The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations

by Daniel W. Drezner

• ISBN13: 9780521643320
• ISBN10: 0521643325
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1999-09-13
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.

Author Biography

Daniel Drezner is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder. He is the author of a number of articles in scholarly journals, and has acted as a research consultant for the RAND corporation.

Table of Contents

List of figures	xii
List of tables	xiii
Acknowledgments	xv
Introduction	1	(24)
A tale of two cases	1	(3)
The argument	4	(2)
Why economic coercion matters	6	(3)
The literature	9	(9)
Flaws in the literature	18	(3)
The methodology	21	(1)
The rest of the book	22	(3)
Part I Theory and data	25	(104)
A model of economic coercion	27	(32)
The assumptions	28	(7)
The model	35	(12)
A caveat: switches in preferences	47	(1)
Another caveat: non-negotiable demands	48	(2)
Choosing between carrots and sticks	50	(3)
Conclusions and implications	53	(2)
Appendix: proofs of lemmas	55	(4)
Plausibility probes	59	(43)
First impressions	60	(2)
Statistical studies of sanctions initiation	62	(6)
Statistical studies of sanctions outcomes	68	(6)
the grain embargo	74	(6)
the pipeline sanctions	80	(8)
economic sanctions and human rights	88	(11)
Summary	99	(3)
Statistical tests	102	(27)
Selecting the appropriate sample	102	(4)
Operationalizing the variables	106	(8)
Testing the causes of sanctions initiation	114	(7)
Testing the causes of sanctions outcomes	121	(6)
Summary	127	(2)
Part II Economic coercion in the former Soviet Union	129	(120)
Russian power and preferences	131	(22)
The motivation	131	(3)
Russian policy preferences	134	(6)
Russia's ability to coerce	140	(7)
Conflict expectations with Russia	147	(3)
Predicting the outcomes	150	(3)
The extent of NIS concessions	153	(78)
Introduction	153	(1)
Belarus	154	(6)
Kazakhstan	160	(9)
Turkmenistan	169	(4)
Kyrgyzstan	173	(3)
Armenia	176	(3)
Tajikistan	179	(4)
Uzbekistan	183	(4)
Moldova	187	(6)
Georgia	193	(5)
Ukraine	198	(10)
Azerbaijan	208	(7)
Lithuania	215	(4)
Latvia	219	(5)
Estonia	224	(5)
Conclusion	229	(2)
Evaluating the evidence	231	(18)
Introduction	231	(1)
Coding the data	232	(1)
Predictions and outcomes	233	(6)
A Boolean analysis	239	(6)
Some final observations	245	(4)
Part III Choosing between carrots and sticks	249	(56)
Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula	251	(54)
Carrots and sticks	251	(3)
The United States and South Korea's nuclear program	254	(21)
The United States and North Korea's nuclear program	275	(28)
Implications	303	(2)
Part IV Conclusion	305	(17)
Conclusions, implications, speculations	307	(15)
A review	307	(2)
Additional insights	309	(2)
A critique	311	(1)
Policy implications	312	(5)
Questions for future research	317	(5)
References	322	(14)
Index	336