Taking Sides on Takings Issues : The Public and Private Perspectives

by ROBERTS THOMAS E.

• ISBN13: 9781590310144
• ISBN10: 1590310144
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2001-11-01
• Publisher: Natl Book Network

Summary

Takings law centers on the requirement of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that just compensation be paid for property taken for public use, and the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings that excessive regulations of land use can effect takings.

Table of Contents

Foreword	xxi
The Section of State and Local Government's Efforts and Aims
About the Contributors	xxiii
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 Regulatory Takings: Setting Out the Basics and Unveiling the Differences	1	(20)
Thomas E. Roberts
§ 1.0 Introduction	1	(1)
§ 1.1 Regulatory Takings Basics	2	(5)
§ 1.1(a) Physical Takings: The per se Loretto Test	3	(1)
§ 1.1(b) When Excessive Regulations Came to Be Recognized as Takings	4	(1)
§ 1.1(c) Confusion between Substantive Due Process Claims and Takings Claims	5	(2)
§ 1.2 The Penn Central Test	7	(1)
§ 1.3 The "Substantially Advances" Test	7	(3)
§ 1.3(a) Agins	7	(1)
§ 1.3(b) Nollan and Dolan	8	(2)
§ 1.4 The Economic Impact Test: Total and Partial Deprivations	10	(1)
§ 1.4(a) Total Deprivations	10	(1)
§ 1.4(b) Partial Deprivations	11	(1)
§ 1.5 Investment-Backed Expectations	11	(1)
§ 1.6 Defining the Unit of Property: Segmentation	12	(1)
§ 1.7 Temporal Segmentation: Moratoria	13	(1)
§ 1.8 Ripeness and Forum Selection	14	(1)
§ 1.9 Conclusion	15	(6)
II. THE ROLE OF REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS
Chapter 2 The Notice Rule in Investment-Backed Expectations	21	(20)
Daniel R. Mandelkar
§ 2.0 Introduction	21	(1)
§ 2.1 The Origins and Elaboration of the Investment-Backed Expectations Takings Factor in the Supreme Court	22	(6)
§ 2.1(a) Penn Central: Introducing the Idea	22	(2)
§ 2.1(b) Kirby: Foreseeability	24	(1)
§ 2.1(c) Monsanto: The Notice Rule	25	(1)
§ 2.1(d) Nollan: The Death of the Notice Rule?	26	(2)
§ 2.2 The Ascendancy of Investment-Backed Expectations in the Post-Trilogy Years	28	(1)
§ 2.3 Federal and State Court Cases	29	(5)
§ 2.3(a) Good v. United States	30	(2)
§ 2.3(b) Kim v. City of New York	32	(2)
§ 2.4 Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island	34	(7)
§ 2.4(a) The Decision	34	(2)
§ 2.4(b) Implications	36	(5)
Chapter 3 The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on the Role of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations	41
Gregory M. Stein
§ 3.0 Introduction	41	(1)
§ 3.1 Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations before Palazzolo	41	(2)
§ 3.2 The Court Addresses Expectations Again in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island	43	(6)
§ 3.2(a) The Opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court	44	(1)
§ 3.2(b) The Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court	44	(3)
§ 3.2(c) Concurrences and Dissents in the Supreme Court	47	(2)
§ 3.3 The Effect of Palazzolo on Judicial Analysis of Expectations	49	(11)
§ 3.3(a) Direct Condemnations	50	(1)
§ 3.3(b) Inverse Physical Takings	51	(1)
§ 3.3(c) Facial Inverse Regulatory Takings	51	(1)
§ 3.3(d) As-Applied Inverse Regulatory Takings, in General	52	(2)
