Preface | p. iii |
Figures | p. xi |
Tables | p. xiii |
Summary | p. xv |
Acknowledgments | p. xxxiii |
Abbreviations | p. xxxvii |
Introduction | p. 1 |
The Purpose of This Report | p. 2 |
Why Three Alternatives? | p. 2 |
The Effects of the Drawdown | p. 3 |
Methodology | p. 3 |
About This Report | p. 5 |
Drawdown Scheduling | p. 7 |
Ending the Combat Mission in Iraq | p. 8 |
Iraqi Security Forces | p. 9 |
U.S. Military Forces in Iraq | p. 10 |
Sequencing the Withdrawal of U.S. Combat and Support Forces | p. 11 |
Implementation and the Rotation Schedule | p. 12 |
The Security Agreement Referendum | p. 12 |
Three Alternatives | p. 13 |
Rationale | p. 14 |
Defining the Alternatives | p. 15 |
Combat Units Depart by April 30, 2010 | p. 16 |
Planning | p. 16 |
ISF Support | p. 16 |
Security | p. 17 |
Leaving Iraq | p. 18 |
Unforeseen Contingencies | p. 18 |
Mitigation Measures | p. 18 |
Mission of U.S. Forces Changes After August 2010 | p. 19 |
Planning | p. 20 |
ISF Support | p. 20 |
Security | p. 21 |
Leaving Iraq | p. 21 |
Unforeseen Contingencies | p. 22 |
Implications of This Alternative | p. 22 |
Maintain Combat and Noncombat Units Through December 2011 | p. 22 |
Planning | p. 23 |
ISF Support | p. 23 |
Security | p. 24 |
Leaving Iraq | p. 24 |
Unforeseen Contingencies | p. 24 |
Implications of This Alternative | p. 25 |
Conclusion | p. 25 |
Shortfalls in the Iraqi Armed Forces' Capability Beyond 2011 | p. 26 |
Logistics Factors and Constraints Affecting the Drawdown | p. 29 |
Drawdown Processes | p. 30 |
Planning the Redeployment of a Unit | p. 31 |
Moving U.S. Military Personnel Out of the Region | p. 31 |
Moving Military Vehicles from the Region | p. 32 |
Base Closure | p. 36 |
Methodology | p. 37 |
Assessment of U.S. Military Personnel Movement Capacity | p. 38 |
Assessment of Convoy Capacity for Military Vehicles and Unit Equipment | p. 38 |
Assessment of Staging and Washrack Capacity | p. 40 |
Assessment of Customs and Agricultural Inspection Capacity | p. 40 |
Assessment of Sterile Lot Capacity and Disposition Instructions | p. 41 |
Assessment of Port and Shipping Capacity | p. 41 |
Assessment of Base Closure or Transfer Time | p. 42 |
Overall "Baseline" Findings | p. 42 |
Mitigating Logistics Risks or Improving Drawdown Capabilities | p. 43 |
Affecting Capacity | p. 44 |
Reducing Demand on Convoys and on Base Closure or Transfer Time | p. 46 |
Shifting Demand to Alternative Redeployment Modes-Convoy Substitutes | p. 47 |
Conclusion | p. 49 |
Internal Security and Stability | p. 51 |
The Role of the MNF-I in Promoting Internal Security | p. 54 |
Dangers | p. 54 |
Extremists | p. 56 |
Mainstream Armed Opposition Groups | p. 57 |
Politicized Iraqi Security Forces | p. 63 |
The Impact of a Weakened Economy | p. 66 |
Summary of Dangers | p. 66 |
Security Needs That Will Remain Unmet After Full U.S. Military Withdrawal | p. 67 |
Direct Threats to U.S. Personnel | p. 71 |
Extremists | p. 71 |
Main Opposition Groups | p. 73 |
A Summary of Potential Threats to U.S. Forces and Personnel | p. 74 |
An Assessment of Drawdown Options in Light of Dangers to Iraq's Security and U.S. Personnel | p. 75 |
Regional Effects | p. 79 |
Iran | p. 81 |
Overt Iranian Military Intervention | p. 82 |
Covert Iranian Actions and Links to Regional Proxies | p. 82 |
The Counterweights of Arab Nationalism and Iraqi Shi'ism | p. 83 |
Iraqis Avoid Provoking Iran | p. 83 |
Iranian Levers of Influence in Iraq | p. 84 |
Saudi Arabia | p. 86 |
Risks to Saudi Arabia from the New Iraq | p. 87 |
Saudi Levers of Influence | p. 89 |
Syria | p. 90 |
Syrian Interests in Iraq | p. 91 |
Instruments of Syrian Influence in Iraq | p. 91 |
The Degree of Syrian Intervention in Iraq | p. 92 |
Turkey | p. 93 |
Israel | p. 95 |
Effects of the Drawdown on Iraq's Relations with Regional Powers | p. 96 |
Serious Challenges Remain | p. 96 |
Military Intervention by Iraq's Neighbors | p. 96 |
The Importance of the Political Process | p. 97 |
The View from Iraq's Neighbors | p. 97 |
The Possibility of Heightened U.S.-Iranian Tensions | p. 97 |
Risk Mitigation | p. 99 |
The Iraqi Security Forces | p. 99 |
Risk | p. 100 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 101 |
Creeping Authoritarianism | p. 102 |
Risk | p. 102 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 103 |
The Arab-Kurdish Conflict | p. 103 |
Risk | p. 104 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 104 |
Turkish Incursion into Northern Iraq | p. 106 |
Risk | p. 106 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 106 |
Iranian Subversion of the Iraqi Government | p. 106 |
Risk | p. 106 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 107 |
A Return to Violence by the Sons of Iraq | p. 107 |
Risk | p. 107 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 108 |
Detainees | p. 108 |
Risk | p. 108 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 109 |
Vulnerable Groups, Internally Displaced Persons, and Refugees | p. 109 |
Risk | p. 110 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 111 |
The Referendum on the Security Agreement | p. 113 |
Risk | p. 114 |
Mitigating Measures | p. 114 |
Conclusion | p. 117 |
Major Findings | p. 117 |
Drawdown Timelines | p. 117 |
Arab-Kurdish Armed Conflict | p. 117 |
Iran | p. 118 |
The Iraqi Security Forces | p. 118 |
Reconciliation and Development | p. 118 |
Recommendations | p. 119 |
Arab-Kurdish Conflict | p. 119 |
Iranian Subversion | p. 119 |
A Return to Violence by the Sons of Iraq | p. 120 |
Iraqi Security Forces | p. 120 |
Appendixes | |
The Study's Legislative Background | p. 121 |
Drawdown of Remaining Forces | p. 123 |
Economic and Advisory Issues Involved in a Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq | p. 135 |
Bibliography | p. 153 |
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