Rational Choice Politics

by Keith Dowding

• ISBN13: 9781412945028
• ISBN10: 141294502X
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-03-12
• Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd

Summary

The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.Volume I: Social Choice and EquilibriumVolume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral SystemsVolume III: Legislatures and Pressure PoliticsVolume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State

Table of Contents

Social Choice and Equilibrium

Social Choice On the Rationale of Group Decision-making

A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem

A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Equilibrium A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule

Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control

Generic Instability of Majority Rule

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions

On 64%-Majority Rule

Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice

The Uncovered Set and the Core

An Essay on Bargaining

Bargaining in Legislatures

A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Electoral Systems Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions

A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout

Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

A New Theory of Strategic Voting

Voting, Elections and Pressure Politics

Voting and Elections A Theory of the Calculus of Voting

Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

The Swing Voter's Curse

Voting as Communicating

The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model

Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control

Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence

Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters

An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium

Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes

Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics

Pressure Politics The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft

The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society

A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests

Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented

Protection for Sale

The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective

Legislatures

Bureaucracy Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas

Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior

Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting

Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale fo

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