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9783642038204

Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

by ; ; ;
  • ISBN13:

    9783642038204

  • ISBN10:

    3642038204

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2009-09-01
  • Publisher: Springer-Nature New York Inc
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Supplemental Materials

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Summary

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

Table of Contents

Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctionsp. 1
Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Googlep. 3
A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Marketsp. 4
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusionp. 13
A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chilep. 25
Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctionsp. 26
Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Marketsp. 40
Market Design for a P2P Backup System (Extended Abstract)p. 55
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanismp. 58
Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Marketp. 61
A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Schedulingp. 74
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization (Extended Abstract)p. 87
Revenue Submodularityp. 89
Fair Package Assignmentp. 92
Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scalep. 93
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about Itp. 95
Author Indexp. 107
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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