Reduction, Explanation, and Realism

by Charles, David; Lennon, Kathleen

• ISBN13: 9780198751311
• ISBN10: 0198751311
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1992-08-27
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, colour, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels ofdescription or explanation? In recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examinethe motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields. Their essays constitute a unified discussion, into which the reader is led by an introductory chapter where the editors set out some of the central claims and questions.

Table of Contents

Notes on the Contributors
Introduction	p. 1
Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science	p. 19
Irreducibility and Teleology	p. 45
Reduction and Evolutionary Biology	p. 69
Structural Explanation in Social Theory	p. 97
Weak Externalism and Psychological Reduction	p. 133
Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology	p. 155
The Limitations of Pluralism	p. 179
Reduction, Causality, and Normativity	p. 225
Elimination Versus Non-Reductive Physicalism	p. 239
Supervenience, Composition, and Physicalism	p. 265
Values: Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by Ascent	p. 297
Valuing: Desiring Or Believing?	p. 323
Reductionism and First-Person Thinking	p. 361
The First Person: The Reductionist View of the Self	p. 381
The Autonomy of Colour	p. 421
Select Bibliography	p. 467
Index of names	p. 477
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