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9781858989150

Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility : Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy

by
  • ISBN13:

    9781858989150

  • ISBN10:

    1858989159

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 1999-03-01
  • Publisher: Edward Elgar Pub
  • Purchase Benefits
List Price: $119.00

Author Biography

Francesco Lippi is an Economist in the Research Department at the Bank of Italy, Italy.

Table of Contents

Figures and Tables
vi
Preface vii
Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview
1(22)
PART ONE: EXTENSIONS OF THE CREDIBILITY MODEL
Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control
23(18)
Wilko Letterie
Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments
41(22)
Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias
63(10)
Otto H. Swank
Policy Delegation and Elections
73(14)
Otto H. Swank
PART TWO: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND TARGETS
On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
87(18)
Central Bank Independence and Conservatism
105(16)
PART THREE: SOME EVIDENCE
Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence
121(28)
Otto H. Swank
References 149(8)
Index 157

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