The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

by Jonathan L. Kvanvig

• ISBN13: 9780521827133
• ISBN10: 0521827132
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2003-09-22
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, the book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology.

Table of Contents

Introduction	ix
1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It	1	(27)
The Pragmatic Theory	2	(10)
Plato and the Tethering of True Belief	12	(9)
Knowledge and Action	21	(7)
2 The Value of True Belief	28	(16)
The Value of Belief	29	(9)
The Value of Truth	38	(4)
Conclusion	42	(2)
3 The Value of Justification	44	(32)
Externalise Accounts	44	(8)
Justificationist Accounts	52	(8)
Two Kinds of Means to a Goal	60	(16)
4 Reliabilism, Normativity, and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology	76	(32)
Zagzebski's Virtue Theory	79	(2)
Virtue Epistemology and Credit for True Belief	81	(18)
A Further Benefit of Virtue Epistemology?	99	(7)
Conclusion	106	(2)
5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge	108	(32)
The Gettier Problem 109 Gettier-like Cases	110	(3)
The Appeal to Accidentality and a General Concern	113	(4)
Approaches to the Genier Problem	117	(8)
Counterfactual and Defeasibility Approaches to the Genier Problem	125	(14)
Conclusion	139	(1)
6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable	140	(17)
Curiosity and the Intrinsic Value of Knowledge	143	(7)
The Desire to Know	150	(5)
Conclusion	155	(2)
7 Epistemic Attitudinalism: Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches	157	(28)
Semantic and Pragmatic Versions of Epistemic Attitudinalism	158	(12)
Epistemic Attitudinalism and the Value of Knowledge	170	(3)
The Failure of Epistemic Attitudinalism	173	(11)
Conclusion	184	(1)
8 Knowledge and Understanding	185	(19)
Understanding, Knowledge, and Logical Form	188	(8)
Understanding Is Not a Species of Knowledge	196	(4)
The Value of Understanding	200	(2)
Conclusion	202	(2)
9 Conclusion	204	(3)
References	207	(6)
Index	213