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9780847691937

Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: Black Men and Women Remember World War II

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780847691937

  • ISBN10:

    0847691934

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2001-01-01
  • Publisher: Natl Book Network
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List Price: $24.95

Summary

Told in their own words, the stories of 50 men and women from two segregated, black infantry divisions will change the way we think about World War II.

Table of Contents

Foreword ix
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xvii
We're in the Army Now
1(40)
Life on the Military Reservation
41(46)
Stateside
87(42)
The ``Good Fight''
129(56)
Coming Home
185(44)
Afterword
229(6)
Methods and Sources 235(8)
Index 243(6)
About the Author 249

Supplemental Materials

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The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

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Excerpts


Chapter One

WE'RE IN THE ARMY NOW

THE "NEGRO PROBLEM"

When the white paratroopers dropped out of the sky and into the military maneuver area around the Pee Dee River in South Carolina, they had no idea that some of the troops waiting for them on that summer day in 1941 were black combat soldiers. The paratroopers were prepared to out-maneuver their opponents in war-preparation training, but when they discovered that one of the opposing teams was black, many of the white paratroopers became enraged.

    Felix Goodwin, one of the black combat soldiers, described the encounter:

Some of those white boys were not really accustomed to the idea of black combat soldiers like us.... They were jumping out there without realizing that a black unit was down in those woods. We had little bags of flour to throw on the opponent, and when they got hit, they were supposed to be "dead." When those white boys jumped into that field, we were all over them. It was their worst nightmare. They didn't like the idea of black guys throwing flour on them. So we had a big fight.

In that fight, as in many other altercations between white and black soldiers during the war years, according to Goodwin, "somebody had some live ammunition and some shots were fired." Even though no one was injured in the fracas during the Carolina maneuvers, military officials quickly assigned the black troops to another area.

    The army moved the black troops deeper into the South--from South Carolina to an area around Augusta, Georgia. This change of venue was supposed to diffuse the hostile situation the black troops faced. In fact, the move exacerbated tensions, because the local Georgia farmers did not want armed black men in their fields. Goodwin said:

Those old farmers were raising hell about what they were gonna do with us and all that kind of nonsense. They came down to talk to our [white] commander about getting us out of there. And they brought their hunting dogs with them, too. When the captain went out there to talk to them, well, one of our guys started firing a machine gun into the area. I don't know where the ammunition came from, but I saw one of our guys mounted on top of a truck just firing away. You have never seen dogs and men run so fast in your life. Everybody was hitting the dirt, getting into the ditches, or running like hell. Those farmers were running back toward Augusta as last as they could. Three of those hunting dogs didn't make it, and of course, our guy got sent to jail. Now this was all before the war even broke out!

    Goodwin was a private serving in the 25th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army. All service personnel in World War II served in a newly constituted national army--one that was organized differently from those in earlier eras because of the National Defense Act of 1920. The first peacetime draft was implemented in 1940, and National Guard units were federalized, making the World War II army not only a completely national army, but one that was constitutively different from those of other war times. The black soldier served under a new and experimental set of racial policies crafted and recrafted during the war years. Yet he served much like every other soldier in World War II, without thinking too much about the War Department's policies. At the beginning of World War II, black infantry soldiers were limited to service in only a few units of the Regular Army. All of the units were segregated, and most of them were filled to the maximum allotment for black soldiers. Four all-black units had been in existence since the Civil War: the 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry. In the period between World War I and World War II, total army personnel stood at 188,000 men, with about 3,700 black soldiers serving in segregated units. The army at that time was maintained strictly by volunteer enlistment handled though recruitment offices around the nation. In 1939, two more all-black units were added, designated as quartermaster or service units. In 1940, more all-black units were added, including more quartermaster units and units in field artillery, antiaircraft, engineer, and chemical warfare.

SEGREGATION WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION

Before World War II, many government agencies studied possible options for racial policies within the armed forces. By the outbreak of the war, no agency or military office had resolved "the Negro problem," as the black soldier population was referred to at the time. After much research, numerous acrimonious debates, more research, presidential edicts, committee reports, and more committee reports, the War Department constructed a segregated policy for the enlistment and usage of black Americans within the armed forces. The department called its approach "segregation without discrimination." True to the time period, military planners did not consider segregation to be inherently unequal. The army of the 1940s was a microcosm of American society--it was segregated and thoroughly racist.

