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In Representation of Language Georges Rey offers a philosophical defense of Chomskyan theories of human language, according to which our linguistic competence is founded on an internal, innate computational system. Yet he also gives a critical examination of some of the ways in which Chomskyan views have been developed. He critiques, for instance, their assimilation to traditional Rationalism, and the supposed conflict between being innate and being learned. He shows that their associated ontology is often unclear, requiring what he calls a 'representational pretense', whereby linguists merely pretend for the sake of exposition that, for example, tokens of words are uttered. Most crucially, he takes a critical look at Chomsky's eliminativism about the role of intentionality not only in his own theories, but in any serious science at all. Ultimately, Rey shows how a theory as rich and promising as Chomskyan linguistics can continue to illuminate a range of issues relating to language and mind, not only in linguistics but in psychology and philosophy as well.