§ 3.3(e) Ripe As-Applied Inverse Regulatory Takings	54	(2)
§ 3.3(f) As-Applied Inverse Regulatory Takings Claims That Are Unripe under the Compensation Prong	56	(1)
§ 3.3(g) As-Applied Inverse Regulatory Takings Claims That Are Unripe under the Finality Prong	57	(2)
§ 3.3(h) Summary of the Effect of Palazzolo on Judicial Analysis of Expectations	59	(1)
§ 3.4 Issues Palazzolo Leaves Open	60	(4)
§ 3.4(a) The Circularity Problem	60	(2)
§ 3.4(b) How Far Back Do We Go?	62	(1)
§ 3.4(c) Transfers Without Consideration	63	(1)
§ 3.5 Conclusion	64
III. DEFINING THE PROPERTY UNIT: TO SEGMENT OR NOT TO SEGMENT
Chapter 4 The Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule and Its Importance in Defending Against Regulatory Takings Challenges	15	(86)
Timothy J. Dowling
§ 4.0 Introduction	75	(1)
§ 4.1 Defining the Relevant Parcel	75	(1)
§ 4.2 The Supreme Court's Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule	76	(9)
§ 4.2(a) The Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule Defined	76	(3)
§ 4.2(b) Caveats	79	(1)
§ 4.2(c) Lucas Footnote 7	79	(2)
§ 4.2(d) Palazzolo: Lucas Footnote 7 Redux?	81	(1)
§ 4.2(e) So-called "Temporal Severability"	82	(3)
§ 4.3 Lower Court Application of the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule	85	(16)
§ 4.3(a) Contiguity and Common Ownership	85	(1)
§ 4.3(b) The Claimant's Treatment of the Property	86	(3)
§ 4.3(c) Previously Owned, Contiguous Property	89	(2)
§ 4.3(d) Is Noncontiguity Fatal?	91	(1)
§ 4.3(e) Aberrant Rulings	92	(9)
Chapter 5 Of Parcels and Property	101	(24)
John E. Fee
§ 5.0 Introduction	101	(1)
§ 5.1 The Denominator of Regulatory Takings	102	(2)
§ 5.2 The Twin Problems of Conceptual Severance and Conceptual Agglomeration	104	(2)
§ 5.3 The Whole Parcel Rule	106	(6)
§ 5.3(a) Functional Severance	108	(1)
§ 5.3(b) Vertical Severance	109	(1)
§ 5.3(c) Temporal Severance	109	(1)
§ 5.3(d) Horizontal Severance	110	(2)
§ 5.4 The Problem with Focusing on Unity of Ownership	112	(1)
§ 5.5 The Problem with Focusing on Actual or Intended Use	113	(2)
§ 5.6 The Problem with Focusing on Governmental Action	115	(1)
§ 5.7 A Proposed Solution: Economic Viability of the Land	116	(9)
IV. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY AND NUISANCE LAW
Chapter 6 Background Principles: Custom, Public Trust, and Preexisting Statutes as Exceptions to Regulatory Takings	125	(38)
David L. Callies and J. David Breemer
§ 6.0 Introduction: Lucas and Background "Principles"	125	(1)
§ 6.1 Background Principles: An Analysis	126	(1)
§ 6.2 Customary Law	127	(7)
§ 6.2(a) Blackstonian Custom	127	(1)
§ 6.2(b) Early U.S. Decisions	128	(2)
§ 6.2(c) The Rebirth of Custom and Its Rise as a Potential Background Principle	130	(4)
§ 6.3 The Public Trust	134	(5)
§ 6.3(a) The Origins of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine	135	(1)
§ 6.3(b) Recent Expansions of the Trust Doctrine: Selected State Cases	136	(3)
§ 6.4 Statutory Law and Background Principles	139	(2)
§ 6.5 A Critical Look at the Parameters of the Principles	141	(4)
§ 6.5(a) The Limits of Statutory Law	142	(3)
§ 6.5(b) The Limits of Custom and the Public Trust	145	(1)
§ 6.6 Custom Must Be Returned to the Blackstonian Framework	145	(2)
§ 6.7 The Public Trust Should Be Restricted to Its Traditional Scope	147	(2)
