Strategy 2E Cl

Summary

Strategy , Second Edition, is a thorough revision and update of one of the most successful Game Theory texts available. Known for its accurate and simple-yet-thorough presentation, Joel Watson has refined his text to make it even more student friendly. New features of Strategy , Second Edition, include: Chapter on General Assumptions and Methodology - This added chapter provides an overview of how mathematical models can be used to predict how people will behave in strategic situations. Guided Exercises - Game theory is best mastered by problem solving, and Strategy , Second Edition, has numerous end-of-chapter exercises. A "guided exercise" has been added to each chapter to help students understand how to approach and work through problems. Topics for Political Economists and Political Scientists - The Second Edition includes new sections on the median voter theorem and candidates\' equilibrium policy locations, strategic voting, multilateral bargaining in legislatures over proposals and amendments to new laws, and information aggregation and jury deliberations. More on Contracting and Contract Enforcement - A wide range of interesting strategic behaviour relates to the formation and enforcement of contracts, and Strategy , Second Edition, includes expanded coverage of the hold-up problem, unverifiable investments, up-front contracting, and option contracts. Joel Watson is professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego. He received his B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, and his Ph.D. from Stanford University. Watson\'s work has been published in a variety of leading journals, including American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Games and Economic Behavior.

Preface
Introduction
Representations and Basic Assumptions
The Extensive Form
Strategies and the Normal Form
Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
General Assumptions and Methodology
Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings
Dominance and Best Response
Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
Location and Partnership
Nash Equilibrium
Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings
Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings
Details of the Extensive Form
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Topics in Industrial Organization
Parlor Games
Bargaining Problems
Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, and Ownership
Repeated Games and Reputation
Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill
Information
Random Events and Incomplete Information
Risk and Incentives in Contracting
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Job-Market Signaling and Reputation
Appendices
Review of Mathematics
The Mathematics of Rationalizability and Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Index
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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