    The military segregated its troops, creating separate and usually unequal conditions. Military planners and government officials agreed that segregation was the most efficient manner of dealing with perceived racial differences. Many official documents of the War Department confirm the military's belief that segregation did not constitute discrimination. This is not surprising, considering that Plessy v. Ferguson , the 1896 Supreme Court ruling that affirmed "separate-but-equal" as a legal precedent, was still in effect. Many white Americans, in social settings and in government institutions, believed that black people were inferior in intelligence, character, and ability. Racist attitudes prevailed in all strata of American society and also throughout the military. War Department officials constantly stated they were not going to solve the racial problem--a social problem--within the military. Army Service Forces Manual M5 clarified the official position:

War Department concern with the Negro is focused directly and solely on the problem of the most effective military use of colored troops. It is essential that there be a clear understanding that the Army has no authority or intention to participate in social reform as such, but does view the problem as a matter of efficient troop utilization.

Efficient troop utilization meant keeping the black soldiers in segregated units, while also attempting to restrict them to service jobs rather than give them combat assignments.

    All across America, black infantry soldiers were separated from white soldiers as a result of the army's policy of segregation without discrimination. Black soldiers were separated from white troops in troop training, work situations, and social settings. Bill Perry even experienced the policy while a patient at a U.S. Army hospital. He recalled, "I caught pneumonia and got hospitalized in Alabama. For the first week that I was bedridden they brought my food to me." Then the next week the white nurses told Perry to go down to the mess hall and get his own food. When he got to the door he saw six black soldiers standing outside the door. As he entered the room one of the black men tapped him on the shoulder and asked where he was going. Perry replied that he was going in to "fetch" his meal. The soldier shook his head and told Perry, "You gotta wait until the white guys finish." Perry was offended. He said, "I had never experienced anything like that, and it was as if a veil had been lifted, and I began to see things more clearly."

    Ultimately, the military's policy of segregation without discrimination failed in World War II, as it had in every other military engagement since colonial times. The policy failed to produce military efficiency. Work stoppages on military bases, labor problems with war industry workers, and racial friction within army units dragged down the efficiency of the war machine. The policy resulted in both the misuse and the underuse of the black Americans who served in the military during World War II. Rigid segregation disadvantaged the black soldier in all social and military settings. Added to the emotional cost of segregating soldiers was the economic cost of building separate facilities and structures. The multiplicity of government agencies charged with addressing "the Negro problem" failed to construct a universal policy approach that did anything more than reflect the general prejudice rampant in the American ethos.

    The Selective Service Act of 1940 was introduced in the House of Representatives by Republican Representative Hamilton Fish, a commander in World War I of the "Harlem Hellfighters," an all-black infantry regiment. The debates within Congress and the War Department make it clear that the final Selective Service bill, Public Law 783, was a compromise reflecting the prevalent racial attitudes of the day. The original wording of the bill allowed the president to assign men--white or black--to various units within the army as situations arose and also to induct any number of men. Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring responded to the proposed bill by asking Congress to strike the presidential authority provision from the legislation.

Its retention ... might result in the enlistment of Negroes in numbers out of all proportion to the colored population of the country. Such a result would demoralize and weaken the effect of military units by mixing colored and white soldiers in closely related units, or even in the same units. It might also have a dangerously adverse effect upon discipline....

    The bill, if passed as written, would have given the president the authority to bring black men into every branch of the army, rather than simply the all-black Regular Army units. Additionally, it would have allowed black men to serve in the military in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of the American population. The final compromise bill contained specific instructions to recruit black Americans commensurate with their percentage of the overall population. In the 1940s, thirteen million black Americans made up approximately 10 percent of the country's population. The final bill included provisions that banned discrimination in the recruitment of black men. Sections 3a and 4a of the Selective Service Act specified that, regardless of race, all persons were to be afforded the opportunity to volunteer for induction and that no discrimination in the training or selection of men was to be practiced. However, this policy left intact the racial restrictions whereby black men could only be assigned to one of the all-black Regular Army units. Because very little turnover occurred within those units, new army hopefuls, if they were black, had to wait for someone to retire or for the armed forces to expand before they were inducted into the service.

    This technicality kept many black men out of the army. Although the armed forces were expanding, black men were relegated to segregated units, and their processing to active duty was delayed. Between 1940 and 1942, despite the nondiscrimination clause of the Selective Service Act, less than 2 percent of volunteer enlistments came from the black population. Recruitment offices deterred black enlistment by rejecting applicants due to lack of space in the six black-only regiments. Applicants were also rejected due to housing concerns, Because black soldiers had to be segregated, and most bases did not have sufficient space to provide segregated housing, the army was unable to accommodate the number of black men attempting to enlist for service. By the end of World War II, more than two and a half million African Americans had registered to serve in the military, but only about one million were accepted. By 1945, 650,000 black soldiers were serving in the army, with approximately 50,000 in some type of combat capacity. A black soldier in the army could expect routinely to encounter white officers and enlisted men who felt that he was not fit to be in the armed forces except in a service and support capacity. He could also expect to be constrained by the military's racist policies, which limited his opportunities for advancement.

