Foreword | p. ix |
Preface | p. xi |
Introduction | p. xiii |
Summary and Analysis | p. 1 |
General Comments | p. 1 |
The Arab-Israeli Wars and the Rise of the Ba'ath Party | p. 2 |
Between the 1973 War and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) | p. 3 |
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) | p. 5 |
Thoughts on the Iran-Iraq "Cold-War" in the 1990s | p. 16 |
Comments on Saddam Hussein as Political and Military Leader | p. 16 |
The Interviews | p. 19 |
p. 19 | |
Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 | |
Military Transition under Ba'athist Rule | |
p. 26 | |
Iraqi Military and Political Transition through the 1970s | |
Prologue to Iran-Iraq War | |
Transition of Iranian Leadership and Military | |
Decision to Invade | |
Saddam's Aspirations | |
Earliest Phase of the War | |
Political and Professional Soldiers | |
Disorganized Command and Control of Iranian Operations | |
p. 34 | |
Early Use of Air Power | |
Sigint [Signals Intelligence] | |
Winter 1980-1981 Iraqi Command Changes | |
Saddam's Response to Failure and Executions | |
1980-1982 Losses and Army Expansions | |
Developments of Iranian and Iraqi Forces | |
p. 40 | |
Saddam's Psychology and Personality Development | |
January 1981 Armor Battle | |
Iranian Human Wave Tactics and Iraqi Minefields | |
Khomeini's Spiritual Influence | |
Battles of Abadan and Khorramshahr | |
Loss of Special Forces | |
End of Initial Iraqi Offensives in May 1981 | |
p. 49 | |
1981-1982 Turbulence in Tehran | |
Iranian Infiltration Tactics | |
1982 Attacks around Basra | |
1984-1988 Marsh Infiltrations and Iraqi Engineering Efforts | |
International Support to Iran | |
Chemical Weapons Usage | |
Iranian Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction | |
Postwar Preparations with WMD | |
1982-1983 Reorganization and Recruiting for Republican Guard | |
Psychological Support of Saddam to Troops | |
Postwar Republican Guard Reorganization | |
p. 62 | |
Summer 1983 Iranian Offensive into Haj Umran | |
Northern Mountain Operations and Kurdish Support | |
A 1,000-kilometer Front | |
Threats to the Dams and Baghdad | |
Unpredictable Iranian Strategy and Tactics | |
February 1984 Iraqi 6th Armored Division Losses | |
Iranian Marsh Operations | |
Intelligence Development and Satellite Support in March 1985 | |
p. 70 | |
1986 Al-Fao Campaign and Baghdad's Misinterpretation of Iranian Strategy | |
Traitors in the Iraqi Leadership | |
Prisoners of War | |
Operation Dawn | |
Iraqi Casualty Competition and the "Bedouin Mentality" | |
p. 77 | |
Republican Guard Expansion and the Response to Al-Fao | |
Hussein Kamel | |
General Hamdani's Command Obstacles | |
1987 Iranian Attack on Basra and Casualty Inflation | |
Shalamjah: The Somme of the Iran-Iraq War | |
Hamdani's Venture through the Front and the Battlefield Conditions | |
p. 83 | |
July 1987 Republican Guard Command Changes | |
Battlefield Missiles | |
Halabjah | |
Factors of Post-1987 Shift in "Correlation of Forces" toward Iraq-Planning Effort for Al-Fao Offensive | |
Use of Helicopters | |
Front of 1988 | |
July 1988 Iraqi Incursion through to Ahvaz and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq | |
p. 90 | |
Foundations of the Iraqi Military and Saddam's Detrimental Influence | |
Hamdani's Effort to Improve Iraqi Military Culture | |
Questioning Military Orders and Planning | |
Lessons Learned from the Iran-Iraq War | |
Fight to follow the War and Saddam's Perception of Victory and Warfare | |
p. 95 | |
Stories of War Heroes, 1973 to Operation Iraqi Freedom | |
Saddam's Misunderstanding of Warfare | |
Hamdani's Recognition of U.S. Strategy in 2003 | |
Understanding One's Enemy | |
p. 100 | |
1990s Military Planning against Iran | |
Historical Explanation of Iran-Iraq Conflict | |
Religious and Ethnic Elements | |
Economic and Regional Aspects (Persian Gulf) | |
Shatt al-Arab | |
Ideology, Ba'athism, and Khomeini | |
Present Conflict and Iranian and al Qaeda Influence | |
p. 108 | |
Planning for an Iranian Adversary | |
Iranian Structure | |
2003 and Iranian Strategy | |
Ayatollah as Executive | |
Iranian Military Development and Capabilities | |
Missiles | |
Iranian Threat to Iraq and Infiltration | |
Internal Agents | |
Iraqi Counterinfiltration | |
Iranian Militias | |
Iraqi Military Developments since 1991 | |
Cooptation of Tribes | |
p. 119 | |
Role of Religion in Iran-Iraq Conflict | |
Hypothetical Iraqi Offensive Against Iran and Phases of Preparations | |
Iranian Influence in Iraq | |
Arabistan | |
Baluchs and Kurds | |
Air and Missile Strikes and Military-Industrial Complex | |
Younger Iranian Generation | |
Smart Weapons and Satellites | |
Terrain | |
Operational Objectives | |
Iranian Lessons Learned | |
Iranian Missile Deterrent | |
p. 127 | |
Armor Operations | |
Bravery and the Warrior Mentality | |
Saddam's Misunderstanding of Military Technology | |
Integration of Helicopter and Tank Capabilities | |
Lessons Learned on Artillery, Iraq, and Iran | |
Changes in Iranian Command and Control | |
Iranian Tactical and Operational Developments | |
p. 133 | |
Recommendations for U.S. Actions in Iraq from May 2007 | |
Endnotes | p. 137 |
Bibliography | p. 143 |
Index to Themes in the Discussions | p. 144 |
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