Internal Coherentism	p. 146
BonJour's Version of Coherentism	p. 147
Standards of Coherence	p. 148
Immediate Problems	p. 149
The Doxastic Presumption	p. 152
Standard Objections to Coherentism	p. 154
Coherence and Observation	p. 155
The Multiple-Choice Problem	p. 158
Justification and Truth	p. 159
An Assessment	p. 162
Lehrer and the Isolation Objection	p. 162
External Coherentism	p. 170
Davidson's Version of Coherentism	p. 171
The Nature of Coherence	p. 172
Truth	p. 173
The Skeptical Challenge	p. 174
Sensation and Belief	p. 175
Meaning and Justification	p. 176
The Fundamental Argument	p. 176
The Golden Triangle	p. 182
Davidson's Externalist Semantics	p. 183
The Problem of Error	p. 184
The Cartesian Skeptic's Reply	p. 186
The Pyrrhonian Skeptic's Reply	p. 188
Pyrrhonism	p. 192
Neo-Pyrrhonism	p. 192
Again, Is There a Fact of the Matter in Knowing?	p. 193
The Pyrrhonist's Use of Epistemic Terms	p. 195
Is Skepticism Statable?	p. 196
A Temporary Stopping Point	p. 202
Two Wittgensteins	p. 205
Turning Things Around	p. 206
Holism	p. 208
Publicity	p. 211
Action	p. 215
References	p. 223
Index	p. 231
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