The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind

by Kelly,Sean D.

• ISBN13: 9780815338550
• ISBN10: 0815338554
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-11-29
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Through discussion of phenomenological and analytic traditions such as the philosophical problems of perceptual content, the content of demonstrative thoughts and the unity of proposition, Kelly explains that these concepts are not as alien to one another as most people believe.

Table of Contents

Preface	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Methodological Introduction: Intentionality as Meaning and Meaningfulness	1	(30)
Intentionality is a common concern for phenomenology and analytic philosophy	1	(3)
Meaning vs. meaningfulness: two interpretations of intentionality	4	(3)
Searle and the ordinary language accounts of intentionality	7	(5)
Meaningfulness is more basic than meaning	12	(3)
Phenomenology and externalist theories of meaning: Part I	15	(3)
Phenomenology and externalist theories of meaning: Part II	18	(13)
The Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality	31	(34)
Introduction to the transcendental problem of intentionality	31	(4)
The transcendental project: condition-of-the-possibility in Kant and Heidegger	35	(7)
Heidegger's account of the pre-linguistic structures grounding assertion	42	(9)
Heidegger against the representational account of meaning	51	(4)
Merleau-Ponty against the cognitivist account of perception	55	(3)
Summary of anti-representationalist accounts in phenomenology	58	(7)
The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Demonstrative Thought	65	(46)
Evans on perception and demonstratives	67	(4)
Perceptual content and motor intentional behavior	71	(6)
Objective versus egocentric place	77	(6)
Motor intentional identification	83	(4)
A phenomenological account of egocentric space	87	(3)
Against Evans's view of perceptual content	90	(3)
Conclusion: What view of demonstrative content is left?	93	(18)
Phenomology and the Unity of the Proposition	111	(36)
Russell and Frege's formal attempts to solve the problem	112	(5)
The phenomenon of color constancy: empiricist and cognitivist accounts	117	(4)
The empiricist account of perceptual constancy	121	(3)
Criticism of the empiricist account	124	(2)
The cognitivist account of perceptual constancy	126	(3)
Criticism of the cognitivist account	129	(6)
The inadequacy of Peacocke's non-conceptualist alternative	135	(12)
Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of Skillful Action	147	(18)
What is phenomenology and why should a cognitive scientist care?	147	(4)
Motor intentional behavior	151	(2)
The phenomenology and cognitive science of motor intentional behavior	153	(8)
Conclusion	161	(4)
Bibliography	165	(8)
Index	173