The Robot's Rebellion

by Stanovich, Keith E.

• ISBN13: 9780226771250
• ISBN10: 0226771253
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-10-15
• Publisher: Univ of Chicago Pr

Summary

The idea that we might be robots is no longer the stuff of science fiction; decades of research in evolutionary biology and cognitive science have led many esteemed thinkers and scientists to the conclusion that, following the precepts of universal Darwinism, humans are merely the hosts for two replicators (genes and memes) that have no interest in us except as conduits for replication. Accepting and now forcefully responding to this disturbing idea that precludes the possibilities of morality or free will, among other things, Keith Stanovich here provides the tools for the "robot's rebellion," a program of cognitive reform necessary to advance human interests over the limited interest of the replicators. He shows how concepts of rational thinking from cognitive science interact with the logic of evolution to create opportunities for humans to structure their behavior to serve their own ends. These evaluative activities of the brain, he argues, fulfill the need that we have to ascribe significance to human life. Only by recognizing ourselves as robots, argues Stanovich, can we begin to construct a concept of self based on what is truly singular about humans: that they gain control of their lives in a way unique among life forms on Earththrough rational self-determination. "Stanovich offers readers a sweeping tour of theory and research, advancing a programme of 'cognitive reform' that puts human interests first. . . . By making the point that cognition is optimized at the level of genes, not of individuals, Stanovich puts a fresh spin on the familiar claim that people are sometimes woefully irrational. . . . WithThe Robot's Rebellion, he sets himself apart from unreflective thinkers on both sides of the divide by taking evolutionary accounts of cognition seriously, even as he urges us to improve on what evolution has wrought."Valerie M. Chase,Nature

