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9780521390156

Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780521390156

  • ISBN10:

    052139015X

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 1990-09-28
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Summary

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.

Table of Contents

Foreword Robert Auman
Acknowledgment
Introduction
One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model
Stable matchings
The structure of the set of stable matchings
Strategic questions
Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers
The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns
Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences
Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable
A simple model of one seller and many buyers
The assignment game
The generalization of the assignment model
Epilogue
Open questions and research directions
Bibliography
Indexes
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

Supplemental Materials

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The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

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