Re-Emergence

by Vision, Gerald

• ISBN13: 9780262015844
• ISBN10: 0262015846
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2011-07-29
• Publisher: Mit Pr

Summary

The presence of sentience in a basically material reality is among the mysteries of existence. Many philosophers of mind argue that conscious states and properties are nothing beyond the matter that brings them about. Finding these arguments less than satisfactory, Gerald Vision offers a nonphysicalist theory of mind. Revisiting and defending a key doctrine of the once widely accepted school of philosophy known as emergentism, Vision proposes that conscious states are emergents, although they depend for their existence on their material bases. Although many previous emergentist theories have been decisively undermined, Vision argues that emergent options are still viable on some issues. In Re-Emergence he explores the question of conscious properties arising from brute, unthinking matter, making the case that there is no equally plausible non-emergent alternative. Vision defends emergentism even while conceding that conscious properties and states are realized by or strongly supervene on the physical. He argues, however, that conscious properties cannot be reduced to, identified with, or given the right kind of materialist explanation in terms of the physical reality on which they depend. Rather than use emergentism simply to assail the current physicalist orthodoxy, Vision views emergentism as a contribution to understanding conscious aspects. After describing and defending his version of emergentism, Vision reviews several varieties of physicalism and near-physicalism, finding that his emergent theory does a better job of coming to grips with these phenomena.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. ix
Emergentism of the Mental Described and Defended
History and Background	p. 3
Surveying the Landscape	p. 3
Emergentism Depicted	p. 5
Classical Emergentism	p. 7
Problems and Refinements	p. 9
Emergence and the Mental	p. 13
Relevant Emergentist Theses	p. 14
Theories of the Mental I: Eliminativism	p. 19
Theories of the Mental II: Dualism	p. 24
Variations on Physicalist Themes	p. 25
Non-Reductive Physicalism Contrasted with Emergentism	p. 31
Conclusion	p. 33
Fleshing Out the View	p. 35
Elaboration of Supervenience and Explanation	p. 35
Supervenience Essentials	p. 36
Supervenience and Emergentism	p. 40
Explanation Essentials	p. 50
The Conceptual Gambit	p. 57
Some Alternative Formulations	p. 59
Transition	p. 62
Coincidence: Realization and Identity	p. 63
From Supervenience to Realization	p. 63
Realization and Identity	p. 65
Objections	p. 69
Artifacts as Temporary Properties of Matter	p. 70
Identity and Persistence Conditions	p. 72
Artifacts and Ontology	p. 78
Causation: Oppositions and Propinquities	p. 88
The Menace of Non-Physical Causation	p. 93
Arguments against Mental Causation	p. 93
The Lessons of the Criticisms	p. 101
Too Many Causes	p. 102
A Distinction between Mental and Neurological Properties	p. 104
Downward Causation	p. 108
Ultimate Particles and Descending Support	p. 113
A Causal Nexus	p. 122
Belief, Desire, and the Physical	p. 125
Access Consciousness Revisited	p. 125
Two Standards of Physicality	p. 125
Access-Conscious Properties and Behavior	p. 132
Elaborating and Augmenting	p. 136
Interlude	p. 141
Orthodox Alternatives
Physicalism: Chauvinism and Pluralism	p. 147
The Physicalist Landscape	p. 147
Multiple Realizability	p. 149
The Rudiments of Chauvinism	p. 152
Levels, Functions, and Forms	p. 157
Dora and Commander Data	p. 160
Pluralism	p. 166
Representationalism	p. 177
Prologue	p. 177
The Setting for Further Disccussion	p. 180
Intensionality and Intentionality	p. 182
Semantics Nsturotazed	p. 187
A Feature of Content	p. 194
Optimal Conditions	p. 195
Teteological Semantic Arguments	p. 197
Nonreductive Physicalism and Pure Token Identity	p. 203
Introducing Pure Token Identity	p. 203
A Most Curious Conundrum	p. 208
Background Conditions for Identity Claims	p. 210
Undisputed Cases and Complications	p. 213
Token Physicalism Revisited	p. 216
Materially Kosher Explanation	p. 220
Epilogue	p. 225
References	p. 231
Index	p. 243
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