Author Biography

Keith E. Stanovich holds the Canada Research Chair in Applied Cognitive Science at the University of Toronto. A fellow of the American Psychological Association and the American Psychological Society, he is the author of Who Is Rational ? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning and How to Think Straight About Psychology, now in its seventh edition.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
Acknowledgments	xv
Staring into the Darwinian Abyss	3	(28)
Why Jerry Falwell Is Right	4	(4)
The Replicators and the Vehicles	8	(4)
What Kind of Robot Is a Person?	12	(1)
Whose Goals Are Served by Our Behavior?	13	(3)
All Vehicles Overboard!	16	(4)
Your Genes Care More about You than You Should Care about Them!	20	(3)
Escaping the Clutches of the Genes	23	(3)
The Pivotal Insight: Putting People First	26	(5)
A Brain at War with Itself	31	(50)
Two Minds in One Brain	34	(3)
The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS): The Parts of Your Brain that Ignore You	37	(7)
Characterizing the Analytic System: Avoiding the Homunculus Problem	44	(3)
One Step at a Time: Figuring Out the Way the World Is with Language	47	(3)
Hypothetical Thinking and Representational Complexity	50	(2)
Processing without Awareness: There Are Martians in Your Brain!	52	(9)
When the Different Kinds of Minds Conflict: The Override Function of the Analytic System	61	(2)
The Brain on a Long Leash and the Brain on a Short Leash	63	(6)
Try It Yourself---Can You Override TASS in the Famous Four-Card Selection Task and the Famous Linda Task?	69	(4)
Don't Be Sphexish	73	(5)
Putting the Vehicle First by Getting the Analytic System in the Driver's Seat	78	(3)
The Robot's Secret Weapon	81	(14)
Choosing Humans over Genes: How Instrumental Rationality and Evolutionary Adaptation Separate	81	(4)
What It Means to Be Rational: Putting the Person (the Vehicle) First	85	(1)
Fleshing Out Instrumental Rationality	86	(5)
Evaluating Rationality: Are We Getting What We Want?	91	(4)
The Biases of the Autonomous Brain: Characteristics of the Short-Leash Mind that Sometimes Cause Us Grief	95	(36)
The Dangers of Positive Thinking: TASS Can't ``Think of the Opposite''	98	(4)
Now You Choose It---Now You Don't: Framing Effects Undermine the Notion of Human Rationality	102	(6)
Can Evolutionary Psychology Rescue the Ideal of Human Rationality?	108	(2)
The Fundamental Computational Biases of the Autonomous Brain	110	(3)
The Evolutionary Adaptiveness of the Fundamental Computational Biases	113	(2)
Evolutionary Reinterpretations of Responses on Heuristics and Biases Tasks	115	(6)
The Fundamental Computational Biases and the Demands for Decontextualization in Modern Society	121	(4)
The TASS Traps of the Modern World	125	(6)
How Evolutionary Psychology Goes Wrong	131	(18)
Modern Society as a Sodium Vapor Lamp	134	(5)
Throwing Out the Vehicle with the Bathwater	139	(3)
What Follows from the Fact that Mother Nature Isn't Nice	142	(7)
Dysrationalia: Why So Many Smart People Do So Many Dumb Things	149	(24)
Cognitive Capacities, Thinking Dispositions, and Levels of Analysis	150	(3)
TASS Override and Levels of Processing	153	(1)
The Great Rationality Debate: The Panglossian, Apologist, and Meliorist Positions Contrasted	154	(8)
Dysrationalia: Dissolving the ``Smart But Acting Dumb'' Paradox	162	(2)
Would You Rather Get What You Want Slowly or Get What You Don't Want Much Faster?	164	(3)
Jack and His Jewish Problem	167	(2)
The Panglossian's Lament: ``If Human Cognition Is So Flawed, How Come We Got to the Moon?''	169	(4)
From the Clutches of the Genes into the Clutches of the Memes	173	(34)
Attack of the Memes: The Second Replicator	174	(5)
Rationality, Science, and Meme Evaluation	179	(1)
Reflectively Acquired Memes: The Neurathian Project of Meme Evaluation	180	(1)
Personal Autonomy and Reflectively Acquired Memes	181	(3)
Which Memes Are Good for Us?	184	(8)
Why Memes Can Be Especially Nasty (Nastier than Genes Even!)	192	(2)
The Ultimate Meme Trick: Why Your Memes Want You to Hate the Idea of Memes	194	(3)
Memetic Concepts as Tools of Self-Examination	197	(2)
Building Memeplex Self on a Level Playing Field: Memetics as an Epistemic Equalizer	199	(2)
Evolutionary Psychology Rejects the Notion of Free-Floating Memes	201	(1)
The Co-Adapted Meme Paradox	202	(5)
A Soul without Mystery: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin	207	(70)
Macromolecules and Mystery Juice: Looking for Meaning in All the Wrong Places	210	(3)
Is Human Rationality Just an Extension of Chimpanzee Rationality? Context and Values in Human Judgment	213	(4)
There's More to Life than Money---But There's More than Happiness Too: The Experience Machine	217	(1)
Nozick on Symbolic Utility	218	(3)
``It's a Meaning Issue, Not a Money Issue'': Expressive Rationality, Ethical Preferences, and Commitment	221	(3)
Rising Above the Humean Nexus: Evaluating Our Desires	224	(1)
Second-Order Desires and Preferences	225	(3)
Achieving Rational Integration of Desires: Forming and Reflecting on Higher-Order Preferences	228	(15)
Why Rats, Pigeons, and Chimps Are More Rational than Humans	243	(4)
Escaping the Rationality of Constraint	247	(2)
Two-Tiered Rationality Evaluation: A Legacy of Human Cognitive Architecture	249	(2)
The Spookiness of Subpersonal Entities	251	(3)
Desires Connected to Dollars: Another Case of Spooky Subpersonal Optimization	254	(11)
The Need for Meta-Rationality	265	(3)
The Formula for Personal Autonomy in the Face of Many Subpersonal Threats	268	(1)
Are We up to the Task? Finding What to Value in Our Mental Lives	269	(8)
Notes	277	(28)
References	305	(40)
Author Index	345	(10)
Subject Index	355