Rules and Reason: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

by Edited by Ram Mudambi , Pietro Navarra , Giuseppe Sobbrio

• ISBN13: 9780521650571
• ISBN10: 0521650577
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2001-01-29
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan.

Table of Contents

Foreword	ix
James M. Buchanan
Preface and Acknowledgments	xi
List of Contributors	xiii
Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies	1	(8)
Ram Mudambi
Pietro Navarra
Giuseppe Sobbrio
PART I CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Introductory Note	7	(2)
On Writing a Constitution	9	(24)
Dennis C. Mueller
Constitutional Order and Economic Evolution: Competitive and Protectionist Interests in Democratic Society	33	(23)
Viktor Vanberg
The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules	56	(13)
James M. Buchanan
Yong J. Yoon
Constitutional Political Economy and Civil Society	69	(28)
Charles K. Rowley
The Constitutional Conflict between Protecting Expectations and Moral Evolution	97	(10)
Nicolaus Tideman
Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why ``Cultural'' Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense	107	(16)
Michael J. Ensley
Michael C. Munger
PART II ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS	123	(82)
Introductory Note
Electoral Systems and the Art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings	125	(40)
Bernard N. Grofman
Andrew Reynolds
Ordinary Elections and Constitutional Arrangements	165	(16)
Pierre Salmon
The Cost Imposed on Political Coalitions by Constituent Parties: The Case of Italian National Elections	181	(11)
Ram Mudambi
Pietro Navarra
Giuseppe Sobbrio
A Model of Two-Party Campaigns in Pluralistic Elections with Evidence	192	(13)
Chris W. Paul II
Allen W. Wilhite
PART III CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE	205	(108)
Introductory Note
Ensuring a Stable Federal State: Economics or Political Institutional Design	207	(30)
Mikhail Filippov
Peter C. Ordeshook
Olga V. Shvetsova
A Proposal for Dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ	237	(21)
Bruno S. Frey
Reiner Echenberger
The Maastricht ``Excessive Deficit'' Rules and Creative Accounting	258	(31)
Francesco Forte
Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Direct Democracy as Basic Elements of a Federal European Constitution: Some Ideas Using Constitutional Economics	289	(24)
Friedrich Schneider
Alexander F. Wagner
Index	313