§ 6.8 Supreme Court Precedent Precludes Redefinitions of Property from the Background Principles Exception	149	(14)
Chapter 7 Threshold Statutory and Common Law Background Principles of Property and Nuisance Law Define if There Is a Protected Property Interest	163	(26)
Glenn P. Sugameli
§ 7.0 Introduction	163	(1)
§ 7.1 Background Principles of Property and Nuisance Law	164	(1)
§ 7.1(a) Destruction of Property by Necessity	164	(1)
§ 7.1(b) Lucas Immunity from Takings Liability Is Truly Categorical	164	(1)
§ 7.2 The Supreme Court Has Continued the Lucas Court's Deference to State Courts in Defining Background Principles	165	(2)
§ 7.3 Background Principles Include Federal and State Limitations	167	(1)
§ 7.4 Background Principles of Nuisance Law	168	(1)
§ 7.5 Background Principles of Property Law	169	(1)
§ 7.6 Wetland Laws and Background Principles	170	(1)
§ 7.7 Public Trust and Just v. Marinette County	171	(2)
§ 7.8 Background Principles of Nuisance (and Property) Law Evolve	173	(1)
§ 7.9 Statutes as Background Principles	174	(15)
V. PARTIAL DEPRIVATIONS OF VALUE AS TAKINGS
Chapter 8 Palazzolo and Partial Takings	189	(30)
Dwight H. Merriam
§ 8.0 Introduction	189	(1)
§ 8.1 Factual and Procedural History	190	(7)
§ 8.2 Issues Before the Court	197	(1)
§ 8.3 Ripeness Through Futility Exception	198	(2)
§ 8.4 Notice Defense Greatly Weakened	200	(2)
§ 8.5 Categorical Takings Limited	202	(1)
§ 8.6 The Other Opinions	203	(1)
§ 8.7 Probable Effects of the Decision	204	(5)
§ 8.7(a) Effects on Property Owners	204	(2)
§ 8.7(b) Decision Effects on Government	206	(3)
§ 8.7(c) Effects on Mr. Palazzolo	209	(1)
§ 8.8 The Partial Takings Issue	209	(5)
§ 8.9 Conclusions	214	(5)
Chapter 9 Do Partial Regulatory Takings Exist?	219	(32)
John D. Echeverría
§ 9.0 Introduction	219	(1)
§ 9.1 Defining Terms	220	(6)
§ 9.1(a) What Is a Total Taking?	220	(1)
§ 9.1(b) Different Kinds of Partial Restrictions	220	(2)
§ 9.1(c) Part of What?	222	(3)
§ 9.1(d) What Would Be the Remedy for a Partial Taking?	225	(1)
§ 9.2 The Problematic Penn Central Test	226	(4)
§ 9.3 The Incoherence of the Penn Central Test	230	(5)
§ 9.3(a) Character	231	(1)
§ 9.3(b) Economic Impact	232	(1)
§ 9.3(c) Reasonable Investment Expectations	233	(2)
§ 9.4 Seven Brief Arguments Against the Partial Regulatory Takings Theory	235	(10)
§ 9.4(a) Original Understanding	235	(1)
§ 9.4(b) Judicial Deference to Elected Branches	236	(1)
§ 9.4(c) Livings Matter	237	(2)
§ 9.4(d) The Analogy to a Physical Occupation Is Flawed	239	(2)
§ 9.4(e) A Decline in Property Value Is Not a Taking	241	(1)
§ 9.4(f) Partial Takings Liability Would Unreasonably Chill Government Action	242	(2)
§ 9.4(g) The Limitations on the Judicial Role of Counsel Against the Partial Taking Theory	244	(1)
§ 9.5 Conclusion	245	(6)
Chapter 10 Partial Regulatory Takings: A Property Rights Perspective	251	(22)
Edward H. Ziegler
§ 10.0 Fairness, Causation, and Proportionality Limit the Constitutional Scope of Uncompensated Regulation	251	(1)
§ 10.1 The Supreme Court's Recognition that the Takings Clause Limits the Permissible Scope of Uncompensated Regulation	252	(1)
§ 10.2 The Supreme Court's Analysis of Partial Regulatory Taking Claims	253	(6)
§ 10.3 Survey of Possibly Successful Partial Taking Claims	259	(3)
