Social Epistemology

by Haddock, Adrian; Millar, Alan; Pritchard, Duncan

• ISBN13: 9780199577477
• ISBN10: 0199577471
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-11-05
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

The idea of approaching epistemological concerns from a social perspective is relatively new. For much of its history the epistemological enterprise -- and arguably philosophy more generally -- has been cast along egocentric lines. Where a non-egocentric approach has been taken, as in the recent work of naturalist epistemologists, the focus has been on individuals interacting with their environment rather than on the significance of social interaction for an understanding of the nature and value of knowledge. The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally.Social Epistemologywill be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.

Author Biography

Adrian Haddock, University of Stirling
Alan Millar, University of Stirling
Duncan Pritchard, University of Edinburgh

Table of Contents

List of Contributors	p. vii
Acknowledgements	p. viii
Introduction	p. ix
Analytical Table of Contents	p. xi
Why Social Epistemology Is Real Epistemology	p. 1
Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically about Social Knowledge	p. 29
Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time	p. 51
On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig	p. 69
The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist	p. 89
From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism	p. 112
Norms of Trust	p. 129
Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension	p. 148
Knowing from Being Told	p. 175
Can A Priori Entitlement be Preserved by Testimony?	p. 194
The Assurance View of Testimony	p. 216
The Epistemology of Silence	p. 243
Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability	p. 262
The Epistemology of Disagreement	p. 278
A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance	p. 298
Bibliography	p. 326
Index	p. 345
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.