Conventional wisdom in international relations maintains that democracies are only peaceful when encountering other democracies. Using a variety of social scientific methods of investigation ranging from statistical studies and laboratory experiments to case studies and computer simulations, Rousseau challenges this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that democracies are less likely to initiate violence at early stages of a dispute. Using multiple methods allows Rousseau to demonstrate that institutional constraints, rather than peaceful norms of conflict resolution, are responsible for inhibiting the quick resort to violence in democratic polities. Rousseau finds that conflicts evolve through successive stages and that the constraining power of participatory institutions can vary across these stages. Finally, he demonstrates how constraint within states encourages the rise of clusters of democratic states that resemble "zones of peace" within the anarchic international structure.

David L. Rousseau is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

List of Tables and Figures

xiii

Acknowledgments

xvii

1. Introduction: Domestic Institutions, Political Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict

1

(17)

Central Questions

4

(7)

Methodology

11

(2)

Overview of the Book

13

(1)

Significance of the Project

14

(1)

Notes

15

(3)

2. The Impact of Institutions and Norms in International Crises

18

(82)

Structural Explanations of the Democratic Peace

20

(7)

Normative Explanations of the Democratic Peace

27

(2)

Testing the Arguments

29

(19)

The Dependent Variables

34

(4)

Specific Hypotheses and Operationalizations

38

(5)

Analysis and Results

43

(5)

Case Studies

48

(31)

The Suez Crisis: Why Don't Monadic Norms and Institutions Constrain?

49

(17)

Motives for British Intervention

51

(2)

Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the British

53

(3)

International Considerations for Britain

56

(1)

Motives for French Intervention

57

(1)

Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the French

58

(1)

International Considerations for France

59

(1)

Motives for Israeli Intervention

60

(1)

Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the Israelis

61

(1)

International Considerations for Israel

62

(1)

Conclusions from the Suez Crisis

63

(3)

The Ecuador-Peru Dispute: Conflict in a Democratic Dyad

66

(50)

Background

67

(1)

Recent Crises

68

(11)

Conclusions from the Ecuador-Peru Case Study

79

(1)

Conclusions

79

(1)

Appendix 2.1: Dropping the Aggressive Leader Assumption

80

(3)

Appendix 2.2: Crisis Data Set: 337 Conflict Dyads in 301 International Crises

83

(6)

Appendix 2.3: Crises from the ICB Data Set That Have Been Deleted or Merged

89

(2)

Appendix 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis

91

(1)

Notes

92

(8)

3. International Disputes and the Evolution of Conflict

100

(39)

The Dispute Data Set

103

(2)

Hypotheses and Analysis

105

(11)

Case Studies

116

(13)

Israel and Egypt in the 1967 Six Days' War

117

(4)

Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus and the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus

121

(8)

Conclusions

129

(1)

Appendix 3.1: Dispute Data Set-223 International Conflicts

130

(3)

Appendix 3.2: Sensitivity Analysis Displaying Results with the Inclusion of Additional Control Variables

133

(1)

Notes

133

(6)

4. Institutional Constraint Versus Regime Type

139

(62)

The Institutional Constraint Model

140

(17)

Recent Research

145

(3)

Variables and Specific Hypotheses

148

(3)

Analyses and Results

151

(6)

Case Studies

157

(34)

India Versus Pakistan in the 1971 Bangladesh Independence War

158

(8)

Motives for Indian Intervention

158

(2)

Domestic Factors

160

(2)

International Considerations

162

(1)

Decisions to Intervene

163

(3)

El Salvador Versus Honduras in the 1969 Football War

166

(8)

Institutional Structures in El Salvador

167

(3)

Motives for Salvadoran Intervention

170

(2)

Domestic Factors

172

(1)

International Considerations

173

(1)

The War and Its Consequences

173

(1)

The United Kingdom Versus the Soviet Union During the Russian Civil War

174

(8)

Motives for British Intervention

175

(4)

Domestic Factors

179

(3)

Constraint and Two Monarchies: Saudi Arabia and Jordan

182

(37)

Saudi Arabia

183

(4)

Jordan

187

(4)

Conclusions

191

(2)

Appendix 4.1: Nested Versus Nonnested Models of the Democratic Peace

193

(1)

Notes

194

(7)

5. Political Norms Versus Institutional Structures

201

(67)

A Typology of Norms

206

(2)

Test 1: New Political Norms Variables for the Statistical Model

208

(6)

Test 2: Testing Political Norms with a Logit Model

214

(5)

Test 3: A Laboratory Experiment

219

(13)

Hypotheses

222

(3)

Research Design

225

(2)

Experimental Findings

227

(5)

Case Studies

232

(9)

Middle East Campaign, 1941 (United Kingdom Versus Iraq), and Occupation of Iran, 1941 (United Kingdom Versus Iran)

233

(1)

Motives for British Intervention in Iraq

233

(2)

The Crisis

235

(2)

Motives for British Intervention in Iran

237

(2)

Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force

239

(2)

Bay of Pigs, 1961 (United States Versus Cuba)

241

(9)

Motives for U.S. Intervention

242

(1)

Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force

243

(4)

Consequences of Intervention

247

(3)

Invasion of Grenada, 1983 (United States Versus Grenada)

250

(6)

Motives for U.S. Intervention

250

(3)

Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force

253

(3)

Conclusions

256

(1)

Appendix 5.1: Scenario Wording by Dimension

257

(2)

Appendix 5.2: Experimental Survey Instrument

259

(1)

Notes

260

(8)

6. Democratization and International Conflict

268

(38)

Mansfield and Snyder's Theoretical Argument

268

(4)

Critics of Mansfield and Snyder's Original Analysis

270

(1)

Mansfield and Snyder's Response

271

(1)

Regime Change, Norms, and Structures

272

(2)

Conceptualizing Regime Change

274

(7)

The Data Set, Hypotheses, and Variables

274

(7)

Case Studies

281

(19)

Somalia Versus Ethiopia

281

(11)

The Teschen Crisis, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Poland), and the Hungarian War, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Hungary)

292

(8)

Conclusions

300

(1)

Notes

301

(5)

7. The Evolution of Conflicts, Institutions, and Norms: An Agent-Based Simulation

306

(33)

Strengths and Weaknesses of Agent-Based Computer Simulations

307

(2)

Cederman's Agent-Based Model

309

(17)

Adding Domestic Politics to the Simulation

314

(1)

Expanding Phases of Conflict

314

(1)

Incorporating a Trait Structure

315

(4)

Traits

315

(3)

Mutation

318

(1)

Learning

318

(1)

Incorporating Domestic Political Opposition

319

(2)

Simulation Results

321

(5)

Conclusions

326

(2)

Appendix 7.1: DomGeoSim Parameter Dictionary and Comparison of Parameters with GeoSim

328

(9)

Notes

337

(2)

8. Conclusions

339

(2)

Synthesizing Across Cases: The Breakdown of Structural and Normative Constraints

341

(6)

Future Research

347

(2)

Notes

349

(2)

Bibliography

351

(24)

Index

375

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Democracy And War

9780804750813

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