§ 10.3(a) Direct Taking of Property by Imposition of Development Exactions, Fees, or Conditions	259	(1)
§ 10.3(b) Shifting of Burdens to Benefit Favored Persons or Groups	260	(1)
§ 10.3(c) Burden Imposed to Subsidize Distinct Government Function or Enterprise	260	(1)
§ 10.3(d) Burdens Directly Benefiting Neighboring Owners: Reverse Spot Zoning	261	(1)
§ 10.3(e) Substantial Diminution in Value for Social Benefit and Absence of Reciprocal Benefit	261	(1)
§ 10.3(f) Violation of Judicially Formulated Fairness Doctrines Protecting Property Rights in the Regulatory Process	262	(1)
§ 10.4 Toward a Conclusion	262	(11)
VI. MORATORIA AND TEMPORARY TAKINGS
Chapter 11 What's "Normal" About Planning Delay?	273	(28)
Michael M. Berger
§ 11.0 Introduction	273	(1)
§ 11.1 First English and the Concept of Temporary Takings	274	(3)
§ 11.2 A Tale of Two Cases	277	(7)
§ 11.2(a) The Facts of the Tahoe-Sierra Litigation	277	(3)
§ 11.2(b) The Ninth Circuit's Holding-That a "Temporary" Planning Moratorium Can Never Constitutionally Require Compensation-Is Flatly Contrary to First English	280	(3)
§ 11.2(c) Aside from Its Conflicts with Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit's Decision Conflicts with Decisions of Other Lower Courts, Creating Confusion That All but Asked for Certiorari to Be Granted	283	(1)
§ 11.3 With Apologies to Gertrude Stein, a Taking Is a Taking Is a Taking. It Doesn't Matter How or Why or for How Long, They All Require Compensation	284	(5)
§ 11.3(a) All Takings Require Compensation	285	(3)
§ 11.3(b) A Seizure of the Right to Use Property-Even Temporarily-Requires Compensation	288	(1)
§ 11.4 From a Landowner's Point of View, Government Imposition of a Freeze on All Economically Productive Uses, Albeit Temporarily, Is the Equivalent of a Temporary Condemnation of Such Land. In Either Event, the Rightful Owner's Use of the Land Has Been Taken, and Just Compensation Is Due	289	(7)
§ 11.4(a) A "Police Power" Freeze and an "Eminent Domain" Taking Are Functionally-and Constitutionally-the Same 290
§ 11.4(b) "Eminent Domain" and "Police Power" Are Really Two Sides of the Same Coin	291	(2)
§ 11.4(c) Good Intentions Do Not Vitiate the Need for Compensation-In Fact They Reinforce It	293	(3)
§ 11.5 Conclusion	296	(5)
Chapter 12 Moratoria and Categorical Takings	301	(32)
Daniel P. Setmi
§ 12.0 Introduction	307	(1)
§ 12.1 First English, Lucas, and the "Play on Words"	308	(3)
§ 12.2 Moratoria and the Lucas Rationale	311	(5)
§ 12.2(a) Adjusting the Benefits and Burdens of Regulation	311	(1)
§ 12.2(b) Functional Effect on Government	312	(1)
§ 12.2(c) Risk of Impressing Property into Public Service	313	(2)
§ 12.2(d) Equivalency to a Physical Appropriation	315	(1)
§ 12.3 Treatment of Delay in Using Land	316	(3)
§ 12.3(a) Delay in the Permit Process	316	(1)
§ 12.3(b) Delay Under the Ripeness Doctrine	317	(1)
§ 12.3(c) Delay Caused by Pre-condemnation Activity	317	(2)
§ 12.4 Interference With Governmental Discretion	319	(2)
§ 12.4(a) Impact on Legislative Discretion	319	(1)
§ 12.4(b) Impact on Land-Use Planning	320	(1)
§ 12.5 Effects on Takings Theory	321	(3)
§ 12.5(a) Conceptual Segmentation of Property Rights	321	(1)
§ 12.5(b) Value Versus Use	322	(2)
§ 12.6 Need for a Corrective Rule	324	(1)
§ 12.6(a) Policing Regulatory Abuse	324	(1)
