Reform Processes and Policy Change

by Konig, Thomas; Tsebelis, George; Debus, Marc

• ISBN13: 9781441958082
• ISBN10: 1441958088
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-10-02
• Publisher: Springer Verlag

Summary

George Tsebelis’ veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.

Table of Contents

Introduction
Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction	p. 3
Identification of Veto Players
Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness	p. 21
The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement	p. 43
Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary Democracies	p. 69
Interpretation of Veto Players
Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work	p. 99
Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945-1999	p. 125
The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies	p. 145
Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?	p. 165
Modelling of Veto Players
Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988-2008)	p. 189
Domestic Veto Players, Commission Monitoring and the Implementation of European Policy	p. 213
Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting	p. 231
Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference	p. 247
Conclusion
Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks	p. 269
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.