The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resultingpotential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived.

David Papineau is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London. His books include Theory and Meaning (Clarendon Press 1979), Reality and Representation (Blackwell 1987), Philosophical Naturalism (Blackwell 1993), and The Philosophy of Science (Oxford Readings in Philosophy 1996).

Introduction

1

(1)

Mystery---What Mystery?

1

(1)

The Intuition of Distinctness

2

(1)

A Need for Therapy

3

(1)

Ontological Monism, Conceptual Dualism

4

(2)

Understanding the Intuition of Distinctness

6

(2)

The Details of Materialism

8

(1)

The Plan of the Book

9

(4)

The Case for Materialism

13

(34)

Introduction

13

(4)

The Causal Argument

17

(1)

The Ontology of Causes

18

(3)

Epiphenomenalism and Pre-established Harmony

21

(5)

Accepting Overdetermination

26

(2)

Functionalism and Epiphobia

28

(4)

A Possible Cure for Epiphobia

32

(4)

Intuition and Supervenience

36

(2)

An Argument from A Priori Causal Roles

38

(2)

What is `Physics'?

40

(4)

The Completeness of Physics

44

(3)

Conceptual Dualism

47

(26)

Introduction

47

(3)

Jackson's Knowledge Argument

50

(1)

Denying Any Difference

51

(5)

Imaginative Re-creation

56

(1)

Introspective Classification

57

(2)

The Ability Hypothesis

59

(4)

Indexicality and Phenomenal Concepts

63

(4)

The Contingency of Learning from Experience

67

(2)

Imagination and Introspection

69

(2)

Further Issues

71

(2)

The Impossibility of Zombies

73

(23)

Introduction

75

(2)

Epistemology versus Metaphysics

77

(1)

The Appearance of Contingency

77

(2)

Explaining the Appearance of Contingency

79

(2)

Referring via Contingent Properties

81

(4)

A Different Explanation

85

(3)

Thinking Impossible Things

88

(3)

Conceivability and Possibility

91

(2)

The Intuition of Distinctness

93

(3)

Phenomenal Concepts

96

(45)

Introduction

96

(1)

Psychological, Phenomenal, and Everyday Concepts

97

(6)

Phenomenal Properties Provide their own `Modes of Presentation'

103

(3)

World-Directed Perceptual Re-creation and Classification

106

(2)

Perceptual Concepts

108

(2)

How Do Perceptual Concepts Refer?

110

(4)

The Phenomenal Co-option of Perceptual Concepts

114

(2)

A Quotational Model

116

(6)

Indexicality and the Quotational Model

122

(3)

The Causal Basis of Phenomenal Reference

125

(2)

Phenomenal Concepts and Privacy

127

(6)

First-Person Incorrigibility

133

(6)

Third-Person Uses of Phenomenal Concepts

139

(2)

The Explanatory Gap

141

(20)

Introduction

141

(2)

Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and Intuitions of Gaps

143

(4)

Reduction, Roles, and Explanation

147

(3)

Materialism Require the Physical Truths to Imply all of the Truths?

150

(5)

An Epistemological Gap

155

(5)

Conclusion

160

(1)

The Intuition of Distinctness

161

(14)

Introduction

161

(1)

Is an Explanation Already to Hand?

162

(2)

Does Conceptual Dualism Explain the Intuition of Distinctness?

164

(3)

Nagel's Footnote

167

(2)

The Antipathetic Fallacy

169

(2)

Do Phenomenal Concepts Resemble their Objects?

171

(4)

Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness

175

(57)

Introduction

175

(1)

The Limitations of Consciousness Research

176

(3)

Phenomenal and Psychological Research

179

(2)

Subjects' First-Person Reports

181

(3)

Consciousness-as-Such

184

(3)

Methodological Impotence

187

(4)

Further Alternatives

191

(5)

Vague Phenomenal Concepts

196

(3)

Vagueness Defended

199

(3)

Theories of Consciousness-as-Such

202

(2)

Actualist Hot Theories

204

(4)

Attention

208

(2)

The Dispositional HOT theory

210

(5)

Methodological Meltdown

215

(6)

Representational Theories of Consciousness

221

(4)

Vagueness and Consciousness-as-Such

225

(3)

Conclusion

228

(4)

Appendix: The History of The Completeness of Physics

232

(25)

A.1 Introduction

232

(2)

A.2 Descartes and Leibniz

234

(3)

A.3 Newtonian Physics

237

(6)

A.4 The Conservation of Energy

243

(6)

A.5 Conservative Animism

249

(4)

A.6 The Death of Emergentism

253

(2)

A.7 Conclusion

255

(2)

References

257

(6)

Index

263

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