§ 12.6(b) Abnormal Delay	324	(1)
§ 12.7 Conclusion: First Principles	325	(8)
VII. APPLYING NOLLAN AND DOLAN TO IMPACT FEES
Chapter 13 Applying Nollan/Dolan to Impact Fees: A Case for the Ehrlich Approach	333	(12)
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. and Cecily T. Talbert
§ 13.0 Introduction	333	(1)
§ 13.1 The Nollan/Dolan Nexus Test	334	(3)
§ 13.2 Applying the Nollan/Dolan Test to Impact Fees: Ehrlich v. City of Culver City	337	(3)
§ 13.2(a) Factual Situation	338	(1)
§ 13.2(b) Judicial Proceedings	338	(1)
§ 13.2(c) A New Distinction: Legislatively Formulated v. Ad Hoc Development Fees	339	(1)
§ 13.3 National Treatment of the Ehrlich Approach	340	(1)
§ 13.4 Conclusion	341	(4)
Chapter 14 Dolan Works	345	(6)
Fred P. Bosselman
§ 14.0 Introduction	345	(1)
§ 14.1 All Forms of Development Exaction Should Be Treated Equally	345	(3)
§ 14.1(a) Land Deserves No Preference	347	(1)
§ 14.1(b) The Legislative-Adjudicative Distinction Is Irrelevant	348	(1)
§ 14.2 Fees Based on the Dolan Test Often Benefit Both Parties	348	(1)
§ 14.3 Exactions Tailored to Specific Projects Often Benefit Both Parties	349	(2)
§ 14.4 The Dolan Test Has Been a Success	351	(2)
§ 14.5 Conclusion	353
Chapter 15 Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis	351
Julian C. Juergensmeyer and James C. Nicholas
§ 15.0 Introduction	357	(1)
§ 15.1 Regulatory Takings Analysis and Impact Fees	358	(2)
§ 15.2 Impact Fees and Required Dedications	360	(1)
§ 15.3 Impact Fees and the Dual Rational Nexus Test	361	(3)
§ 15.3(a) Defining and Applying the Dual Rational Nexus Test	361	(1)
§ 15.3(b) Distinctions between Principles	362	(2)
§ 15.4 Impact Fees and the Power of Taxation	364	(2)
§ 15.4(a) Distinguishing Impact Fees from Taxes	364	(1)
§ 15.4(b) Confusion between Fees and Taxes	365	(1)
§ 15.5 Conclusion	366
VIII. AGINS "SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING STATE INTEREST" TEST: TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
Chapter 16 The "Substantially Advance" Quandary: How Closely Should Courts Examine the Regulatory Means and Ends of Legislative Applications?	311	(80)
Douglas W. Kmiec
§ 16.0 Introduction	371	(1)
§ 16.1 Substantive Due Process and the "Substantially Advance" Taking Inquiry	372	(2)
§ 16.2 Dolan's Misstep	374	(1)
§ 16.3 Is Dolan's Misstep Compounded in Del Monte?	375	(1)
§ 16.4 Heightened Review Is Appropriate for Specific Applications of General Policy	376	(1)
§ 16.5 "Quasi-Adjudicative Rezoning"	377	(2)
§ 16.6 Historic Landmark and District Designations	379	(1)
§ 16.7 The Application of Ultra Vires Legislation--The "Normal Delay" Ruse	380	(2)
§ 16.8 Legislative Enactments Imposing Public Burdens on Specific Private Uses	382	(1)
§ 16.9 what Next for Heightened Scrutiny?	383	(3)
§ 16.10 A Concluding Word	386	(5)
Chapter 17 Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy and Operation of the Agins Tests	391	(30)
Edward J. Sullivan
§ 17.0 Introduction	391	(2)
§ 17.1 The Origins of Agins	393	(5)
§ 17.1(a) Takings and the Fifth Amendment	393	(2)
§ 17.1(b) Rewriting the Constitution-Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon	395	(1)
§ 17.1(c) Substantive Due Process	396	(1)
§ 17.1(d) The Resurrection of Pennsylvania Coal The Case of Penn Central	397	(1)
