Laurie S. Goodman, PhD, is Managing Director and cohead of Global Fixed Income Research at UBS.
SHUMIN LI is Executive Director in the U.S. Securitized Products Strategy Group at UBS.
Douglas J. Lucas is Executive Director and head of CDO research at UBS.
THOMAS A. ZIMMERMAN is Managing Director in the U.S. Securitized Products Strategy Group at UBS.
Frank J. Fabozzi, PhD, CFA, is Professor in the Practice of Finance at Yale University's School of Management and the Editor of the Journal of Portfolio Management.
Preface | p. xiii |
About the Authors | p. xv |
Mortgage Credit | p. 1 |
Overview of the Nonagency Mortgage Market | p. 3 |
Issuance Volumes | p. 5 |
Roots of the 2007-2008 Subprime Crisis | p. 5 |
Defining Characteristics of Nonagency Mortgages | p. 9 |
Loan Characteristics | p. 9 |
Risk Layering | p. 18 |
Agency versus Nonagency Execution | p. 22 |
Summary | p. 23 |
First Lien Mortgage Credit | p. 27 |
Concepts and Measurements of Mortgage Credit | p. 28 |
Collateral Characteristics and Mortgage Credit: Assault of the Four Cs in 2006 (Credit, Collateral, Capacity, and Character) | p. 35 |
The End Game: Foreclosure, REO Timeline, and Severity | p. 46 |
The Role of Unobservable in 2006 Subprime Mortgage Credit | p. 62 |
Second Lien Mortgage Credit | p. 73 |
Two Types of Seconds | p. 73 |
Higher Risks in Seconds | p. 75 |
Recent Performance | p. 80 |
Why Higher Losses? | p. 80 |
Summary | p. 81 |
Mortgage Securitizations | p. 87 |
Features of Excess Spread/Overcollateralization: The Principle Subprime Structure | p. 89 |
Excess Spread-Based Credit Enhancement | p. 90 |
OC in Alt-A-Land | p. 97 |
OC Internal Workings | p. 103 |
Summary | p. 110 |
Subprime Triggers and Step-Downs | p. 111 |
The Step-Down and the Trigger | p. 111 |
BBB Stack (on the Knife's Edge) | p. 116 |
Effect of Triggers and the Loss Waterline | p. 117 |
Sampling the Subprime Universe | p. 118 |
2000-2003 Deal Step-Down Summary | p. 118 |
Step-Down and Credit Effects | p. 119 |
Summary | p. 122 |
Credit Default Swaps on Mortgage Securities | p. 123 |
Introduction to Credit Default Swap on ABS CDS | p. 125 |
Corporate CDS Fundamentals and Terminology | p. 125 |
Differences Between Corporate CDS and ABS CDS | p. 128 |
Difficulties in ABS CDS | p. 131 |
ABS CDS Effect on ABS CDO Management | p. 141 |
Two New Types of ABS CDOs | p. 142 |
Summary | p. 143 |
The ABX and TABX Indices | p. 145 |
Background | p. 145 |
How a Deal Gets into the Index | p. 146 |
Index Mechanics | p. 149 |
Index Pricing Over Time | p. 152 |
ABX Tranche Trading | p. 156 |
TABX Pricing | p. 157 |
TABX versus CDOs | p. 159 |
Summary | p. 160 |
Relationship among Cash, ABCDS, and the ABX | p. 161 |
Fundamental Contractual Differences-Single-Name ABCDS/ABX Index/Cash | p. 162 |
Supply/Demand Technicals | p. 168 |
What Keeps the Arbitrage from Going Away? | p. 171 |
Summary | p. 173 |
Importance of ABCDS to CDO Managers | p. 173 |
Credit Default Swaps on CDOs | p. 177 |
CDO CDS Nomenclature | p. 178 |
CDO Credit Problems and their Consequences | p. 179 |
Alternative Interest Cap Options | p. 182 |
Miscellaneous Terms | p. 185 |
Cash CDO versus CDO CDS | p. 186 |
Exiting a CDO CDS | p. 187 |
Rating Agency Concerns on CDOs that Sell Protection via CDO CDS | p. 188 |
Summary | p. 189 |
Loss Projection and Security Valuation | p. 191 |
Loss Projection for Subprime, Alt-A, and Second Lien Mortgages | p. 193 |
Two Ways of Projecting Loss | p. 193 |
Default Timing | p. 194 |
Steps in Predicting Collatal Losses | p. 195 |
Pros and Cons of the Default Timing Curve | p. 201 |
Historical Model Fit versus Actual | p. 201 |
Default Timing Is Not Equal to Loss Timing | p. 203 |
An Alternative Specification | p. 203 |
Alt-A and Closed-End Seconds | p. 206 |
Summary | p. 209 |
Valuing the ABX | p. 211 |
Review of Basic Valuation for ABX Indices | p. 211 |
Review of Valuation Approaches | p. 212 |
Econometric Approach | p. 214 |
ABX Valuation | p. 234 |
The "Simple" or Do-It-Yourself Approach to ABX Valuation | p. 239 |
ABX After Subprime Shutdown | p. 254 |
Summary | p. 259 |
Results of Original "Base" Pricing (And Number of Bonds Written Down) and the New "Shutdown" Estimates | p. 260 |
ABS CDO Losses and Valuation | p. 269 |
The Mortgage Loan-Mortgage Bond-ABS CDO Chain | p. 270 |
Mortgage Deal Losses | p. 270 |
Subprime Mortgage Bond Losses | p. 273 |
Alt-A, Second Lien, and Prime Mortgage Bond Losses | p. 276 |
Aggregating Mortgage Bond Losses in 2006-7 Mezzanine ABS CDOs | p. 276 |
Aggregating Mortgage Bond Losses in 2005 Mezzanine ABS CDOs | p. 283 |
Drivers of CDO Losses and the Role of the Manager | p. 284 |
ABS CDO Valuation and CDO Structure | p. 288 |
Summary | p. 291 |
Subprime Meltdown | p. 293 |
The Great Subprime Meltdown of 2007 | p. 295 |
An Earlier Subprime Crisis | p. 296 |
The Virtuous Cycle | p. 299 |
Early-Pay Defaults: The First Hint Things Were Changing | p. 301 |
The 2006 Conundrum | p. 303 |
Banking Regulators: Not Too Little but Too Late | p. 308 |
Who Will Rescue the Subprime Borrower? | p. 312 |
Is Securitization the Villain? | p. 312 |
Lack of Transparency | p. 316 |
Spillover | p. 317 |
Future for Subprime | p. 317 |
Index | p. 319 |
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