Surprise Attack

by Kam, Ephraim

• ISBN13: 9780674013544
• ISBN10: 0674013549
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2004-05-15
• Publisher: Harvard Univ Pr

Summary

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints.

Table of Contents

Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling	xiii
Preface, 2004: Old Patterns, New Lessons	xvii
Introduction	1	(6)
Part I. The Components of Surprise Attack
1. The Essence of Surprise Attack	7	(30)
Reaction to Disasters and Warnings	9	(3)
Aspects of Erroneous Estimates	12	(10)
The Strategic Warning	22	(9)
Surprise and Military Preparedness	31	(6)
2. Information and Indicators	37	(19)
Quality of Intelligence Information	38	(4)
Early Warning Indicators	42	(8)
Signal and Noise	50	(3)
Quantity of Intelligence Information	53	(3)
3. Intentions and Capabilities	56	(29)
Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions	59	(5)
The Enemy's Conceptual Framework	64	(5)
Risk Taking by the Enemy	69	(3)
Estimating Capabilities	72	(13)
Part II. Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis
4. Conceptions and Incoming Information	85	(30)
The Set of Conceptions	86	(3)
The Persistence of Conceptions	89	(5)
Assimilating Information	94	(4)
Information and Expectations	98	(3)
Treating Discrepant Information	101	(4)
Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence	105	(10)
5. The Process of Analysis	115	(44)
Prediction and Intelligence Analysis	115	(5)
Stages of Intelligence Analysis	120	(2)
Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses	122	(2)
Analogies and Learning from History	124	(8)
Evaluating Incoming Information	132	(4)
Choosing among Alternative Hypotheses	136	(6)
External Obstacles to Perception	142	(6)
Changing a View	148	(11)
Part III. The Environment
6. The Analyst and the Small Group	159	(17)
The Other Opinion	160	(3)
Groupthink	163	(1)
Pressures for Conformity	164	(4)
The Leader and the Expert	168	(5)
Group Risk Taking	173	(3)
7. Organizational Obstacles	176	(23)
Rivalry, Coordination, and Communication	179	(7)
Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization	186	(10)
Military Men and Surprise Attack	196	(3)
8. Intelligence and Decision Makers	199	(37)
Decision Makers and Intelligence Production	200	(4)
Commitment to a Policy	204	(2)
How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process	206	(5)
Decision Makers and Surprise Attack	211	(2)
Conclusion: Is Surprise Attack Inevitable?	213	(1)
The Complexity of the Problem	213	(2)
Why Safeguards Usually Fail	215	(14)
War without Surprise?	229	(7)
Notes	236	(5)
Bibliography	241	(18)
Index	259