§ 17.2 The Supreme Court Decision in Agiras	398	(9)
§ 17.2(a) The Alternative Tests of Agiras	403	(1)
§ 17.2(b) Academic Criticism of Agiras	404	(2)
§ 17.2(c) Is a Natural Law Basis for Constitutional Law Effective?	406	(1)
§ 17.3 The Place of Agiras in Subsequent Takings Cases	407	(5)
§ 17.3(a) First Fruits: Nollan and Dolan	407	(2)
§ 17.3(b) The Use of Agiras in Lucas	409	(3)
§ 17.4 Constitutional Interpretation and Doctrinal Consistency	412	(4)
§ 17.5 The Circle Closes: Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel	416	(3)
§ 17.6 Conclusion	419	(2)
IX. USE V. VALUE UNDER LUCAS
Chapter 18 Defining the Lucas Box: Palazzolo, Tahoe, and the Use/Value Debate	421	(30)
Douglas T. Kendall
§ 18.0 Introduction	427	(2)
§ 18.1 Overview of Lucas	429	(5)
§ 18.1(a) Use and Value under Lucas	430	(1)
§ 18.1(b) The Text of Lucas	431	(2)
§ 18.1(c) Palazzolo and Other Post-Lucas Use/Value Cases	433	(1)
§ 18.2 Use/Value and the Role of Per Se Rules	434	(1)
§ 18.3 Practical Problems with a Use-Only Standard	435	(1)
§ 18.4 Problems with a Value-Only Standard	436	(1)
§ 18.5 Use and Value in Awarding Just Compensation	437	(4)
§ 18.5(a) Overview of Just Compensation Cases	438	(1)
§ 18.5(b) Permissible Uses	439	(1)
§ 18.5(c) Excluded Uses	439	(2)
§ 18.6 Just Compensation Caselaw Meets Lake Tahoe	441	(3)
§ 18.6(a) Suitum v. TRPA	441	(2)
§ 18.6(b) TSPC v. TRPA	443	(1)
§ 18.7 Conclusion	444	(7)
Chapter 19 Can Property Value Avert a Regulatory Taking When Economically Beneficial Use Has Been Destroyed?	451
James Burling
§ 19.0 Introduction	451	(3)
§ 19.1 Rights in Property in the Common Law and Western Traditions	454	(4)
§ 19.2 Preservation of Property and the Origins of the Constitution	458	(1)
§ 19.3 Modern Jurisprudence and the Respected Place of Property in the Law	459	(7)
§ 19.3(a) The Existence or Absence of Residual Value	463	(1)
§ 19.3(b) The Court's Articulation of Takings Principles if Marginal Value Remains	463	(1)
§ 19.3(c) The Law's Adherence to Traditional Principles in Property Rights	464	(2)
§ 19.4 The Role of Value in Pursuing a Regulatory Takings Claim	466
X. RIPENESS AND FORUM SELECTION
Chapter 20 Should Land Use Be Different? Reflections on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v. Hamilton Bank	411	(74)
Peter A. Buchsbaum
§ 20.0 Introduction	471	(1)
§ 20.1 Treating Land-Use Cases Differently	472	(2)
§ 20.1(a) Justifications for Different Treatment	472	(1)
§ 20.1(b) Evaluating the Justifications	473	(1)
§ 20.1(c) The Real Reason for Different Treatment	474	(1)
§ 20.2 Williamson County's Exhaustion Barrier	474	(3)
§ 20.2(a) The Impact of Palazzolo as to the First Williamson Prong	475	(1)
§ 20.2(b) Let the Cases Be Heard on the Merits	476	(1)
§ 20.3 Williamson County's Forum Barrier-the Second Prong	477	(4)
§ 20.4 Conclusion	481	(4)
Chapter 21 The Finality Requirement in Takings Litigation after Palazzolo	485	(22)
Vicki Been
§ 21.0 Introduction	485	(1)
§ 21.1 The Finality Requirement	486	(4)
§ 21.1(a) The Genesis of the Requirement	486	(1)
§ 21.1(b) Williamson County	487	(1)
§ 21.1(c) The Requirement That Applications Be "Meaningful"	488	(1)
§ 21.1(d) The Reach of the Finality Requirement	489	(1)
§ 21.2 Palazzolo	490	(7)
§ 21.2(a) The Narrowness of Palazzolo's Holding	494	(2)
