What is included with this book?
Preface | p. xi |
Acknowledgments | p. xii |
Introduction | p. 1 |
The problem: A transformation in sovereignty | p. 1 |
Aims and rationale | p. 5 |
Book synopsis | p. 8 |
Private Military Companies: The New Face of War | p. 11 |
Introduction | p. 11 |
Post-Cold War: The entrenchment of the contemporary PMC | p. 13 |
Classification of PMCs | p. 15 |
PMC centralization in national military operations | p. 26 |
PMCs and mercenaries: Tailored from the same cloth? | p. 28 |
Conclusion | p. 31 |
The Corporate Form and the Private Military Corporation | p. 33 |
Introduction | p. 33 |
The corporate form as the distinctive difference between individual mercenaries and private armies | p. 35 |
The corporation: History, theory, and the PMC | p. 37 |
Concession theory of the corporation | p. 39 |
Contractual theory of the corporation | p. 40 |
Implications of corporate theory for the PMC | p. 41 |
Corporation laws and the PMC | p. 43 |
Directors' duties and rights | p. 43 |
Shareholders' duties and rights | p. 44 |
Separate entity doctrine and the corporate veil | p. 45 |
Liability issues for deaths specific to the PMC | p. 47 |
The PMC and the contract to kill | p. 51 |
Corporate regulation | p. 52 |
The politics of corporate law regulation and the PMC | p. 55 |
Corporate governance and the PMC | p. 57 |
Should there be distinctive remedies available against corporate bodies engaged in PMC activities? | p. 61 |
Regulatory recommendations | p. 63 |
Conclusion | p. 65 |
The State, Control of Violence, and the Private Military Corporation | p. 66 |
Introduction | p. 66 |
The nation-state | p. 66 |
The nation-state and the monopoly of violence | p. 68 |
Nation-state and de facto control of armed groups and armaments | p. 69 |
Nation-state and de jure control of armed groups, weapons industries, and violence | p. 71 |
Privatization: A historical and policy perspective | p. 73 |
Privatization of defense services: Historical trajectories and market drivers | p. 74 |
Control and accountability of privatized defense forces | p. 76 |
Control of the corporation as creature of the state | p. 80 |
De jure control of the PMC-Law of contract | p. 81 |
De facto control of the PMC-Materiel and services | p. 84 |
Legal myths about control of the state's use of the monopoly of violence | p. 85 |
Understanding the Rule of Law | p. 86 |
Legal challenges to government action | p. 86 |
Judicial review, justiciability, and political questions | p. 87 |
Rule of Law and constitutional limitations on the use of violence: Militaries and PMCs | p. 87 |
Conclusion concerning the Rule of Law and restraint on government's resort to violence | p. 90 |
The PMC challenge to monopoly of violence-based sovereignty | p. 90 |
Domestic PMCs and internatioal influence-Lobby and geopolitical outcomes | p. 93 |
PMC as foreign policy tool: Five case studies | p. 96 |
Iraq: Supplementing unilateral action | p. 98 |
Sudan: Avoiding public scrutiny | p. 100 |
East Timor: Honoring international commitments | p. 102 |
Equatorial Guinea: Advancing domestic values on the international stage | p. 104 |
The Balkans: Achieving conflicting objectives by sleight of hand | p. 105 |
Regulatory recommendations | p. 107 |
Conclusion | p. 108 |
National Regulation of Private Military Companies | p. 110 |
Introduction | p. 110 |
Regulation and regulatory design | p. 110 |
Is self-regulation of the PMC industry feasible? | p. 112 |
The International Peace Operations Association | p. 114 |
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights | p. 116 |
Can self-regulation work? | p. 118 |
The case in favor of regulation | p. 119 |
Papua New Guinea: The Sandline Affair | p. 121 |
Iraq: CACI and Titan | p. 123 |
Can state regulation be effective | p. 124 |
New Zealand: National regulation consistent with International Treaty | p. 127 |
United States: Registration and licensing | p. 130 |
Proposals to create a Civilian Reserve Corps | p. 131 |
South Africa: Prohibition, registration and executive authorization | p. 132 |
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 1998 | p. 133 |
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Bill | p. 134 |
United Kingdom: "Light footprint" regulation, if any | p. 137 |
Regulatory recommendations | p. 138 |
Conclusion | p. 140 |
Private Military Firms under International Law | p. 143 |
Introduction | p. 143 |
PMCs and the mercenary regime: Peeling a legal onion | p. 144 |
General Assembly resolutions | p. 144 |
Problems with General Assembly resolutions | p. 147 |
Specialized mercenary conventions | p. 147 |
Regional instruments | p. 147 |
International instruments | p. 149 |
The Law of Armed Conflict | p. 152 |
Hague Conventions | p. 152 |
Additional Protocol I | p. 153 |
State responsibility: Snaring governmental and PMC duplicity | p. 157 |
State and nonstate actors | p. 158 |
Private persons acting under direction/control of state-"quasi-state actors" | p. 160 |
PMCs and command responsibility: A new avenue for an established doctrine | p. 162 |
Embedding command responsibility in international law | p. 163 |
A new calculus: Should command responsibility embrace civilians? | p. 165 |
Abu Ghraib: State and command responsibility: Belling the corporate "devil" | p. 166 |
Corporate actors in the chain of command | p. 167 |
Regulatory recommendations | p. 170 |
Conclusion | p. 171 |
Conclusion: Taming the Wild Dogs | p. 173 |
Notes | p. 177 |
Bibliography | p. 222 |
Index | p. 240 |
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