Victory Has a Thousand Fathers Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency

by Paul, Christopher; Clarke, Colin P.; Grill, Beth

• ISBN13: 9780833049612
• ISBN10: 0833049615
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2010-09-16
• Publisher: RAND Corporation

Summary

Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations. A companion volume, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, presents in-depth profiles of each of the insurgencies. Book jacket.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. iii
Figures	p. ix
Tables	p. xi
Summary	p. xiii
Acknowledgments	p. xxvii
Abbreviations	p. xxix
Introduction	p. 1
Purpose of This Study	p. 1
Data and Analyses	p. 3
About This Monograph and the Accompanying Case Studies	p. 3
The Cases	p. 5
Case Selection and Data Collection	p. 5
Phased Data	p. 7
Assessing Case Outcomes	p. 8
Nicaragua (Somoza), 1978-1979	p. 10
Afghanistan (Anti-Soviet), 1978-1992	p. 11
Kampuchea, 1978-1992	p. 12
El Salvador, 1979-1992	p. 13
Somalia, 1980-1991	p. 13
Peru, 1980-1992	p. 14
Nicaragua (Contras), 1981-1990	p. 15
Senegal, 1982-2002	p. 15
Turkey (PKK), 1984-1999	p. 16
Sudan (SPLA), 1984-2004	p. 17
Uganda (ADF), 1986-2000	p. 17
Papua New Guinea, 1988-1998	p. 17
Liberia, 1989-1997	p. 18
Rwanda, 1990-1994	p. 19
Moldova, 1990-1992	p. 19
Sierra Leone, 1991-2002	p. 20
Algeria (GIA), 1992-2004	p. 21
Croatia, 1992-1995	p. 22
Afghanistan (Post-Soviet), 1992-1996	p. 23
Tajikistan, 1992-1997	p. 23
Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992-1994	p. 24
Nagorno-Karabakh, 1992-1994	p. 24
Bosnia, 1992-1995	p. 25
Burundi, 1993-2003	p. 26
Chechnya I, 1994-1996	p. 26
Afghanistan (Taliban), 1996-2001	p. 27
Zaire (Anti-Mobutu), 1996-1997	p. 27
Kosovo, 1996-1999	p. 28
Nepal, 1997-2006	p. 28
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998-2003	p. 29
Case Narrative Results	p. 29
Testing the Approaches to Counterinsurgency	p. 31
Representing the Approaches in the Data	p. 33
Analysis of the Relationships Between Case Factors and Case Outcomes	p. 33
Factor Stacks	p. 34
Tests of Each Approach	p. 35
Classic COIN Approaches	p. 36
Contemporary Approaches to COIN	p. 55
Insurgent Approaches	p. 75
Summary of the Tests of the Approaches	p. 79
Broader Findings	p. 83
Scorecard: Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices	p. 84
Every Insurgency May Be Unique, but Not at This Level of Analysis	p. 88
Which Successful Approach Is Most Essential? Qualitative Comparative Analysis	p. 89
Phase Outcomes	p. 91
Conclusions and Recommendations	p. 93
Key Findings	p. 93
Effective COIN Practices Tend to Run in Packs	p. 94
The Balance of Good Versus Bad Practices Perfectly Predicts Outcomes	p. 94
Poor Beginnings Do Not Necessarily Lead to Poor Ends	p. 96
Repression Wins Phases, but Usually Not Cases	p. 97
Tangible Support Trumps Popular Support	p. 98
Appendixes
Methods and Data	p. 101
Details of Qualitative Comparative Analysis	p. 123
Possible Criticisms of the Analyses and Response Commentary	p. 133
References	p. 147
Supplemental Material: Matrix of Factors Representing 20 Approaches to COIN and Scorecard of Good Versus Bad COIN Practices and Factors	p. 153
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