§ 21.2(b) Finality and the Relevant Parcel Debate	496	(1)
§ 21.2(c) Using State Law to Protect Permitting Processes	496	(1)
§ 21.3 Legitimacy of the Finality Requirement	497	(10)
XI. ALTERNATIVES TO TAKINGS: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION; STATE LAW
Chapter 22 Protecting Property from Unjust Deprivations beyond Takings: Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, and State Legislation	507	(44)
Steven J. Eagle
§ 22.0 Introduction	507	(2)
§ 22.1 A Historical Analysis of American Property Rights Jurisprudence	509	(6)
§ 22.1(a) Why and How the Framers Sought to Protect Private Property	509	(1)
§ 22.1(b) The Supreme Court's Property Jurisprudence before the New Deal	510	(2)
§ 22.1(c) The Classic Property Deprivation/Takings Cases	512	(2)
§ 22.1(d) The New Deal Revolution	514	(1)
§ 22.1(e) A Revisionist History Transmutes Substantive Due Process into Takings	514	(1)
§ 22.2 The Takings Clause and Its Limitations	515	(1)
§ 22.3 Embedded Due Process in the Court's Recent Takings Cases	516	(3)
§ 22.3(a) The Agins Substantial Advancement Test	516	(1)
§ 22.3(b) Deprivation of wealth as a Taking-Eastern Enterprises	517	(2)
§ 22.4 "Character of the Governmental Action"-An Expanding Test	519	(5)
§ 22.4(a) "Character" as Physical vs. Regulatory Taking	519	(1)
§ 22.4(b) "Character" as Comprehensive Balancing	520	(1)
§ 22.4(c) "Character" as Targeted Retroactivity	521	(1)
§ 22.4(d) "Character" as Good Faith	522	(2)
§ 22.5 The Possible Retreat from Legislative Redefinition of Property	524	(3)
§ 22.5(a) Rights and Adjudications under Common Law and Statutes	524	(1)
§ 22.5(b) Rejection of the "Positive Notice Rule" in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island	524	(1)
§ 22.5(c) The Court's Possible Retreat from Circularity	525	(2)
§ 22.6 Preventing or Compensating Property Deprivations beyond "Takings"	527	(4)
§ 22.6(a) The Commandeering of Private Property of No Monetary Value 527
§ 22.6(b) Deprivation of Property with No "Public Use"	529	(2)
§ 22.7 Due Process Requires Meaningful Scrutiny	531	(1)
§ 22.8 Equal Protection	532	(3)
§ 22.9 State Property Rights Protective Legislation	535	(16)
§ 22.9(a) Texas	536	(1)
§ 22.9(b) Florida	536	(2)
§ 22.9(c) Oregon	538	(13)
Chapter 23 Alternatives to Takings: Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, and State Law Doctrine	551	(16)
Susan L. Trevarthen
§ 23.0 Introduction	551	(1)
§ 23.1 Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights Claims	552	(5)
§ 23.1(a) Estoppel vs. Taking as a Remedy	553	(1)
§ 23.1(b) Good-Faith Reliance and the Pre-acquisition Notice Rule	553	(1)
§ 23.1(c) Detriment and Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations	554	(2)
§ 23.1(d) Takings of Vested Rights?	556	(1)
§ 23.2 Claims for Compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983	557	(1)
§ 23.3 Procedural Due Process	557	(1)
§ 23.4 Equal Protection	558	(3)
§ 23.4(a) Rational Basis Review of Economic Regulation	558	(1)
§ 23.4(b) "Ill will" or "Class of One" Equal Protection Claims	559	(2)
§ 23.5 First Amendment	561	(1)
§ 23.6 Conclusion	562
XII. REPORTS AND COMMENTS
Appendix	567	(1)
Introduction	567	(1)
Report of Retreat on Takings Jurisprudence	568	(13)
Response to the Report of the Retreat on Takings Jurisprudence	581	(14)
Index	595