    As Congress was passing the Selective Service Act, the army released a new plan for the utilization of black troops, the 1940 Army Plan for Mobilization. The plan contemplated the mobilization of black soldiers equal to their proportion of the total population. Furthermore, the plan called for assignment of black soldiers to all types of units for which the men were qualified. Both combat and service assignments were to be open to black recruits. The army ordered its men into separate and supposedly equal facilities. This experimental plan had little practical consequence: by the end of 1941, only 5 percent of the army's infantry personnel were black. For most of World War II, the army struggled to meet the goals of its 1940 plan and the Selective Service Act. Only in 1944 did the percentage of black army men get close to the stated goal of 10 percent enlistment.

FIGHT AGAINST THE "WORST FORM OF SLAVERY"

Whatever the push or pull factors bringing the men into the armed forces, and despite the restrictions of segregated service, many black men wanted to help protect their nation through military service. The 1940 Army Plan for Mobilization, along with the first peacetime Selective Service Act, ostensibly made volunteering for induction more democratic, because it allowed all groups to participate equally in the armed forces. These new policies and new conditions of service did not create equality between white and black servicemen, but black men still continued to volunteer for or were inducted into the service. Despite the racial restrictions, military constraints, social mores, and inherent distrust that surrounded enlistment in the armed forces, many black men sought to wear the uniform of the United States during the war years. Most Americans, white and black, were swept up in the patriotism of the day that called on men to protect the nation. Many black Americans were thoroughly committed to the fight against fascism, although it is not clear how many believed that it was "the worst form of slavery ever imposed upon the world," as the War Department propaganda charged. In general, black men enlisted in the army for the same reasons as white men did: first, to serve their country; second, for steady employment and better job opportunities; and third, because they felt conditions would be better for them after military service. Of course, the sense of adventure and the inevitability of wartime service were also major reasons for participating, Several black World War II veterans commented on their reasons for serving.

    Nelson Peery said he felt that soldiering was a respected profession with secure employment. He noted the prevalence of segregation and discrimination within the army, but he thought conditions were even worse outside of the armed forces. A. William "Bill" Perry, explained how "some things you accepted, you would say `this is a fact.' When they began to build up for World War II by adding white units and Negro units, we always figured we'd get the short end of the stick because that's the way life was. We expected, like after every other war, things would improve a little. And I did think that the army would try to live up to a separate-but-equal thing."

    Woodrow Walton said he too felt blacks would come up short in the segregated army, but he was advised by his friends to just "keep going, and keep cool." Jim Williams said:

I just thought up until that time the whole world was prejudiced. I thought that even though the army was segregated, if we went in and proved ourselves, in some small way, when we got back home they would have to recognize us. And I thought that in a sense they would have to recognize our deportment in the army and say, "Well, hey, look. These people are A-number-1, so we'll have to treat them as citizens."

    Black Americans faced obstacles on their way to becoming soldiers that most whites never encountered. Despite the obstacles, most remained loyal to their country. Perhaps the sentiments of famed boxer Joe Louis best expressed the reasons black men volunteered in the fight against fascism: "There may be a whole lot wrong with America, but there's nothing that Hitler can fix." In 1941 the War Department declared:

Negroes have been notably a loyal and patriotic group. One of their outstanding characteristics is the single-mindedness of their patriotism. They have no other country to which they owe or feel any degree of allegiance. Therefore, they have built in America a fine record of loyalty and willingness to support and defend their native land.

    In the press, particularly in the seventy or more newspapers that catered to a black audience, journalists debated the merits of black men fighting for the nation. In a syndicated article titled "A Negro Looks at the War," journalist J. Saunders Redding spelled out the reasons black men should engage in the fight against fascism.

The issue is plain. The issue, simply, is freedom. Freedom is a precious thing. It used to seem shamefully silly to me to hear Negroes talk about freedom. But now I know that we Negroes here in America know a lot about freedom and love it more than a great many people who have long had it. We see that in the logic of a system based on freedom and the dignity of man we have a chance. This is a war to keep me free. The very fact that I, a Negro in America, can fight against the evils in America is worth fighting for.

    While articles in the black press were reporting debates on the merits of service in a segregated army, groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE), and the Urban League pressured the War Department to create a racial policy that would address the issues of black service to the nation. The NAACP used its paper, Crisis , to induce black Americans to serve in the war effort by equating defense of the country with full citizenship rights. But other papers and individuals questioned why black Americans should serve in a segregated army to protect a racist government.

