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Preface | p. xiii |
Acknowledgments | p. xix |
Introduction | p. 1 |
Rationality, Markets, and Institutions | p. 13 |
Rediscovering the Scottish Philosophers | p. 15 |
Exchange in Social and Economic Order | p. 15 |
Lessons from Scotland | p. 18 |
On Two Forms of Rationality | p. 24 |
Introduction | p. 24 |
Constructivist Rationality | p. 26 |
Limitations and Distractions of Constructivist Rationality | p. 32 |
Ecological Rationality | p. 36 |
Implications | p. 41 |
Impersonal Exchange: The Extended Order of the Market | p. 43 |
Relating the Two Concepts of a Rational Order | p. 45 |
Introduction | p. 45 |
Airline Route Deregulation | p. 47 |
The California Energy Crisis | p. 50 |
Economic Systems Design | p. 53 |
Constructivism as Rational Reconstruction of Emergent Order | p. 57 |
Market Institutions and Performance | p. 61 |
Knowledge, Institutions, and Markets | p. 61 |
The Iowa Electronic Market | p. 68 |
Strategy Proof-ness: Theory and Behavior | p. 70 |
Did Gresham Have a Law? | p. 74 |
Market Power and the Efficacy of Markets | p. 75 |
Equilibrium with a Dominant Firm? | p. 75 |
The Ethyl Case and Antitrust Policy | p. 77 |
Gasoline Market Behavior and Competition Policy | p. 81 |
Predatory Pricing | p. 83 |
Entry Cost and Competition: Contestable Markets Theory | p. 86 |
Asymmetric Information and Equilibrium without Process | p. 94 |
Rationality in Asymmetric Information Markets | p. 94 |
The Neoclassical Synthesis | p. 101 |
Hayek and the Hurwicz Program | p. 104 |
Experimental Markets with Asymmetric Information | p. 108 |
Markets for Quality | p. 109 |
Labor Markets and Efficiency Wages | p. 111 |
FCC Spectrum Auctions and Combinatorial Designs: Theory and Experiment | p. 115 |
Introduction | p. 115 |
Auctions: Modeling Institutions | p. 116 |
Economics of English Auctions | p. 117 |
Independent Private Values | p. 118 |
Common Values | p. 121 |
Review of Relevant Experimental Results | p. 125 |
Single Object Auctions | p. 126 |
Common Value Auctions | p. 126 |
A "Winner's Curse" in Private Value English Auctions for Gambles? | p. 127 |
Jump Bidding and the Class of Badly Performing Multiple-Unit English Auctions | p. 127 |
The English Clock Corrects Bad Performance | p. 130 |
Combinatorial Auctions | p. 131 |
Tests of SMR and a Proposed Alternative | p. 133 |
The FCC Auction Design Process | p. 137 |
Auction Design for Complex Environments | p. 140 |
The Combo Clock: Simple Solutions for Complex Auctions | p. 141 |
Implications for the Design of Spectrum Auctions | p. 144 |
Psychology and Markets | p. 149 |
Psychology's Challenge to Constructivist Rationality | p. 149 |
Psychology, Economics, and the Two Forms of Rationality | p. 156 |
What Is Fairness? | p. 161 |
Examples of Fairness | p. 163 |
Fairness: An Experimental Market Test | p. 166 |
What Is Rationality? | p. 168 |
Economic Survival versus Maximizing Utility | p. 169 |
Maximizing the Probability of Survival | p. 169 |
Maximizing Expected "Profit," or Discounted Withdrawals | p. 172 |
Is It Rational to Be "Rational"? | p. 173 |
Literature Background | p. 176 |
Modeling Net Subjective Value | p. 177 |
Examples from Experiments | p. 179 |
Monetary Incentives: Further Discussion | p. 180 |
Rationality in Collectives and the Sense of Number | p. 182 |
Market Rationality: Capital versus Commodity and Service Flow Markets | p. 186 |
Personal Exchange: The External Order of Social Exchange | p. 189 |
Emergent Order without the Law | p. 192 |
Rules and Order | p. 192 |
Ellickson Out-Coases Coase | p. 196 |
The Effects of Context on Behavior | p. 199 |
Introduction and Elementary Theoretical Background | p. 199 |
Perspectives on Interpreting Results | p. 200 |
How Does Context Matter? | p. 202 |
Anonymity as a Treatment Procedure | p. 204 |
Perception, Context, and the Internal Order of the Mind | p. 206 |
The Significance of Experimental Procedures | p. 209 |
Overview of Experimental Procedures | p. 211 |
The Ultimatum Game Example | p. 212 |
Dictator Games | p. 220 |
Behavioral Deviation from Prediction: Error, Confusion, or Evidence of Brain Function? | p. 227 |
Investment Trust Games: Effects of Gains from Exchange in Dictator Giving | p. 234 |
A Celebrated Two-Stage Dictator Game | p. 234 |
Reciprocity or Other-Regarding Preferences? | p. 237 |
Reciprocity in Trust Games | p. 245 |
Introduction | p. 245 |
Trust Games without a Punishment Option | p. 250 |
Why So Much Cooperation? | p. 253 |
Is It the Subjects? Undergraduates versus Graduates | p. 253 |
Machiavelli, Trust, and Cooperation: Mandeville's Knaves? | p. 254 |
Is It Utility for Other Payoff? | p. 257 |
Reciprocity versus Preferences: Does Own Opportunity Cost Influence Other Choice? | p. 260 |
Extensive versus Normal (Strategic) Form Games | p. 264 |
Trust Games with Punishment Options | p. 267 |
Self-Regarding Cooperation in Repeat Play? Protocols with and without Direct Punishment | p. 272 |
Effect of Matching Protocol on Frequency of Cooperation in Trust Games with and without Punishment | p. 274 |
Comparison of Behavior in the Repeated Play of Extensive and Normal Form Games | p. 274 |
A Matching Protocol Based on Sorting for Cooperative Behavior | p. 275 |
Order and Rationality in Method and Mind | p. 281 |
Rationality in Science | p. 283 |
Introduction | p. 283 |
Rational Constructivism in Method | p. 285 |
Can We Derive Theory Directly from Observation? | p. 285 |
Economics: Is It an Experimental Science? | p. 290 |
What Is the Scientists' qua Experimentalists' Image of What They Do? | p. 296 |
Auxiliaries and the Ambiguity of Rejecting the "Test" Hypothesis | p. 297 |
A D-Q Example from Physics | p. 298 |
A Proposition and Some Economics Examples | p. 300 |
The Methodology of Positive Economics | p. 304 |
In View of Proposition 2, What Are Experimentalists and Theorists to Do? | p. 304 |
Experimental Knowledge Drives Experimental Method | p. 305 |
The Machine Builders | p. 308 |
Technology and Science | p. 308 |
Technology and Experimental Economics | p. 309 |
In Conclusion | p. 311 |
Neuroeconomics: The Internal Order of the Mind | p. 312 |
Introduction | p. 312 |
Individual Decision Making | p. 314 |
Rewards and the Brain | p. 316 |
Strategic Interaction: Moves, Intentions, and Mind Reading | p. 316 |
What Are the Neuroeconomic Questions? | p. 317 |
A Summary | p. 322 |
References | p. 329 |
Index | p. 353 |
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The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.