Truth

by Blackburn, Simon; Simmons, Keith

• ISBN13: 9780198752509
• ISBN10: 0198752504
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 1999-10-07
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.

Author Biography

Simon Blackburn is Edna S. Koury Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His publications include Spreading the Word (OUP, 1984), The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (OUP, 1994), and Ruling Passions (OUP, 1998).
Keith Simmons is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is author of Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument (CUP, 1993).

Table of Contents

Introduction	1	(28)
Simon Blackburn
Keith Simmons
PART I: BACKGROUND `ROBUST' THEORIES	29	(54)
On Truth and Copying	31	(15)
F. H. Bradley
The Nature of Truth	46	(7)
H. H. Joachim
Pragmatism's Conception of Truth	53	(16)
William James
William James's Conception of Truth	69	(14)
Bertrand Russell
PART II: EARLY MINIMALIST THEORIES	83	(64)
The Thought: A Logical Inquiry	85	(21)
Gottlob Frege
On Facts and Propositions	106	(2)
F. P. Ramsey
Philosophical Extracts	108	(7)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics	115	(29)
Alfred Tarski
Philosophy of Logic	144	(3)
W. V. Quine
PART III: THE EARLY MODERN DEBATE	147	(54)
Truth	149	(13)
J. L. Austin
Truth	162	(21)
P. F. Strawson
Unfair to Facts	183	(18)
J. L. Austin
PART IV: MODERN MINIMALISM AND DOUBTS ABOUT IT	201	(192)
Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed	203	(36)
Crispin Wright
The Minimalist Conception of Truth	239	(25)
Paul Horwich
Of What Kind of Thing is Truth a Property?	264	(18)
Michael Dummett
A Critique of Deflationism	282	(26)
Anil Gupta
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth	308	(15)
Donald Davidson
Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth	323	(28)
Richard Rorty
Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content	351	(42)
Hartry Field
Notes on the Contributors	393	(4)
Select Bibliography	397	(8)
Index	405