THE "DOUBLE V" CAMPAIGN

White and black leaders exhorted the black population to participate in the war effort to fight fascism. Black soldiers were asked by some black spokesmen to participate in the war for "Democracy at Home and Democracy Abroad," the so-called "Double V" campaign. Black leaders such as Walter White and A. Philip Randolph used the pages of the Pittsburgh Courier to argue the merits of victory against the fascists abroad, as well as victory against racism at home. Many black leaders, government officials, and average citizens believed full participation in the war would bring enhanced rights to America's black citizens after the enemy was defeated. Government officials spoke at public gatherings and worked with the media to garner black support for the war effort. Journalists directed the following message to their black readership: "Today we are engaged in a war in which the freedom of all men is at stake--men of all races and nations. Negroes have a natural and legitimate interest in the fate of oppressed peoples everywhere."

    Several issues confronted the average black man with regard to military service in World War II. Besides the ambiguous Double V campaign, black men were confronted with service in a segregated army and the prospect of combat assignments. In black newspapers, and among the men themselves, a plethora of opinions existed. Clyde Whitted said he knew a few men who did not want to serve in the armed forces, but most of his friends and acquaintances "ended up just doing what they were told." Perhaps Spencer Moore's words best reflect the prevailing mood:

I was a kid. I was into having a good time; I wasn't trying to be a hero. I was just following orders. They'd say, "Go here," and I went there. If they said, "Come back," then I would come back. I mean, I didn't know anybody inside the army who was an activist against the Jim Crow situation. We just felt that was the American way. My leaders were my commanding officers, not the race leaders at the time. And personally, my wife and I were our own leaders; we didn't follow the advice of those spokesmen. We would all say "V for Victory," but I wasn't thinking about my civil rights at home. I was thinking about keeping from getting killed, and from my men getting killed. I was thinking about victory abroad for me.

    As surveys revealed, black soldiers were not unified in agreement about integration in the military. Because of an individual soldier's background--including his degree of politicization before entering the army, his religious values, and most importantly, his social position and experience--a diversity of opinions prevailed among black Americans. A rift developed among various spokesmen. Some leaders promoted accommodation--acceptance of segregation for now--whereas others agitated for full and immediate integration of America's armed forces. This rift was primarily among elite spokesmen rather than among rank-and-file members of the black community. When the army asked thirteen thousand soldiers whether "white and Negro soldiers should be in separate outfits," only 36 percent of black respondents, and 12 percent of white respondents, answered that blacks and whites should be in the same units. Thirty-eight percent of blacks said they wanted to be in separate units, and 26 percent registered indifference. Government officials were not in agreement over which black leader's views should be given priority. Within the Office of War Information members commented to each other: "As anyone in this field soon discovers, there is no little political pulling and hauling between the various factions of Negro leadership in the government. The current fight for power ... is indicative. It would be a mistake [for the War Department] to align itself even implicitly with any one grout)."

    Bill Payne said he did not care whether he served in a segregated army. In fact, he never gave much thought to the dispute over integration versus segregation in the military. Payne's goal in life was to be a soldier. He went into the service with the idea of getting a job, learning as much as he could, and advancing up the ladder. He had some quasi-military experience in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the New Deal make-work program instituted during the Depression. He devoured war stories in pulp-fiction magazines and followed daily radio and newspaper accounts of international affairs. When he learned that black men were being drafted, he and a group of friends went to the local recruiting office and signed up. After the physical and mental exams, two of his friends were rejected, but Payne was accepted into the U.S. Army. He was on his way to fulfilling a boyhood dream, and the army's policy of segregated service was far from his mind.

    With American entry into World War II in late 1941, civilian and military planners became concerned about creating a universal, servicewide policy to counteract rising discontent among black soldiers. Given the state of the international emergency, military planners were especially concerned about designing an effective policy to utilize black troops. The War Department was pressured from all sides to do something proactive to increase enlistment of black soldiers. However, there was not a general consensus among the public voices, nor a united push from within the War Department, to change the segregationist policies in effect at the time. Military planners were confused with the multitude of opinions and voices, so they did very little to change existing policies. Still, many black Americans wanted to serve in the armed forces, segregated or not. A majority of eligible black males attempted to enlist in the military. The reasons they gave were patriotism, a spirit of adventure, and a hope for improved employment and educational opportunities. In 1942, the War Department finally activated two full divisions of black soldiers, with about eighteen thousand men to each division, and the nature of race relations in America changed forever.

(Continues...)

Copyright © 2000 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.. All rights reserved.

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